Daly v.General Motors Corporation
Supreme Court of California,1978
20 Cal.3d 725,575 P.2d 1162,44 Cal.Rptr.380
RICHARDSON,J.The most important of several problems which we consider is whether the principles of comparative negligence expressed by us in Li v.Yellow Cab Co.,(1975) apply to actions founded on strict products liability ….The Facts and the Trial
Although there were no eyewitnesses,the parties agree,generally,on the reconstruction of the accident in question.In the early hours of October 31,1970,decedent Kirk Daly,a 36-year-old attorney,was driving his Opel southbound on the Harbor Freeway in Los Angeles.The vehicle,while traveling at a speed of 50～70 miles per hour,collided with and damaged 50 feet of metal divider fence.After the initial impact between the left side of the vehicle and the fence the Opel spun counterclockwise,the driver’s door was thrown open,and Daly was forcibly ejected from the car and sustained fatal head injuries.It was equally undisputed that had the deceased remained in the Opel his injuries,in all probability,would have been relatively minor.
Plaintiffs,who are decedent’s widow and three surviving minor children,sued General Motors Corporation,Boulevard Buick,Underwriter’s Auto Leasing,and Alco Leasing Company,the successive links in the Opel’s manufacturing and distribution chain.The sole theory of plaintiffs’ complaint was strict liability for damages allegedly caused by a defective product,namely,an improperly designed door latch claimed to have been activated by the impact.It was further asserted that,but for the faulty latch,decedent would have been restrained in the vehicle and although perhaps injured,would not have been killed.Thus,the case involves a so-called “second collision” in which the “defect” did not contribute to the orig-i nal impact,but only to the “enhancement” of injury.
At trial the jury heard conflicting expert versions as to the functioning of the latch mechanism during the accident.Plaintiffs’ principal witness testified that the Opel’s door was caused to open when the latch button on the exterior handle of the driver’s door was forcibly depressed by some protruding portion of the divider fence.It was his opinion that the exposed push button on the door constituted a design “defect” which caused injuries greatly in excess of those which Daly would otherwise have sustained.Plaintiffs also introduced evidence that other vehicular door latch designs used in production models of the same and prior years afforded substantially greater protection.Defendants’ experts countered with their opinions that the force of the impact was sufficiently strong that it would have caused the door to open resulting in Daly’s death even if the Opel had been equipped with door latches of the alternative designs suggested by plaintiffs.
Over plaintiffs’ objections,defendants were permitted to introduce evidence indicating that: (1) the Opel was equipped with a seat belt-shoulder harness system,and a door lock,either of which if used,it was contended,would have prevented Daly’s ejection from the vehicle;(2) Daly used neither the harness system nor the lock;(3) the 1970 Opel owner’s manual contained warnings that seat belts should be worn and doors locked when the car was in motion for “accident security;” and (4) Daly was intoxicated at the time of collision,which evidence the jury was advised was admitted for the limited purpose of determining whether decedent had used the vehicle’s safety equipment.After relatively brief deliberations the jury returned a verdict favoring all defendants,and plaintiffs appeal from the ensuing adverse judgment.Strict Products Liability and Comparative Fault
Those counseling against the recognition of comparative fault principles in strict products liability cases vigorously stress,perhaps equally,not only the conceptual,but also the semantic difficulties incident to such a course.The task of merging the two concepts is said to be impossible,that “apples and oranges” cannot be compared,that “oil and water” do not mix,and that strict liability,which is not founded on negligence or fault,is inhospitable to comparative principles.The syllogism runs,contributory negligence was only a defense to negligence,comparative negligence only affects contributory negligence,therefore comparative negligence cannot be a defense to strict liability.While fully recognizing the theoretical and semantic distinctions between the twin principles of strict products liability and traditional negligence,we think they can be blended or accommodated.
The inherent difficulty in the “apples and oranges” argument is its insistence on fixed and precise definitional treatment of legal concepts.In the evolving areas of both products liability and tort defenses,however,there has developed much conceptual overlapping and interweaving in order to attain substantial justice.The concept of strict liability itself,as we have noted,arose from dissatisfaction with the wooden formalisms of traditional tort and contract principles in order to protect the consumer of manufactured goods.Similarly,increasing social awareness of its harsh “all or nothing” consequences led us in Li to moderate the impact of traditional contributory negligence in order to accomplish a fairer and more balanced result….
