Richardson v.Chapman
Supreme Court of Illinois,1997
175 Ill.2d 98,676 N.E.2d 621
MILLER,J.… [Plaintiff Keva Richardson was the driver of a car with plaintiff Ann McGregor as a passenger.While they were stopped at a traffic light,their car was struck from behind by a semi-trailer driven by defendant Chapman who was employed by defendant tandem/Carrier.At the trial,the judge directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against Chapman and his employer on the question of liability.Determining only the plaintiffs’ damages,the jury returned verdicts against them in favor of Richardson and McGregor in the amounts of $22,358,814 and $102,215,respectively.The intermediate appellate court rejected the defendants’ challenges to the amounts of damages awarded by the jury.]
In their initial challenge to the damages verdicts,the defendants complain of certain testimony introduced by plaintiff Richardson concerning the calculation of the present value of her future economic losses.The defendants maintain that Professor Charles Linke,who testified as Richardson’s economist,improperly used non-neutral,actual figures in describing to the jury the calculation of present cash value.Richardson’s life expectancy at the time of trial,in May 1990,was 54.5 years.Relying on information and figures supplied by Richardson’s primary physician,Professor Linke testified that the present cash value of her future medical expenses had a lower bound of $7,371,914 and an upper bound of $9,570,034.The lower bound figure assumed a discount rate one percentage point higher than the growth rate;the upper bound figure assumed that the two rate would be equal.The difference between the two numbers was based on different assumptions concerning future growth rates and interest rates.Professor Linke also provided testimony regarding the present cash value of Richardson’s lost future earnings.Assuming a work history of 27.5 years,Professor Linke found that the present cash value of Richardson’s lost income was between $854,107 and $971,944;using a longer work history of 35.8 years,Professor Linke arrived at a range of $1,068,343 to$1,265,363.Again,the differences between the two ranges were based on the witness’ different assumptions regarding future growth and interest rates….
In a further objection to Professor Linke’s testimony,the defendants also briefly argue that the economist erroneously included inflation and real growth in reducing Richardson’s economic damages to their present cash value.As we have noted,Professor Linke testified to what he termed “lower bound” and “upper bound” figures in computing the future medical expenses and lost earnings.The “lower bound” figure assumed that the prevailing interest rate would be one percentage point higher than the growth rate of wages and prices,while the “upper bound” figure assumed that the two rates would be equal.In this way,Professor Linke attempted to avoid having to predict the exact rates that would prevail;as Professor Linke explained in his testimony,it is not the absolute levels of the interest rate and growth rate that determine present cash value,but the difference between them….
We conclude that Professor Linke’s approach was a reasonable one;by using a differential between the two rates,he did not have to make a prediction of future growth and inflation rates.Professor Linke was consistent in his treatment of inflation,and he did not adopt a method that would undercompensate or overcompensate the plaintiff.
The defendants next contend that the damages awarded to the plaintiffs are excessive.Before resolving this question,we will briefly summarize the evidence presented at trial regarding the two women’s injuries.
Keva Richardson was 23 years old at the time of the accident.She grew up in Pampa,Texas,and received a bachelor’s degree in elementary education in May 1987 from Texas Tech University.While in college,she participated in a number of athletic activities and was,by all accounts,a popular,happy person.After graduating from college,Keva obtained a position as a flight attendant with American Airlines.She planned to work in that capacity for several years before returning to school to gain a post-graduate degree in education;her ultimate goal was to teach.Keva met Ann McGregor in the flight attendant training program,and the two decided to room together upon completion of their training.At the conclusion of the program,they were assigned to the Chicago area,and they had moved there just several days before the accident occurred.
Following the accident,Keva was initially taken to Highland Park Hospital for treatment.Because of the seriousness of her injuries,however,Keva was transferred that morning to Northwestern Memorial Hospital.Dr.Giri Gereesan,an orthopedic surgeon specializing in spinal surgery,determined that Keva had incurred a fracture of the fifth cervical vertebra,which severely damaged her spinal cord and resulted in incomplete quadriplegia.Dr.Gereesan performed surgery on Keva on December 1,1987,to stabilize her spine so that she would be able to support her head;the surgery did not repair the damage to her spinal cord,and no treatment exists that could do so.
Keva was transferred to the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago in December 1987,where she came under the care of Dr.Gary Yarkony.Keva was initially dependent on others in all aspects of her daily life.At the Rehabilitation Institute she learned how to perform a number of basic tasks,such as sitting in a wheelchair,transferring from a bed to a wheelchair,brushing her teeth,washing her face,and putting on loose-fitting tops.Keva’s initial stay at the Rehabilitation Institute lasted until April 1988,when she moved to her parents’ home in Texas.Keva returned to the Rehabilitation Institute in 1988 and in 1989 for follow-up visits.Keva also required hospitalization in Texas on three subsequent occasions for treatment of conditions arising from the accident.
Testifying in Keva’s behalf at trial,Dr.Gary Yarkony,who had served as her primary physician at the Rehabilitation Institute,described Keva’s current condition.He explained that she cannot use her legs and that she has only limited functioning in her arms,with loss of control of her fingers and fine muscles in her hands.She suffers pain in her legs and shoulders.Her chest and abdomen are paralyzed,and she has restrictive pulmonary disease.In addition,she has no control over her bladder or bowel functions and requires assistance in emptying them.As a consequence of her physical condition,she is at risk for bladder infections,pneumonia,and pressure ulcers.Keva also suffered a number of facial injuries in the accident.Some of these scars were later repaired through plastic surgery,but others remain.(https://www.daowen.com)
At trial,Keva’s mother,Dixie Richardson,described her daughter’s current activities and the level of care necessary to assist her in her daily routine.Keva requires help in taking a shower and getting dressed.She cannot put on underwear,socks,or pants by herself but is able to put on pullover shirts and sweaters.With assistance,she can brush her teeth,apply makeup,and put in her contact lenses.She is unable to cut food or button a sweater.She can push her wheelchair on a smooth,level surface but otherwise needs assistance.In her own testimony,Keva said that she is self-conscious about her appearance now and the impression she makes on others.She said that the thing she misses most is just being able to get up in the morning and begin her day;now she requires the assistance of others,throughout the day.
