打击海事恐怖主义
在“9·11”事件之后，为了保障国际海上运输的安全，联合国海事组织通过多项对《1974年海上安全公约》（1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea）的修订案。2002年12月，联合国海事组织的成员国在伦敦召开国际海事组织海上安全大会，通过《国际船舶和港口设施保安规则》（International Ship and port Facility Security，ISPS）。
规则规定：所有300吨位及以上的国际航行船舶，必须安装自动识别系统（Automatic Identification System，AIS）；所有100吨位以上的客船以及300吨位以上的货船，必须在船体和内部舱壁上，标记船舶永久识别号；所有300吨位以上的国际航行船舶，必须持有记录船舶历史的“连续概要记录”（Continuous Synopsis Record）；所有500吨位以上的国际航行船舶，必须配备船上保安警报系统（Ship Security Alert System，SSAS）。所有公约适用的国际航行船舶，在船上必须备有经批准的《船舶保安计划》，通过保安审核并取得《国际船舶保安证书》，等等。[49]
2004年7月1日，《国际船舶和港口设施保安规则》开始实施后，港口和船上同时加强了海事安全的防范，对海盗和海上武装抢劫，起了明显的阻遏作用。规则中要求所有300吨位以上的国际航行船舶，必须持有记录船舶历史的“连续概要记录”这项措施，杜绝了海盗将抢来的船只重新注册成“幽灵船”的现象。
2005年，联合国海事组织还应马六甲海峡沿岸国的要求，在印尼首都雅加达举行了“雅加达会议”，召集了马六甲海峡的使用国以及与马六甲海峡利益攸关的各方，讨论有关分担马六甲海峡管理费用的问题。2006年在马来西亚首都吉隆坡举行了“吉隆坡会议”，沿岸国政府提出了6项与马六甲海峡航运安全有关的提案，要求与会国资助，中国、美国、韩国等国承诺出资援助这些项目。
2007年，马六甲海峡的使用国以及马六甲海峡利益攸关方，在“新加坡会议”上通过了建立“合作协调机制”（Cooperative Mechanism）的决议，该机制旨在协调马六甲海峡沿岸国和马六甲海峡的使用国以及马六甲海峡利益攸关方的合作，促进马六甲海峡的使用国以及马六甲海峡利益攸关方，以自愿为原则帮助沿岸国保障马六甲海峡的航运安全和环境保护，等等。通过这三次会议，减轻了马六甲海峡沿岸国管理海峡的负担，提高了沿岸国保障海峡安全和打击海盗的积极性。[50]
【注释】
[1]Alan Collins，Contemporary Security Studies，Oxford University Press，2007，p.292
[2]Martin N.Murphy，Small Boats，Weak States，Dirty Money：The Challenge of Piracy（New York：Columbia University Press，2009），p.185.
[3]Matthew Hunt，Bleed to Bankruptcy：Economic Targeting in the Global Jihad，JIR，Jan.2007.pp.14-17.
[4]Simon Elegant，The Return of Abu Sayyaf，Time Asia，23 August，2004.
[5]Harold W Gehman Jr.Lost Patrol：The Attack on the USS Cole，US Naval Institute Proceedings，Vol.1227，No.4，April 2001，pp.34～37。
[6]Michael Richardson，A Time Bomb for Global Trade：Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction（Singapore：Institute of Southeast Asian Studies，2004），p.18.
[7]Gottschalk and Flanagan，Jolly Roger with an Uzi，（Annapolis，Md.：Naval Institute Press，2000）p.110.
[8]Ministry of Home Affairs，White Paper：The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism（Singapore：Ministry of Home Affairs，2003），pp.29-30.
[9]Michael Richardson，A Time Bomb for Global Trade：Martime－related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction（Singapore：Institute of Southeast Asian Studies，2004）p.4.
[10]Tullio Treves，The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation in Ronzitti，Natalino，ed.Maritime Terrorism and International Law（Dorecht，Boston and London：Maritinus Nijhoff Publishers，1990），pp.69-90.
[11]Michael Bohn，The Achille Lauro Hijacking：Lessons in the Politics and Prejudices of Terrorism.Washington.DC：Potomac Books，2004，p.10.
[12]Malvina Halberstam，Terrorism on the High Sea：The Achille Lauro，Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety，The American Journal of International Law 82，No.2（1988）.
[13]Martin N.Murphy，Small Boats，Weak States，Dirty Money：The Challenge of Piracy，（New York：Columbia University Press，2009），p.208.
[14]Ibid.p.252.
[15]Sakhuja，Three more mini-subs found in Rawai，The Nation（Bangkok），5 June 2000.
[16]Peter Apps，Sri Lanka，Tigers claim victory in naval clash，Reuters AlertNet，17 June 2006.