Furthermore,the “apples and oranges” argument may be conceptually suspect.It has been suggested that the term “contributory negligence,” one of the vital building blocks upon which much of the argument is based,may indeed itself be a misnomer since it lacks the first element of the classical negligence formula,namely,a duty of care owing to another.A highly respected torts authority,Dean William Prosser,has noted this fact by observing,“It is perhaps unfortunate that contributory negligence is called negligence at all.‘Contributory fault’ would be a more descriptive term.Negligence as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.Contributory negligence is conduct which involves an undue risk of harm to the actor himself.Negligence requires a duty,an obligation of conduct to another person.Contributory negligence involves no duty,unless we are to be so ingenious as to say that the plaintiff is under an obligation to protect the defendant against liability for the consequences of his own negligence.” (Prosser,LAW OF TORTS,[4th ed.] § 65,p.418.)
We pause at this point to observe that where,as here,a consumer or user sues the manufacturer or designer alone,technically,neither fault nor conduct is really compared functionally.The conduct of one party in combination with the product of another,or perhaps the placing of a defective article in the stream of projected and anticipated use,may produce the ultimate injury.In such a case,as in the situation before us,we think the term “equitable apportionment or allocation of loss”may be more descriptive than “comparative fault.”
Given all of the foregoing,we are,in the wake of Li disinclined to resolve the important issue before us by the simple expedient of matching linguistic labels which have evolved either for convenience or by custom.Rather,we consider it more useful to examine the foundational reasons underlying the creation of strict products liability in California to ascertain whether the purposes of the doctrine would be defeated or diluted by adoption of comparative principles.We imposed strict liability against the manufacturer and in favor of the user or consumer in order to relieve injured consumers “from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence … and warranty … remedies ….” As we have noted,we sought to place the burden of loss on manufacturers rather than “… injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves....”
The foregoing goals,we think,will not be frustrated by the adoption of comparative principles.Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production,design,or dissemination of the article in question.Defendant’s liability for injuries caused by a defective product remains strict.The principle of protecting the defenseless is likewise preserved,for plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury.The cost of compensating the victim of a defective product,albeit proportionately reduced,remains on defendant manufacturer,and will,through him,be “spread among society.” However,we do not permit plaintiff’s own conduct relative to the product to escape unexamined,and as to that share of plaintiff’s damages which flows from his own fault we discern no reason of policy why it should,following Li,be borne by others.Such a result would directly contravene the principle announced in Li,that loss should be assessed equitably in proportion to fault.
A second objection to the application of comparative principles in strict products liability cases is that a manufacturer’s incentive to produce safe products will thereby be reduced or removed.While we fully recognize this concern we think,for several reasons,that the problem is more shadow than substance.First,of course,the manufacturer cannot avoid its continuing liability for a defective product even when the plaintiff’s own conduct has contributed to his injury.The manufacturer’s liability,and therefore its incentive to avoid and correct product defects,remains;its exposure will be lessened only to the extent that the trier finds that the victim’s conduct contributed to his injury.Second,as a practical matter a manufacturer,in a particular case,cannot assume that the user of a defective product upon whom an injury is visited will be blameworthy.Doubtless,many users are free of fault,and a defect is at least as likely as not to be exposed by an entirely innocent plaintiff who will obtain full recovery.In such cases the manufacturer’s incentive toward safety both in design and production is wholly unaffected.Finally,we must observe that under the present law,which recognizes assumption of risk as a complete defense to products liability,the curious and cynical message is that it profits the manufacturer to make his product so defective that in the event of injury he can argue that the user had to be aware of its patent defects.To that extent the incentives are inverted.We conclude,accordingly,that no substantial or significant impairment of the safety incentives of defendants will occur by the adoption of comparative principles.
