New York Times Co.v.Sullivan

New York Times Co.v.Sullivan

United States Supreme Court,1964

376 U.S.254

MR.JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.

Respondent L.B.Sullivan is one of the three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery,Alabama.He testified that he was “Commissioner of Public Affairs and the duties are supervision of the Police Department,Fire Department,Departmen t of Cemetery and Department of Scales.” He brought this civil libel action against the four individual petitioners,who are Negroes and Alabama clergymen,and against petitioner the New York Times Company,a New York corporation which publishes the New York Times,a daily newspaper.A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded him damages of $500,000,the full amount claimed,against all the petitioners,and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.

Respondent’s complaint alleged that he had been libeled by statements in a full-page advertisement that was carried in the New York Times on March 29,1960.[1] Entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices,” the advertisement began by stating that “As the whole world knows by now,thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S.Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” It went on to charge that “in their efforts to uphold these guarantees,they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom….” Succeeding paragraphs purported to illustrate the “wave of terror” by describing certain alleged events.The text concluded with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the student movement,“the struggle for the right-to-vote,” and the legal defense of Dr.Martin Luther King,Jr.,leader of the movement,against a perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery.

The text appeared over the names of 64 persons,many widely known for their activities in public affairs,religion,trade unions,and the performing arts.Below these names,and under a line reading “We in the south who are struggling daily for dignity and freedom warmly endorse this appeal,” appeared the names of the four individual petitioners and of 16 other persons,all but two of whom were identified as clergymen in various Southern cities.The advertisement was signed at the bottom of the page by the “Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South,” and the officers of the Committee were listed.

Of the 10 paragraphs of text in the advertisement,the third and a portion of the sixth were the basis of respondent’s claim of libel.They read as follows:

Third paragraph:

In Montgomery,Alabama,after students sang “My Country,‘Tis of Thee” on the StateCapitol steps,their leaders were expelled from school,and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus.When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register,their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.

Sixth paragraph:

Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.King’s peaceful protests with intimidation and violence.They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child.They have assaulted his person.They have arrested him seven times – for “speeding,”“loitering” and similar “offenses.” And now they have charged him with “perjury” – a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years….

Although neither of these statements mentions respondent by name,he contended that the word “police” in the third paragraph referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised the Police Department,so that he was being accused of “ringing” the campus with police.He further claimed that the paragraph would be read as imputing to the police,and hence to him,the padlocking of the dining hall in order to starve the students into submission.[2] As to the sixth paragraph,he contended that since arrests are ordinarily made by the police,the statement “They have arrested[Dr.King] seven times” would be read as referring to him;he further contended that the “They” who did the arresting would be equated with the “They” who committed the other described acts and with the “Southern violators.” Thus,he argued,the paragraph would be read as accusing the Montgomery police,and hence him,of answering Dr.King’s protests with “intimidation and violence,” bombing his home,assaulting his person,and charging him with perjury.Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read some or all of the statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner.

It is uncontroverted that some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery.Although Negro students staged a demonstration on the State Capital steps,they sang the National Anthem and not “My Country,’Tis of Thee.” Although nine s-tu dents were expelled by the State Board of Education,this was not for leading the demonstration at the Capitol,but for demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County Courthouse on another day.Not the entire student body,but most of it,had protested the expulsion,not by refusing to register,but by boycotting classes on a single day;virtually all the students did register for the ensuing semester.The campus dining hall was not padlocked on any occasion,and the only students who may have been barred from eating there were the few who had neither signed a preregistration application nor requested temporary meal tickets.Although the police were deployed near the campus in large numbers on three occasions,they did not at any time “ring” the campus,and they were not called to the campus in connection with the demonstration on the State Capitol steps,as the third paragraph implied.Dr.King had not been arrested seven times,but only four;and although he claimed to have been assaulted some years earlier in connection with his arrest for loitering outside a courtroom,one of the officers who made the arrest denied that there was such an assault.

On the premise that the charges in the sixth paragraph could be read as referring to him,respondent was allowed to prove that he had not participated in the events described.Although Dr.King’s home had in fact been bombed twice when his wife and child were there,both of these occasions antedated respondent’s tenure as Commissioner,and the police were not only not implicated in the bombings,but had made every effort to apprehend those who were.Three of Dr.King’s four arrests took place before respondent became Commissioner.Although Dr.King had in fact been indicted (he was subsequently acquitted) on two counts of perjury,each of which carried a possible five-year sentence,respondent had nothing to do with procuring the indictment.

