选举政治中的自由派—劳工联盟

更新于 2026年10月13日 版权声明
选举政治中的自由派—劳工联盟

自1972年起,自由派—劳工联盟对总统这一层级几乎没有什么独立的影响力。出于对共和党的反工会和反自由派姿态的担心,它极力给中间派或温和保守派立场的民主党总统提名人拉选票。不过,即使竞选献金有重要作用以及企业—保守派联盟在国会层面活动,自由派—劳工联盟还是能够在众参两院的席位上选出一些它的同情者或支持者。一项为本书所做的研究表明,大约30%的参议员和35%的众议员是自由主义者——在这里,自由主义的指标依据的是自由派的“美国人民支持民主行动”(Americans for Democratic Action)组织,该研究考察了4年里议员们的表现,以75%的同意率为界。[58]尽管这样一个自由派的团体还不够大到凭一己之力获胜,但它能够对权力精英产生潜在的威胁。

并且,在某些情况下,那些受权力精英支持并对他们有好感的政治家在投票时也有可能与自由派和劳工立场一致,也就是当大多数当选官员在某个特定议题上不同意权力精英时。这样的同盟的确发生过,尽管它们通常不包括与企业共同体有关的议题。例如,在1984年,一个自由派主导的军费控制联盟挫败了里根政府关于建造100枚额外的MX导弹的提案。这一联盟包括了军方的成员,比如前国防部长、中央情报局局长以及曾经在防核打击中担任领导角色的军队退休将领。这些军界领袖在使立法者认识到MX导弹并非必要这一点上发挥了关键作用。在1982年,自由派的院外集团也发起了一场旨在延长《投票权法案》适用期的斗争,但是却没有出现对立的院外集团,共和党的中间派也同意,在有证据表明南方各州持续出现歧视的情况下,立法复核是有必要的。[59]

自由派—劳工联盟在1987年否决罗伯特·博克(Robert J.Bork)担任最高法院大法官的提名时也很成功。美国劳联—产联、民权组织和妇女团体形成了一个庞大有力的同盟,它们指责博克是一个极端的意识形态主义者,这从他的很多演讲、文章和判决意见书中可以看出来。例如,他曾经宣称法院没有权利去裁决公民权和堕胎问题。极端保守主义团体无法对抗此次自由派—劳工联盟的压力,博克的提名最终以58票对42票被参议院否决。企业共同体在这件事情上保持了沉默,这与它以前在关于法官任免方面的做法一样。不仅如此,甚至有一些中间立场的公民团体也反对博克。中间派的商业和职业女性俱乐部联盟就没有反对这一否决。更重要的是,博克也被一些国内最著名的保守派法学教授与温和派法学教授所反对。简单地说,如果没有这些中间派议员、共和党的温和派和保守派法学教授支持的话,自由派—劳工联盟是不可能在参议院中获胜的。[60]

自由派—劳工联盟还在企业共同体的很多部门反对的情况下获得过一些胜利。这些胜利表明,正如我们在第二章和第四章结尾时所强调过的那样,政府运作过程中有太多的不确定性和反复性,权力精英也不是没有任何漏洞的。因此,权力精英需要直接影响政府以强化他们的结构性经济权力和扩大他们可以用作后备政策选择的数量。对于自由派—劳工在一些涉及企业共同体利益的议题上取得的少数胜利,我们将在下一章中给出解释,这些解释第一眼看上去似乎与这里以及前一章所说的相矛盾。

[1]John Higley et al.,“Elite Integration in Stable Democracies:A Reconsideration,”European Sociological Review 7,no.1(1991):35—53;Michael G.Burton and John Higley,“Elite Settlements,”American Sociological Review 52,no.3(1987):295—307.