In passing,we note one important and felicitous result if we apply comparative principles to strict products liability.This arises from the fact that under present law when plaintiff sues in negligence his own contributory negligence,however denominated,may diminish but cannot wholly defeat his recovery.When he sues in strict products liability,however,his “assumption of risk” completely bars his recovery.Under Li,as we have noted,“assumption of risk” is merged into comparative principles.The consequence is that after Li in a negligence action,plaintiff’s conduct which amounts to “negligent assumption of risk” no longer defeats plaintiff’s recovery.Identical conduct,however,in a strict liability case acts as a complete bar under rules heretofore applicable.Thus,strict products liability,which was developed to free injured consumers from the constraints imposed by traditional negligence and warranty theories,places a consumer plaintiff in a worse position than would be the case were his claim founded on simple negligence.This,in turn,rewards adroit pleading and selection of theories.The application of comparative principles to strict liability obviates this bizarre anomaly by treating alike the defenses to both negligence and strict products liability actions.In each instance the defense,if established,will reduce but not bar plaintiff’s claim.
A third objection to the merger of strict liability and comparative fault focuses on the claim that,as a practical matter,triers of fact,particularly jurors,cannot assess,measure,or compare plaintiff’s negligence with defendant’s strict liability.We are unpersuaded by the argument and are convinced that jurors are able to undertake a fair apportionment of liability.
We note that the majority of our sister states which have addressed the problem,either by statute or judicial decree,have extended comparative principles to strict products liability.
Having examined the principal objections and finding them not insurmountable,and persuaded by logic,justice,and fundamental fairness,we conclude that a system of comparative fault should be and it is hereby extended to actions founded on strict products liability.In such cases the separate defense of “assumption of risk,” to the extent that it is a form of contributory negligence,is abolished.While,as we have suggested,on the particular facts before us,the term “equitable apportionment of loss” is more accurately descriptive of the process,nonetheless,the term “comparative fault” has gained such wide acceptance by courts and in the literature that we adopt its use herein.The Safety Equipment and Intoxication Evidence
We must determine whether admission of evidence of decedent’s failure to use available safety devices and of his intoxication constituted prejudicial error under rules heretofore applicable to strict liability cases.We conclude that it did.(https://www.daowen.com)
While initially evidence bearing on decedent’s intoxication was excluded,other evidence pertaining to the decedent’s alleged failure to employ seat belts and door locks was admitted,apparently on the ground that nonuse of safety devices bore on the issues of proximate cause and mitigation of damages.Plaintiffs contended that evidence of Daly’s intoxication,or of his failure to use available safety devices,was wholly inadmissible since contributory negligence was not a defense to an action founded in strict liability for a defective product.The trial court ultimately admitted the intoxication evidence,ruling that such evidence related to decedent’s failure to use the Opel’s safety devices,which failure,the court reasoned,would bar recovery on the theory of product misuse “aside from any question of contributory negligence.” …
Substantial time was spent on the nonuse and intoxication issues,reasonably suggesting to the jury their central importance to the defense case.There can be little doubt that the evidence of Daly’s intoxication was inflammatory.The only restrictions placed on the jury’s consideration of the intoxication evidence was that it bore on the “nonuse” of safety devices in general.No limitation was placed on the conclusions which the jury could draw either from a finding of “nonuse”itself,or as to the effect on it deliberations of a finding of “nonuse.” In the absence of any such restrictions,we think the jury could well have concluded that decedent’s negligent failure,induced by intoxication,to use the belts and locks constituted negligent conduct which completely barred recovery for his death.We do not think it reasonable to conclude that plaintiffs waived their objection by failing to request limiting instructions.
In summary,our review of the record convinces us that,notwithstanding that plaintiffs’ case was founded on strict products liability,evidence of decedent’s failure to use available seat belts and door locks,and of his intoxication at the time of the fatal collision,may have been improperly regarded by the jury as authorizing,a defense verdict.It appears reasonably probable that,had such evidence been either excluded or its effect confined,a result more favorable to plaintiffs would have been reached.Reversal is therefore required.
TOBRINER,J.,CLARK,J.,and MANUEL,J.,concurred.
CLARK,J.The reasoning of Li v.Yellow Cab Co.,as the majority point out,is equally applicable to strict liability cases and compels applying comparative fault in those cases.Under the compulsion of Li,I have signed the majority opinion.
Nevertheless,again we must recognize the difficulties inherent in comparing fault.Relying on the apples and oranges argument,JUSTICES MOSK and JEFFERSON point out that comparative fault cannot be applied logically and consistently in strict liability cases.The difficulty,however,is not limited to comparing strict liability with negligence.The same difficulty persists in almost every case in which we attempt to compare parties’ negligence.