Respondent made no effort to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result of the alleged libel.[3] One of his witnesses,a former employer,testified that if he had believed the statements,he doubted whether he “would want to be associated with anybody who would be a party to such things that are stated in that ad,” and that he would not re-employ respondent if he believed “that he allowed the Police Department to do the things that the paper say he did.” But neither this witness nor any of the others testified that he had actually believed the statements in their supposed reference to respondent.

The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that the statements in the advertisement were “libelous per se” and were not privileged,so that petitioners might be held liable if the jury found that they had published the advertisement and that the statements were made “of and concerning” respondent.The jury was instructed that,because the statements were libelous per se,“the law … implies legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself,” “falsity and malice are presumed,” “general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed,” and “punitive damages may be awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual damages is neither found nor shown.” …

In affirming the judgment,the Supreme Court of Alabama … [rejected] … petitioners’ constitutional contentions with the brief statements that “The First Amend-ment of the U.S.Constitution does not protect libelous publications” and “The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not private action.”

… We reverse the judgment.We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct….

II.

Under Alabama law … [o]nce “libel per se” has been established,the defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars.His privilege of “fair comment” for expressions of opinion depends on the truth of the facts upon which the comment is based.Unless he can discharge the burden of proving truth,general damages are presumed,and may be awarded without proof of pecuniary injury.A showing of actual malice is apparently a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages,and the defendant may in any event forestall a punitive award by a retraction meeting the statutory requirements.Good motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice,but are relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord them weight.

The question before us is whether this rule of liability,as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct,abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions….The First Amendment,said Judge Learned Hand,“presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,than through any kind of authoritative selection.To many this is,and always will be,folly;but we have staked upon it our all.” Mr.Justice Brandeis,in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.California,274 U.S.357,gave the principle its classic formulation:

Those who won our independence believed … that public discussion is a political duty;and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject.But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction;that it is hazardous to discourage thought,hope and imagination;that fear breeds repression;that repression breeds hate;that hate menaces stable government;that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies;and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion,they eschewed silence coerced by law – the argument of force in its worst form.Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,they amended theConstitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.

Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,robust,and wide-open,and that it may well include vehement,caustic,and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.The present advertisement,as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time,would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection.The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent.

If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct,the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate.This is the lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798,1 Stat.596,which first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.That statute made it a crime,punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison,“if any person shall write,print,utter or publish … any false,scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States,or either house of the Congress …,or the President …,with intent to defame … or to bring them,or either of them,into contempt or disrepute;or to excite against them,or either or any of them,the hatred of the good people of the United States.” The Act allowed the defendant the defense of truth,and provided that the jury were to be judges both of the law and the facts.Despite these qualifications,the Act was vigorously condemned as unconstitutional in an attack joined in by Jefferson and Madison….

Madison [believed] that the Constitution created a form of government under which “The people,not the government,possess the absolute sovereignty.” The structure of the government dispersed power in reflection of the people’s distrust of concentrated power,and of power itself at all levels.This form of government was “altogether different” from the British form,under which the Crown was sovereign and the people were subjects.“Is it not natural and necessary,under such different circumstances,” he asked,“that a different degree of freedom in the use of the press should be contemplated?” Earlier,Madison had said: “If we advert to the nature of Republican Government,we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government,and not in the Government over the people.” Of the exercise of that power by the press,[Madison] said: “In every state,probably,in the Union,the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men,of every description,which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common law.On this footing the freedom of the press has stood;on this foundation it yet stands ….” The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus,in Madison’s view,a fundamental principle of the American form of government.

A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions – and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount – leads to a comparable “self-censorship.” Allowance of the defense of truth,with the burden of proving it on the defendant,does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.[4] Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars.Under such a rule,would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism,even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true,because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.They tend to make only statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.” The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.(https://www.daowen.com)

The constitutional guarantees require,we think,a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”– that is,with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.An oft-cited statement of a like rule,which has been adopted by a number of state courts,is found in the Kansas case of Coleman v.MacLennan,78 Kan.711,98 P.281 (1908).The State Attorney General,a candidate for re-election and a member of the commission charged with the management and control of the state school fund,sued a newspaper publisher for alleged libel in an article purporting to state facts relating to his official conduct in connection with a school-fund transaction.The defendant pleaded privilege and the trial judge,over the plaintiff’s objection,instructed the jury that

where an article is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose of giving what the defendant believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate for public office and for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their ballot more intelligently,and the whole thing is done in good faith and without malice,the article is privileged,although the principal matters contained in the article may be untrue in fact and derogatory to the character of the plaintiff;and in such a case the burden is on the plaintiff to show actual malice in the publication of the article.

