State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v.Siliznoff
Supreme Court of California,1952
38 Cal.2d 330,240 P.2d 282
[The State Rubbish Collectors Association sued Siliznoff to collect on certain notes.Siliznoff counterclaimed,asking that the notes be cancelled because of duress and want of consideration.In addition,he sought general and punitive damages because of alleged “assaults” made on him.The evidence was that Siliznoff had collected the trash from the Acme Brewing Company,which the Association regarded as within the territory of another member of the Association named Abramoff.The defendant was called before the Association and ordered to pay over the collected money to Abramoff,as a result of which he signed the notes in question.Further facts appear in the opinion.
The jury returned a verdict for Siliznoff on the original complaint and on the counterclaim.Siliznoff obtained a judgment against the Association for $1,250 general and special damages and $4,000 punitive damages.The Association appealed the judgment.]
TRAYNOR,J.Plaintiff’s primary contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment.Defendant testified that: ….
Andikian [an inspector of the Association] told defendant that “‘We will give yo u up till tonight to get down to the board meeting and make some kind of arrangements or agreements about the Acme Brewery,or otherwise we are going to beat you up.’ …He says he either would hire somebody or do it himself.And I says,‘Well,what wou ld they do to me?’ He says,well,they would physically beat me up first,cut up the truck tires or burn the truck,or otherwise put out of business completely.He said if I didn’t appear at that meeting and make some kind of an agreement that they would do that,but he says up to then they would let me alone,but if walked out of that meeting that night they would beat me up for sure.” Defendant attended the meeting and protested that he owed nothing for the Acme account and in any event could not pay the amoun t demanded.He was again told by the president of the association that “that table right there [the board of directors] ran all the rubbish collecting in Los Angeles and if there was any routes to be gotten that they would get them and distribute them among their members….” After two hours of further discussion defendant agreed to join the association and pay for the Acme account.He promised to return the next day and sign the necessary papers.He testified that the only reason “they let me go home,is that I promised that I would sign the notes the very next morning.” The president “made me promise on my honor and everything else,and I was scared,and I knew I had to come back,so I believe he knew I was scared and that I would come back.That’s the only reason they let me go home.” Defendant also testified that because of the fright he suffered during his dispute with the association he became ill and vomited several times and had to remain away from work for a period of several days.(https://www.daowen.com)
Plaintiff contends that the evidence does not establish an assault against defendant because the threats made all related to action that might take place in the future;that neither Andikian nor members of the board of directors threatened immediate physical harm to defendant.We have concluded,however,that a cause of action is established when it is shown that one,in the absence of any privilege,intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering incident to serious threats to his physical well-being,whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances as to constitute a technical assault.
In the past it has been frequently stated that the interest in emotional and mental tranquility is not one that the law will protect from invasion in its own right.As late as 1934 the Restatement of Torts took the position that “The interest in mental and emotional tranquility and therefore,in freedom from mental and emotional disturbance is not,as a thing in itself,regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended or recognizably likely to cause such a disturbance.” Restatement,torts,§ 46,comment c.The Restatement explained the rule allowing recovery for the mere apprehension of bodily harm in traditional assault cases as an historical anomaly (§ 24,comment c),and the rule allowing recovery for insulting conduct by an employee of a common carrier as justified by the necessity of securing for the public comfortable as well as safe service (§ 48,comment c).
The Restatement recognized,however,that in many cases mental distress could be so intense that it could reasonably be foreseen that illness or other bodily harm might result.If the defendant intentionally subjected the plaintiff to such distress and bodily harm resulted,the defendant would be liable for negligently causing the plaintiff bodily harm.Restatement,torts,§§ 306,312.Under this theory the cause of action was not founded on a right to be free from intentional inte-r ference with mental tranquility,but on the right to be free from negligent interference with physical well-being.A defendant who intentionally subjected another to mental distress without intending to cause bodily harm would nevertheless be liable for resulting bodily harm if he should have foreseen that the mental distress might cause such harm.
The California cases have been accorded with the Restatement in allowing recovery where physical injury resulted from intentionally subjecting the plaintiff to serious mental distress.