Jacque v.Steenberg Homes,Inc.

Jacque v.Steenberg Homes,Inc.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin

563 N.W.2d 154

WILLIAM A.BABLITCH,J.Steenberg Homes had a mobile home to deliver.Unfortunately for [the Jacques],the easiest route of delivery was across their land.Despite adamant protests by the Jacques,Steenberg plowed a path through the Jacques’snow-covered field and via that path,delivered the mobile home.Consequently,the Jacques [called the police who issued a $30 citation,and] sued Steenberg Homes for intentional trespass.At trial,Steenberg Homes conceded the intentional trespass,but argued that no compensatory damages had been proved,and that punitive damages could not be awarded without compensatory damages….

This case presents three issues: (1) whether an award of nominal damages for intentional trespass to land may support a punitive damage award and,if so;(2) whether the law should apply to Steenberg or should only be applied prospectively and,if we apply the law to Steenberg;(3) whether the $100,000 in punitive damages awarded by the jury is excessive.

Steenberg argues that,as a matter of law,punitive damages could not be awarded by the jury because punitive damages must be supported by an awardof compensatory damages and here the jury awarded only nominal and punitive damages.The Jacques contend that the rationale supporting the compensatory damage award requirement is inapposite when the wrongful act is an intentional trespass to land.We agree with the Jacques.

The Mobile Home After Being Dragged Across the Jacques’ Field.

The general rule was stated in Barnard v.Cohen,165 Wis.417,(1917),where the question presented was: “In an action for libel,can there be a recovery of pun-i tory damages if only nominal compensatory damages are found?” With the bare assertion that authority and better reason supported its conclusion,the Barnard court said no….The rationale for the compensatory damage requirement is that if the individual cannot show actual harm,he or she has but a nominal interest,hence,society has little interest in having the unlawful,but otherwise harmless,conduct deterred,therefore,punitive damages are inappropriate.

However,whether nominal damages can support a punitive damage award in the case of an intentional trespass to land has never been squarely addressed by this court.[5] Nonetheless,Wisconsin law is not without reference to this situation.In 1854 the court established punitive damages,allowing the assessment of “damages as a punishment to the defendant for the purpose of making an example.”McWilliams v.Bragg,3 Wis.377,378 (1854).[6] The McWilliams court related the facts and an illustrative tale from the English case of Merest v.Harvey,128 Eng.Rep.761 (C.P.1814),to explain the rationale underlying punitive damages.

In Merest,a landowner was shooting birds in his field when he was approached by the local magistrate who wanted to hunt with him.Although the landowner refused,the magistrate proceeded to hunt.When the landowner continued to object,the magistrate threatened to have him jailed and dared him to file suit.Although little actual harm had been caused,the English court upheld damages of 500 pounds,explaining “in a case where a man disregards every principle which actuates the conduct of gentlemen,what is to restrain him except large damages?”McWilliams,3 Wis.377 at 380.

To explain the need for punitive damages,even where actual harm is slight,McWilliams related the hypothetical tale from Merest of an intentional trespasser:

Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock,before his window,and that a manintrudes and walks up and down before the window of his house,and looks in while the owner is at dinner,is the trespasser permitted to say “here is a halfpenny for you which is the full extent of the mischief I have done.” Would that be a compensation? I cannot say that it would be….

Thus,in the case establishing punitive damages in this state,this court recognized that in certain situations of trespass,the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land,which may be minimal,but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property and,the court implied that this right may be punished by a large damage award despite the lack of measurable harm.

We turn first to the individual landowner’s interest in protecting his or her land from trespass.The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the private landowner’s right to exclude others from his or her land is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” This court has long recognized “[e]very person[’s] constitutional right to the exclusive enjoyment of his own property for any purpose which does not invade the rights of another person.” Thus,both this court and the Supreme Court recognize the individual’s legal right to exclude others from private property.(https://www.daowen.com)

Yet a right is hollow if the legal system provides insufficient means to protect it … and that right has no practical meaning unless protected by the State.And,as this court recognized as early as 1854,a “halfpenny” award does not constitute state protection.

The potential for harm resulting from intentional trespass also supports an exception to Barnard.A series of intentional trespasses,as the Jacques had the misfortune to discover in an unrelated action,can threaten the individual’s very ownership of the land.The conduct of an intentional trespasser,if repeated,might ripen into prescription or adverse possession and,as a consequence,the individual landowner can lose his or her property rights to the trespasser.

Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests of the individual landowner.Society has an interest in preserving the integrity of the legal system.Private landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who trespass upon their land will be appropriately punished.When landowners have confidence in the legal system,they are less likely to resort to “self-help” remedies.Although dueling is rarely a modern form of self-help,one can easily imagine a frustrated landowner taking the law into his or her own hands when faced with a brazen trespasser,like Steenberg,who refuses to heed no trespass warnings.

People expect wrongdoers to be appropriately punished.Punitive damages have the effect of bringing to punishment types of conduct that,though oppressive and hurtful to the individual,almost invariably go unpunished by the public prosecutor.The $30 forfeiture was certainly not an appropriate punishment for Steenberg’s egregious trespass in the eyes of the Jacques.It was more akin to Merest’s “halfpenny.” If punitive damages are not allowed in a situation like this,what punishment will prohibit the intentional trespass to land? Moreover,what is to stop Steenberg Homes from concluding,in the future,that delivering its mobile homes via an intentional trespass and paying the resulting Class B forfeiture,is not more profitable than obeying the law? Steenberg Homes plowed a path across the Jacques’ land and dragged the mobile home across that path,in the face of the Jacques’ adamant refusal.A $30 forfeiture and a $1 nominal damage award are unlikely to restrain Steenberg Homes from similar conduct in the future.An appropriate punitive damage award probably will.

Next we consider the effect of our holding on the parties before us.Steenberg argues that its reliance at trial on the well-established Barnard rule compels this court to either apply our holding prospectively,or grant a new trial.

Steenberg argues if we should hold,as we do,that punitive damages can be awarded with only a nominal damage award,our holding should not apply to them.Steenberg cites Colby,202 Wis.2d 342,for the proposition that a holding that departs from past precedent should only be applied prospectively.Steenberg argues that because it relied on the well-established Barnard rule at trial,and our holding today recognizes an exception to the Barnard rule,today’s holding should not apply to this case.Steenberg misunderstands Colby and the doctrine of sunbursting.

Sunbursting[7] is an exception to the general rule referred to as the “Blackstonian Doctrine.” This classic doctrine provides that a decision which overrules precedent is accorded retroactive effect.

At times,inequities will occur when a court departs from precedent and announces a new rule of law.In an effort to avoid inequity on these rare occasions,the court has recognized exceptions to the Blackstonian Doctrine and used the device of prospective overruling,known as “sunbursting,” to limit the effect of a newly announced rule when retroactive application would be inequitable.

Prospective application of a judicial holding is a question of policy to be determined by this court.The court allows sunbursting for the purpose of mitigating hardships that may occur with the retroactive application of a new rule.This court will not sunburst absent a compelling judicial reason for doing so.No simple rule helps us determine the existence of a judicial reason for sunbursting.Instead,the equities peculiar to a given rule or case determine the rule adopted by the court in each case.

Steenberg contends that its reliance on Barnard at trial creates a compelling judicial reason to sunburst.Steenberg explains that its trial strategy was dependent on the Barnard rule.Therefore,it contends that a holding in this case,recognizing an exception to the Barnard rule should only apply prospectively,i.e.,not to Steenberg Homes.We disagree.We find Steenberg’s contention that it relied on the Barnard rule misleading.Steenberg did not concede the intentional trespass until after the Jacques rested at trial.At this point,when overwhelming evidence clearly established Steenberg’s intentional trespass on the Jacques’ land,then and only then,did Steenberg rely on Barnard and concede intentional trespass.This type of “reliance” does not give rise to the inequity that sunbursting is designed to prevent.

The Jacques’ interests also prevent us from sunbursting in this case.In determining whether hardship or injustice will occur,the court must also consider the effect of prospective application on the party who sought to change the law.Retroactivity is usually justified as a reward for the litigant who has persevered in attacking an unsound rule.To refuse to apply the new rule here would deprive the Jacques of any benefit from their effort and expense in challenging the old rule which we now declare erroneous.That,we conclude,would be the greater injustice.Accordingly,we hold that the exception to Barnard that we recognize today shall be applied to Steenberg.

Finally,we consider whether the jury’s $100,000 punitive damage award to the Jacques is excessive.In this case,the circuit court,finding that the issue was moot,rejected Steenberg’s motion for remittitur without review.Because we conclude that the nominal damages awarded to the Jacques support the jury’s punitive damage award,and because we conclude that our holding today applies to Steenberg,the issue is not moot.Therefore,we review the $100,000 award to determine whether it is clearly excessive.We conclude that it is not.Accordingly,we do not order remittitur.

Reversed and remanded with directions.