Such a privilege for criticism of official conduct[5] is appropriately analogous to the protection accorded a public official when he is sued for libel by a private citizen.In Barr v.Matteo,360 U.S.564,this Court held the utterance of a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made “within the outer perimeter” of his duties.The States accord the same immunity to statements of their highest officers,although some differentiate their lesser officials and qualify the privilege they enjoy.But all hold that all officials are protected unless actual malice can be proved.The reason for the official privilege is said to be that the threat of damage suits would otherwise “inhibit the fearless,vigorous,and effective administration of policies of government” and “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute,or the most irresponsible,in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” Barr,supra,at 571.Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government.It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official’s duty to administer.As Madison said,“the censorial power is in the people over the Government,and not in the Government over the people.” It would give public servants an unjustified preference over the public they serve,if critics of official conduct did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves.

We conclude that such a privilege is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

III.

We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.Since this is such an action,[6] the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.“The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions,” Bailey v.Alabama,219 U.S.219,239;“[t]he showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter for proof by the plaintiff ….”

Applying these standards,we consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands,and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the proper rule of law.The case of the individual petitioners requires little discussion.Even assuming that they could constitutionally be found to have authorized the use of their names on the advertisement,there was no evidence whatever that they were aware of any erroneous statements or were in any way reckless in that regard.The judgment against them is thus without constitutional support.

As to the Times,we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual malice.The statement by the Times’ Secretary that,apart from the padlocking allegation,he thought the advertisement was “substantially correct,” affords no constitutional warrant for the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that it was a “cavalie r ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement [from which],the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times,and its maliciousness inferable therefrom.” The statement does not indicate malice at the time of the publication;even if the advertisement was not “substantially correct” – although respondent’s own proofs tend to show that it was – that opinion was at least a reasonable one,and there was no evidence to impeach the witness’ good faith in holding it….

Finally,there is evidence that the Times published the advertisement without checking its accuracy against the news stories in the Times’ own files.The mere presence of the stories in the files does not,of course,establish that the Times“knew” the advertisement was false,since the state of mind required for actual malice would have to be brought home to the persons in the Times’ organization having responsibility for the publication of the advertisement.With respect to the failure of those persons to make the check,the record shows that they relied upon their knowledge of the good reputation of many of those whose names were listed as sponsors of the advertisement,and upon the letter from A.Philip Randolph,known to them as a responsible individual,certifying that the use of the names was authorized.There was testimony that the persons handling the advertisement saw nothing in it that would render it unacceptable under the Times’ policy of rejecting advertisements containing “attacks of a personal character”;[7] their failure to reject it on this ground was not unreasonable.We think the evidence against the Times supports at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements,and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice.

We also think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect:it was incapable of supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made “of and concerning” respondent.Respondent relies on the words of the advertisement and the testimony of six witnesses to establish a connection between it and himself….

There was no reference to respondent in the advertisement,either by name or official position.A number of the allegedly libelous statements – the charges that the dining hall was padlocked and that Dr.King’s home was bombed,his person assaulted,and a perjury prosecution instituted against him – did not even concern the police;despite the ingenuity of the arguments which would attach this significance to the word “They,” it is plain that these statements could not reasonably be read as accusing respondent of personal involvement in the acts in question.The statements upon which respondent principally relies as referring to him are the two allegations that did concern the police or police functions: that“truckloads of police … ringed the Alabama State College Campus” after the demonstration on the State Capitol steps,and that Dr.King had been “arrested… seven times.” These statements were false only in that the police had been“deployed near” the campus but had not actually “ringed” it and had not gone there in connection with the State Capitol demonstration,and in that Dr.King had been arrested only four times.The ruling that these discrepancies between what was true and what was asserted were sufficient to injure respondent’s reputation may itself raise constitutional problems,but we need not consider them here.Although the statements may be taken as referring to the police,they did not on their face make even an oblique reference to respondent as an individual.Support for the asserted reference must,therefore,be sought in the testimony of respondent’s witnesses.But none of them suggested any basis for the belief that respondent himself was attacked in the advertisement beyond the bare fact that he was in overall charge of the Police Department and thus bore official responsibility for police conduct;to the extent that some of the witnesses thought respondent to have been charged with ordering or approving the conduct or otherwise being personally involved in it,they based this notion not on any statements in the advertisement,and not on any evidence that he had in fact been so involved,but solely on the unsupported assumption that,because of his official position,h e must have been.[8] This reliance on the bare fact of respondent’s official position was made explicit by the Supreme Court of Alabama….