The jury awarded Richardson a total of $22,358,814 in damages,divided among the following six elements: $258,814 for past medical care;$11,000,000 for future medical care;$900,000 for past and future lost earnings;$3,500,000 for disability;$2,100,000 for disfigurement;and $4,600,000 for pain and suffering.In challenging Richardson’s award of damages,the defendants first argue that the sum of the future medical costs found by the jury – $11,000,000 – is not supported by the evidence,for it exceeds even the larger of the two figures supplied by Professor Linke,$9,570,034.The defendants contend that the decision to award Richardson nearly $1.5 million more illustrates the jury’s failure to properly determine damages in this case.
In response,Richardson argues that the larger award may simply be attributable to the jury’s decision to make an award of expenses that she is likely to incur in the future but that were not specifically included in the calculations performed by Professor Linke.Richardson notes that Dr.Yarkony,in compiling for Linke’s use the list of likely future medical costs,did not assign specific values to certain items,such as the expenses of future hospitalizations and the costs of wheelchairs and a specially equipped van.Richardson thus argues that the jury’s decision to award an amount for future medical costs greater than Professor Linke’s higher estimate might simply reflect the jury’s desire to compensate her for those unspecified but likely expenses.We agree with Richardson that the trier of fact enjoys a certain degree of leeway in awarding compensation for medical costs that,as shown by the evidence,are likely to arise in the future but are not specifically itemized in the testimony.In the present case,however,the amount awarded by the jury for future medical costs is nearly $1.5 million more than the higher of the two figures claimed at trial by Richardson.Notably,Professor Linke did not rely on the projections by the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the growth of future medical care costs,mentioned in the partial concurrence.Professor Linke explained that the GAO’s study included a large number of technology-based items,while the main expense to be incurred by Richardson will be wages for attendant care.Given the disparity between the trial testimony and the jury’s eventual award,we will not attribute the entire difference between those sums simply to miscellaneous costs Richardson is likely to incur in the future.For these reasons,we conclude that it is appropriate,by way of remittitur,to reduce by $1 million the nearly $1.5 million differential between the award for Richardson’s future medical expenses and the higher figure presented in the testimony.This adjustment allows Richardson recovery for expected future medical costs for which no specific estimates were introduced,yet is not so large that it represents a departure from the trial testimony.
We do not agree with the defendants,however,that the remainder of the award of damages to Richardson,including the sums for pain and suffering,disability,and disfigurement,is duplicative or excessive or lacks support in the record.The determination of damages is a question reserved to the trier of fact,and a reviewing court will not lightly substitute its opinion for the judgment rendered in the trial court.An award of damages will be deemed excessive if it falls outside the range of fair and reasonable compensation or result from passion or prejudice,or if it is so large that it shocks the judicial conscience.When reviewing an award of compensatory damages for a nonfatal injury,a court may consider,among other things,the permanency of the plaintiff’s condition,the possibility of future deterioration,the extent of the plaintiff’s medical expenses,and the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff by the injuries.
Here,it was the jury’s function to consider the credibility of the witnesses and to determine an appropriate award of damages.We cannot say that the present award to Richardson is the result of passion or prejudice,“shocks the conscience,”or lacks support in the evidence.The record shows that Richardson suffered devastating,disabling injuries as a consequence of the accident.The defendants urge us to compare Richardson’s damages with amounts awarded in other cases.Courts in this state,however,have traditionally declined to make such comparisons in determining whether a particular award is excessive,and we do not believe that such comparisons would be helpful here.
The defendants also contend that the jury’s award of damages to Ann McGregor is excessive.McGregor was 22 years old at the time of the accident.She grew up in Houston,Texas,and graduated from Southern Methodist University in May 1987 with a degree in psychology.Like Keva Richardson,McGregor was accepted after graduation for a position as flight attendant with American Airlines.As mentioned earlier,the two women met while enrolled in the flight attendant training program and were sharing an apartment in the Chicago area at the time of the accident.Following the accident,McGregor was taken to Highland Park Hospital,where she was treated and released that day;she was then off work for about two weeks.A laceration she suffered on her forehead eventually healed,with only minimal scarring.At trial McGregor testified that she continues to suffer from nightmares about the accident.The jury awarded McGregor a total of$102,215 in damages,divided among the following components: $1,615 for past medical expenses,$600 for lost earnings,and $100,000 for pain and suffering.
… [W]e believe that the award of $100,000 for pain and suffering is,in these circumstances,excessive.McGregor was not seriously injured in the accident,incurring a laceration on her forehead,which left only a slight scar.The jury declined to award McGregor any compensation for disfigurement;rather,the bulk of her recovery consisted of compensation for pain and suffering.We conclude that a more appropriate figure for pain and suffering would be $50,000,which would reduce her total damages to $52,215.By way of remittitur,we accordingly reduce the judgment entered in favor of McGregor and against Tandem/Carrier and Chapman to that amount.
[The court then ruled on various matters relating to contribution and indemnity issues among the defendants.]
For the reasons stated,the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part,reversed in part,and vacated in part,and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed in part,reversed in part,and vacated in part….In the absence of consent to the entry of a remittitur by each plaintiff within 21 days of the filing of this opinion or any further period in which the mandate is stayed,her individual action will be remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for a new trial on the question of damages….