Li effectively pointed out that the existing contributory negligence system placed on one party the entire burden of a loss for which two were responsible and today’s majority opinion effectively points out that the negligent plaintiff is responsible and should not recover as much as an innocent one.
Those principles do not require a comparative fault system.Can they not be satisfied by a system which establishes a uniform index factor,such as 30,50 or 70 percent? A uniform discount of the negligent plaintiff’s recovery would eliminate the necessity of the often impossible task of comparing fault.A discount system would bring about consistency and predictability where neither now exists,permitting evaluation and settlement of claims.
JEFFERSON,J.I concur in part and dissent in part.
I agree with the majority’s result that the judgment should be reversed because of the prejudicial error in admitting evidence of decedent’s intoxication and of his failure to use available safety devices.Otherwise,I part company with the majority’s views.
I consider the majority conclusion a case of wishful thinking and an application of an impractical,ivory-tower approach.The majority’s assumption that a jury is capable of making a fair apportionment between a plaintiff’s negligent conduct and a defendant’s defective product is no more logical or convincing than if a jury were to be instructed that it should add a quart of milk (representing plaintiff’s negligence) and a metal bar three feet in length (representing defendant’s strict liability for a defective product),and that the two added together equal 100 percent – the total fault for plaintiff’s injuries;that plaintiff’s quart of milk is then to be assigned its percentage of the 100 percent total and defendant’s metal bar is to be assigned the remaining percentage of the total.Either the jury or the trial judge will then subtract from the total amount of plaintiff’s damages an amount equal to the percentage of total fault allocated to plaintiff.
The majority’s decision herein will require the jury,on the one hand,to follow Barker and focus on the manufacture’s product – disregarding all questions of whether the manufacturer acted unreasonably or negligently – in order to determine defendant manufacturer’s liability.On the other hand,the jury must next focus on plaintiff’s conduct,in order to find that plaintiff was negligent.The jury must then compare its focus on plaintiff’s negligent conduct with its focus on defendant’s defective product – eliminating,as irrelevant,any consideration of whether defendant’s conduct was unreasonable or negligent – to determine the amount of the reduction in plaintiff’s total damages.The end result of this configurational analysis by a jury,I submit,based as it must be – on a comparison of noncomparables – will necessarily constitute a patently unfair result.
It appeals to my sense of reason,justice and equity that we continue the existing legal principle which permits manufacturers to spread through society the costs of compensating injured plaintiffs fully,rather than the adoption of an untenable legal principle which will result in reducing the total costs to be spread by manufacturers,but at the expense of injured plaintiffs by reducing their recover below the full losses sustained through the necessarily fortuitous,conjectural and haphazard determinations to be made by juries.
MOSK,J.I dissent.
This will be remembered as the dark day when this court,which heroically took the lead in originating the doctrine of products liability [Greeman] and steadfastly resisted efforts to inject concepts of negligence into the newly designed tort[Cronin] inexplicably turned 180 degrees and beat a hasty retreat almost back to square one.The pure concept of products liability so pridefully fashioned and nurtured by this court for the past decade and a half is reduced to a shambles.
Transferring the liability,or part of the liability,from the party responsible for putting the article in the stream of commerce to the consumer is precisely what the majority propose to do.They do this by employing a euphemism: the victim’s recovery is to be “proportionately reduced.” The result,however delicately described,is to dilute the defect of the article by elevating the conduct of the wounded consumer to an issue of equal significance.We can be as certain as tomorrow’s daylight that every defendant charged with marketing a defective product will hereafter assert that the injured plaintiff did something,anything,that conceivably could be deemed contributorily negligent….
The defective product is comparable to a time bomb ready to explode;it maims its victims indiscriminately,the righteous and the evil,the careful and the careless.Thus when a faulty design or otherwise defective product is involved,the litigation should not be diverted to consideration of the negligence of the plaintiff.The liability issues are simple: was the product or its design faulty,did the defendant inject the defective product into the stream of commerce,and did the defect cause the injury? The conduct of the ultimate consumer-victim who used the product in the contemplated or foreseeable manner is wholly irrelevant to those issues.