[2]正如2000年大选所戏剧性地展示出来的那样,总统是由选举人团(Electoral College)选举出来的,在选举人团里,每一个州都有若干数目的选举人,其人数与其在国会中相同。对一个小州来说,它能拥有的选举人的最小数是三,亦即两位参议员和一位众议员。选举人把票投给在他们州获胜的候选人。这种以选举人票为核心的做法,迫使候选人将精力放在获得尽可能多的州的简单多数上,而不是仅仅在全国范围内总体上赢得最多的选票。这种体制为第三党创造了更加不利的环境。

[3]Seymour M.Lipset and Gary W.Marks,It Didn't Happen Here:Why Socialism Failed in the United States(New York:W.W.Norton & Co.,2000);Steven J.Rosenstone,Roy L.Behr,and Edward H.Lazarus,Third Parties in America:Citizen Response to Major Party Failure,2nd rev,and expanded ed.(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1996).

[4]罗斯·佩罗(H.Ross.Perot)作为他的改革党的候选人,在1992年和1996年分别赢得19%和接近9%的选票,但这一事实与本章的分析并不矛盾,因为他的党处在两大主要政党之间的位置上。作为一个中间温和党派,它更像是在同时吸引两大党的选民,因此对两党的威胁不相上下:关于1992年大选的严肃研究,以及1992和1996年的投票后民调显示,两大党确实均有选票被佩罗拉走。佩罗所获选票之所以不同寻常的另一个原因是,在1992年,他自掏腰包,花掉了7200万美元来拉票。

[5]G.W.Domhoff,Changing the Powers That Be:How the Left Can Stop Losing and Win(Lanham,Md.:Rowman & Littlefield,2003),chapter 2;John J.Miller,“A Third Party on the Right?”New York Times,16 November 2002,A27.

[6]Richard Hofstadter,The Idea of a Party System:The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States,1780—1840(Berkeley:University of California Press,1969).

[7]Seymour M.Lipset and Gary W.Marks,Ir Didn't Happen Here:Why Socialism Failed in the United States(New York:W.W.Norton & Co.,2000).

[8]1792年,托马斯·杰弗逊和詹姆斯·麦迪逊等人联手正式创立民主—共和党(Democratic-Republican party),反对由亚历山大·汉密尔顿领导的联邦党。联邦党在1812年战争结束时垮台。1825年,民主—共和党发生分裂,安德鲁·杰克逊一派成为民主党,另一派组成国民共和党,1834年改称辉格党,1854年7月,辉格党与北部民主党和其他反对奴隶制的派别联合组建成为今日的共和党。

[9]就本书的目的而言,南方指的是如下14个州:亚拉巴马州、阿肯色州、佛罗里达州、乔治亚州、路易斯安那州、肯塔基州、密西西比州、北卡罗来纳州、俄克拉何马州、南卡罗来纳州、田纳西州、得克萨斯州、弗吉尼亚州和西弗吉尼亚州。虽然对“南方”并没有标准的定义,但是密苏里州也许最好也应该被吸纳进来,因为当时它也是蓄奴州。我在这里所列的14个州也为许多社会科学家所采用。

[10]G.William Domhoff,The Power Elite and the State:How Policy Is Made in America(Hawthorne,N.Y.:Aldine de Gruyter,1990),chapter 9.

[11]Kenneth Baer,Reinventing Democrats(Lawrence:University of Kansas Press,2000);Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks,Social Cleavages and Political Change:Voter Alignments and U.S.Party Coalitions(New York:Oxford University Press,1999);William Mayer,The Divided Democrats(Boulder,Colo.:Westview Press,1996).

[12]C.Vann Woodward,Reunion and Reaction:The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction(Boston:Little,Brown,1966).

[13]Lee J.Alston and Joseph P.Ferrie,Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare State(New York:Cambridge University Press,1999);Michael Webber,New Deal Fat Cats:Business,Labor,and Campaign Finance in the 1936 Presidential Election(New York:Fordham University Press,2000).

[14]David Brady and Charles Bullock,“Is There a Conservative Coalition in the House?”Journal of Politics 42(1980):549—559;James T.Patterson,Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal:The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress,1933—1939(Westport,Conn.:Greenwood Press,1981);David M.Potter,The South and the Concurrent Majority(Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press,1972).

[15]Michael K.Brown,Race,Money and the American Welfare State(Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1999);Alan Brinkley,The End of Reform:New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War,lst ed.(New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1995);Aage R.Clausen,How Congressmen Decide:A Policy Focus(New York:St.Martin's Press,1973).

