Gertz v.Robert Welch,Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States,1974
418 U.S.323
MR.JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court…..
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson.The state authorities prosecuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained a conviction for murder….The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz,a reputable attorney,to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio.
Respondent published American Opinion,a monthly outlet for the views of the John Birch Society.Early in the 1960’s the magazine began to warn of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies and create in their stead a national police force capable of supporting a Communist dictatorship.As part of the continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed danger,the managing editor of American Opinion commissioned an article on the murder trial of Officer Nuccio.For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the magazine.In March 1969 respondent published the resulting article under the title“FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police.” The article purports to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at this criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was part of the Communist campaign against the police.
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in the civil litigation,petitioner attended the coroner’s inquest into the boy’s death and initiated actions for damages,but he neither discussed Officer Nuccio with the press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding.Notwithstanding petitioner’s remote connection with the prosecution of Nuccio,respondent’s magazine portrayed him as an architect of the “frame-up.” According to the article,the police file on petitioner took“a big Irish cop to lift.” The article stated that petitioner had been an official of the“Marxist League for Industrial Democracy,originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society,which has advocated the violent seizure of our government.” It labeled Gertz a “Leninist” and a “Communist-fronter.” It also stated that Gertz had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild,described as a Communist organization that “probably did more than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention.”
These statements contained serious inaccuracies.The implication that petitioner had a criminal record was false.Petitioner had been a member and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 years earlier,but there was no evidence that he or that organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 demonstrations in Chicago.There was also no basis for the charge that petitioner was a “Leninist” or a “Communist-fronter.” And he had never been a member of the “Marxist league for Industrial Democracy” or the “intercollegiate Socialist Society.”
The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify or substantiate the charges against petitioner.Instead,he appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had “conducted extensive research into the Richard Nuccio Case.” And he included in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the caption that appeared under it: “Elmer Gertz of Red Guild harasses Nuccio.”Respondent placed the issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale at newsstands throughout the country and distributed reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago.
[The District Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.After the evidence was in,it “ruled in effect that petitioner was neither a public official nor a public figure,” and it submitted the issue of damages to the jury,which awarded $50,000.On further reflection the District Court concluded that the New York Times standard applied and entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the jury verdict.This action was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,on the basis of Rosenbloom v.Metromedia,Inc.,403 U.S.29 (1971).]
The principal issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements….
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection,it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate.As James Madison pointed out in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798,“Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing;and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.” … As the Court stated in New York Times Co.v.Sullivan,“Allowance of the defense of truth,with the burden of proving it on the defendant,does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.” The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury….In our continuing effort to define the proper accommodation between these competing concerns,we have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that “breathing space” essential to their fruitful exercise.To that end this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood.(https://www.daowen.com)
More important than the likelihood that private individuals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal,there is a compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs.An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs.He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case….
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position.Hypothetically,it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own,but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare….Commonly,those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved….
The communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them.No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual….He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name,and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.Thus,private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures;they are also more deserving of recovery.
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law,for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss.Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel,the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication.Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred.The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.Additionally,the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact.More to the point,the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury.
We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation.In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive.Consequently,juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views.Like the doctrine of presumed damages,jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship,but,unlike the former rule,punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions.They are not compensation for injury.Instead,they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.In short,the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York Times privilege to defamation of private individuals,respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment below on the ground that petitioner is either a public official or a public figure….
Respondent admits this but argues that petitioner’s appearance at the coro-ner’s inquest rendered him a “de facto public official.” Our cases recognize no such concept.Respondent’s suggestion would sweep all lawyers under New York Times rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning of the “public official” category beyond all recognition.We decline to follow it.
Petitioner has long been active in community and professional affairs.He has served as an officer of local civic groups and of various professional organizations,and he has published several books and articles on legal subjects.Although petitioner was consequently well known in some circles,he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community….Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community,and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society,an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life.It is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.
We therefore conclude that the New York Times standard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court erred in entering judgment for respondent.Because the jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and was permitted to presume damages without proof of injury,a new trial is necessary.We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
It is so ordered.