This proposition has disquieting implications for criticism of governmental conduct.For good reason,“no court of last resort in this country has ever held,or even suggested,that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of jurisprudence.” City of Chicago v.Tribune Co.,307 Ill.595,(1923).The present proposition would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of government,however impersonal it may seem on its face,into personal criticism,and hence potential libel,of the officials of whom the government is composed.There is no legal alchemy by which a State may thus create the cause of action that would otherwise be denied for a publication which,as respondent himself said of the advertisement,“reflects not only on me but on the other Commissioners and the community.” Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism,the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression.[9] We hold that such a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible for those operations.Since it was relied on exclusively here,and there was no other evidence to connect the statements with respondent,the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a finding that the statements referred to respondent.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

MR.JUSTICE BLACK,with whom MR.JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins (concurring).

… [T]he Court holds that “the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics o f their official conduct.” I believ[e] that the First and Fourteenth Amendments not merely “delimit” a State’s power to award damages to “public officials against critics of their official conduct” but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power.The Court goes on to hold that a State can subject such critics to damages if “actual malice” can be proved against them.“Malice,” even as defined by the Court,is an elusive,abstract concept,hard to prove and hard to disprove.The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affair s and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.Unlike the Court,therefore,I vote to reverse exclusively on the ground that the Times and the individual defendants had an absolute,unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials….

The half-million-dollar verdict does give dramatic proof,however,that state libel laws threaten the very existence of an American press virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough to criticize the conduct of public officials.The factual background of this case emphasizes the imminence and enormity of that threat.One of the acute and highly emotional issues in this country arises out of efforts of many people,even including some public officials,to continue state-commanded segregation of races in the public schools and other public places,despite our several holdings that such a state practice is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.Montgomery is one of the localities in which widespread hostility to desegregation has been manifested.This hostility has sometimes extended itself to persons who favor desegregation,particularly to so-called “outside agitators,” a term which can be made to fit papers like the Times,which is published in New York….Moreover,a second half-million-dollar libel verdict against the Times based on the same advertisement has already been awarded to another Commissioner.There a jury again gave the full amount claimed.There is no reason to believe that there are not more such huge verdicts lurking just around the corner for the Times or any other newspaper or broadcaster which might dare to criticize public officials.In fact,briefs before us show that in Alabama there are now pending eleven libel suits by local and state officials against the Times seeking $5,600,000,and five such suit s against the Columbia Broadcasting System seeking $1,700,000.Moreover,this technique for harassing and punishing a free press – now that it has been shown to be possible – is by no means limited to cases with racial overtones;it can be used in other fields where public feelings may make local as well as out-of-state news-papers easy prey for libel verdict seekers….

MR.JUSTICE GOLDBERG,with whom MR.JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins (concurring in the result).

In my view,the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and to the press an absolute,unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses….In a democratic society,one who assumes to act for the citizens in an executive,legislative,or judicial capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized.Such criticism cannot,in my opinion,be muzzled or deterred by the courts at the instance of public officials under the label of libel.

If the government official should be immune from libel actions so that his a-r dor to serve the public will not be dampened and “fearless,vigorous,and effective administration of policies of government” not be inhibited,Barr v.Matteo,then the citizen and the press should likewise be immune from libel actions for their criticism of official conduct.Their ardor as citizens will thus not be dampened and they will be free “to applaud or to criticize the way public employees do their jobs,from the least to the most important.”

The conclusion that the Constitution affords the citizen and the press an absolute privilege for criticism of official conduct does not leave the public official without defenses against unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements.”Under our system of government,counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters,not abridgment … of free speech….”

The public official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private citizens to media of communication.In any event,despite the possibility that some excesses and abuses may go unremedied,we must recognize that “the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history,that,in spite of the pro-b ability of excesses and abuses,[certain] liberties are,in the long view,essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.” Cantwell v.Connecticut,310 U.S.296.As Mr.Justice Brandeis correctly observed,“sunlight is the most powerful of all disinfectants.”

For these reasons,I strongly believe that the Constitution accords citizens and press an unconditional freedom to criticize official conduct.It necessarily follows that in a case such as this,where all agree that the allegedly defamatory statements related to official conduct,the judgments for libel cannot constitutionally be sustained.

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