[16]Mack C.Shelley,The Permanent Majority:The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress(Tuscaloosa:University of Alabama Press,1983).

[17]Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro,Politicians Don't Pander(Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2000),see chapter 1 for an excellent analysis.

[18]Allen F.Lovejoy,La Follette and the Establishment of the Direct Primary in Wisconsin,1890—1904(New Haven:Yale University Press,1941),V.0.Key,Southern Politics in State and Nation(New York:Random House,1949).

[19]Robert L.Morlan,Political Prairie Fire:The Nonpartisan League,1915—1922(St.Paul:Minnesota Historical Society Press,1985),p.1.

[20]Greg Mitchell,The Campaign of the Century:Upton Sinclair's Race for Governor of California and the Birth of Media Politics(New York:Random House,1992).

[21]Charles L.Fontenay,Estes Kefauver:A Biography(Knoxville:University of Tennessee Press,1980).

[22]George Rising,Clean for Gene:Eugene McCarthy's 1968 Presidential Campaign(Westport,Conn.:Praeger,1997).

[23]Lucius Barker and Ronald W.Walters,eds,Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign Challenge and Change in American Politics(Urbana University of Illinois Press,1989);Teresa Celsi,Jesse Jackson and Political Power(Brookfield,Conn.:M i llbrook Press,1992).

[24]Jerome L.Himmelstein,To the Right:The Transformation of American Conservatism(Berkeley:University of California Press,1990).

[25]James Weinstein,The Decline of Socialism in America,1912—1925(New York:Monthly Review Press,1967).

[26]Samuel Hays,“The Politics of Reform in the Progressive Era,”Pacific Northwest Review 55(1964):157—169;Martin J.Schiesl,The Politics of Efciency:Municipal Administration and Reform in America,1800—1920(Berkeley:University of California Press,1977);James Weinstein,“Organized Business and the Commission and Manager Movements,”Journal of Southern History 28(1962):166—182.

[27]G.William Domhoff,Who Really Rules?New Haven and Community Power Reexamined(New Brunswick,N.J.:Transaction Books,1978),chapter 5;Alasdair Roberts,“Demonstrating Neutrality:The Rockefeller Philanthropies and the Evolution of Public Administration,1927—1936,”Public Administration Review(May—June 1994):221—228.

[28]James Weinstein,The Decline of Socialism in America,1912—1925(New York:Monthly Review Press,1967);James Weinstein,“Organized Business and the Commission and Manager Movements,”Journal of Southern History 28(1962):166—182.

[29]Tari Renner and Victor DeSantis,“Contemporary Patterns and Trends in Municipal Government Structures,”in The Municipal Yearbook 1993(Washington,D.C.:International City Managers Association,1994);Raymond E.Wolfinger,The Politics of Progress(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1973).

[30]G.William Domhoff,Who Rules America Now?(New York:Simon & Schuster,1983),chapter 6;John R.Logan and Harvey Molotch,Urban Fortunes:The Political Economy of Place(Berkeley:University of California Press,1987).

[31]Richard Gendron,“The Fault Lines of Power:Post-Earthquake Development in a Progressive City,”Ph.D.Dissertation,University of California,Santa Cruz,1998;John Logan,Rachel Whaley,and Kyle Crowder,“The Character and Consequences of Growth Regimes,”Urban Affairs Review 32(1997):603—630.

[32]Warren Miller and J.Merrill Shanks,The New American Voter(Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1996).

[33]Congress Watch,“Final Analysis:A Few People Dominate the Giving”(www.whitehouseforsale.org,2004).(https://www.daowen.com)

[34]“2004联合胜利阵营”是美国最大的527组织,它由另外两家527组织“美国人集结号”和“媒体基金会”共同发起成立,后两家组织分享前者募集到的资金。

[35]James V.Grimaldi and Thomas B.Edsell,“The Big Spenders of Election 2004,”Washington Post Weekly,25—31 October 2004,6—8

[36]Center for Public Integrity,“527s in 2004 Shatter Previous Records for Political Fundraising”(www.publicintegrity.org,2004).

[37]Alan Neustadtl,Denise Scott,and Dan Clawson,“Class Struggle in Campaign Finance?Political Action Committee Contributions in the 1984 Elections,”oSociological oForum 6(1991):219—238.

[38]Dan Clawson,Alan Neustadtl,and Denise Scott,Money Talks:Corporate PACs and Political Influence(New York:Basic Books,1992);Dan Clawson,Alan Neustadtl,and Mark Weller,Dollars and Votes:How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy(Philadelphia:Temple University Press,1998).

[39]Val Burris,“The Political Partisanship of American Business:A Study of Corporate Political Action Committees,”American Sociological Review 52,no.6(1987):732—744;Val Burris and James Salt,“The Politics of Capitalist Class Segments:A Test of Corporate Liberalism Theory,”Social Problems 37,no.3(1990):341—359.

[40]Center for Responsive Politics(opensecrets.org,2004).

[41]Stephen Isaacs,Jews and American Politics(New York:Doubleday,1974);Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab,“The American Jews,the 1984 Elections,and Beyond.”Tocqueville Review 6(1984):401—419.

[42]Dan Clawson,Alan Neustadtl,and Mark Weller,Dollars and Votes:How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy(Philadelphia:Temple University Press,1998).

[43]meetup.com是美国一家社交网站,民主党总统预选候选人霍华德·迪恩曾利用该网站进行动员和募款活动。

[44]Nicholas Horrock,“Reagan Resists Financial Disclosure,”New York Times,13 August 1976,A10.

[45]Paul Hoffman,Lions in the Street(New York:Saturday Review Press,1973),p.106.

[46]Phil Kuntz,“Perfectly Legal,”Wall Street Journal,10 October 1996,Al(W),A1(E).

[47]Douglas Frantz,“Influential Group Brought into Campaign by Kemp,”New York Times,1 September 1996,15(N),32(L).

[48]Karen Foerstel,“Grass Greener after Congress,”National Journal,11 March 2000,pp.515—519.

[49]Marc Lacey,“First Asian-American Picked for Cabinet,“New York Times,30 June 2000,A15.

[50]Richard L.Zweigenhaft,“Who Represents America?”Insurgent Sociologist 5,no.3(1975):119—130;Donald R.Matthews,The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers(New York:Random House,1967);Suzanne Keller,Beyond the Ruling Class:Strategic Elites in Modern Society(New York:Random House,1963).

[51]Edward Pessen,The Log Cabin Myth:The Social Backgrounds of the Presidents(New Haven:Yale University Press,1984),p.81.

[52]Heinz Eulau and John D.Sprague,Lawyers in Politics:A Study in Professional Convergence(Westport,Conn.:Greenwood Press,1984);Mark C.Miller,The High Priests of American Politics:The Role of Lawyers in American Political Institutions(Knoxville:University of Tennessee Press,1995).

[53]Morgens Pederson,“Lawyers in Politics:The Danish Folketing and United States Legislatures,”Comparative Legislative Behavior,ed.Samuel Patterson and John Wahlke(New York:Wiley & Sons,1972),pp.25—63.

[54]Gregory L.Giroux,“A Touch of Gray on Capitol Hill,”CQ Weekly,31 January 2005,240—242.

[55]Joseph A.Schlesinger,Ambition and Politics:Political Careers in the United States(Chicago:Rand McNally,1966),p.5.

[56]Warren Miller and J.Merrill Shanks,The New American Voter(Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1996).

[57]“Will the Rise of‘Blue Dogs’Revive Partisan Right?”Congressional Quarterly,21 December 1996,3436—3438.

[58]Americans for Democratic Action简称ADA,是一家创立于1947年的自由派政治组织。该组织最著名的地方在于它对议员的排名。它追踪每一位议员在重要议题上的投票记录并评分,0%意味着完全不同意ADA的政策立场,100%则意味着完全同意。分数越高越倾向自由主义,越低则越倾向保守主义。

[59]Michael Pertschuk,Giant Killers(New York:Norton,1986).

[60]Michael Pertschuk and Wendy Lesko,The People Rising:The Campaign against the Bork Nomination(St.Paul,Minn.:Thunder's Mouth Press,1989).

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