[17]Scot C.Truver，Mines of August：An International Whodunit，US Naval Institue Proceedings，Vol.111，No.5，May 1985，pp.95-117.
[18]Peter Chalk，Maritime Terrorism in the Contemporary Era：Threat and Potential Future Contingencies，The MIPT Terrorism Annual，2006.Oklahoma City：National Memorial Insitute for the Prevention of Terrorism，2006，p.30.
[19]Martin N.Murphy，Small Boats，Weak States，Dirty Money：The Challenge of Piracy，New York：Columbia University Press，2009，p.261.
[20]Peter Chalk，Martime Terrorism in the Contemporary Era：Threat and Potential Furture contingencies，The MIPT Terrorism Annual，2006.Oklahoma City：National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 2006.
[21]Rommel C.Banlaoi，Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asian：The Abu Sayyaf Threat，Naval War College Review，2005，pp.63-80.
[22]Martin N.Murphy，Small Boats，Weak States，Dirty Money：The Challenge of Piracy，New York：Columbia University Press，2009，p.363.(https://www.daowen.com)
[23]R.S.Vasan，Sea Control and the LTTE，Oberver Research Foundation，Strategic Trends，Vol.IV.Issue 27，7 Aug.2006.
[24]Rommel C.Banlaoi，The Abu Sayyaf Group：Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism in Peter Lehr edited，Violence at Sea：Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism，New York：Routlege，2007，p.123.
[25]Stefan Eklof，Pirates in Paradise：A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders，Copenhangen：NIAS，p.113
[26]Rommel C.Banlaoi，“The Abu Sayyaf Group：Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism”in Peter Lehr edited，Violence at Sea：Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism（New York：Routlege，2007），p.123.
[27]Department of National Defense，Info Kit on the Abu Sayyaf Group，Committee on National Defense and Security of the Philippine Senate，24 August 2001.
[28]Roberto N.Aventajado，140 days of Terror：In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf（Pasig City：Anvil Publishing，INC，2004）.
[29]Larry Niksch，Abu Sayyaf：Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation，CRS Report for Congress，25 January 2002.
[30]Gracia Burnham and Dean Merrill，In the Presence of My Enemies（Wheaton，IL：Tyndale House Publisher，2003）.
[31]Rommel C.Banlaoi，“The Abu Sayyaf Group：Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism”in Peter Lehr edited，Violence at Sea：Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism（New York：Routlege，2007），p.132.
[32]Rommel C.Banlaoi，“The Abu Sayyaf Group：Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism”in Peter Lehr edited，Violence at Sea：Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism（New York：Routlege，2007），p.133.
[33]Mayors Vow to Lead Fight Vs Terrorism，Support National 1D System，Philippine Star，22 October 2002.
[34]Rommel C.Banlaoi，War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia（Quezon City：Rex Book Store International，2004）.
[35]Elena Pavlova，Jemaah Islamiah according to PUPJI”in Andrew T.H.Tan，A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia（Cheltenham，UK：Edward Elgar，2007），p.76
[36]Andrew T.H.Tan，Security Perspectives of the Malay Archipelago：Security Linkages in the Second Front in the War on Terrorism（Cheltenham UK：Edward Elgar，2004），p.62.
[37]Ministry of Home Affairs，White Paper：The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism（Singapore：Ministry of Home Affairs，2003），pp.29-30.
[38]ICC-IMB，Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships：Annual Report 1st January -31st December 1997，UK：ICC International Maritime Bureau，1998，p.12
[39]Kirsten E.Schulze，Free Aceh Movement（GAM），Anatomy of a Separatist Organziation，Policy Studies.NO.2.Washington，D.C：East-West Centre，2004.
[40]Anthony Davis，Police Interdict arms traffic to Aceh，Jane’s IR，1 April，2004.
[41]Free Aceh Movement，http：//www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/aceh.htm.
[42]R.Hariharan，Sri Lank：How strong are the Tigers？，South East Asia Analysis Group Note No.297，28 Feb.2006.
[43]Adam Dolnik，Suicide Terrorism and Southeast Asia in Andrew T.H.Tan edited，A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia，Cheltenham（UK：Edward Elgar，2007）.P.105.
[44]N.Manoharan，Tigers with fins：Naval Wing of the LTTE，Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies，Article No.1757，31 May 2005.
[45]V.Suryanarayan，Sea Tigers and Indian Security，Journal of Indian Ocean Studies，Vol.12，No.3，Dec，2004，pp.404-411.
[46]ICC-IMB，Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships：Annual Report 1st January -31 December 1997，Essex：ICC International Maritime Bureau，1998，pp.13-14.
[47]Mark A.R.Kleiman，Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat：Causal Links and Implications for Domestic Drug Control Policy，Congressional Research Service，RL32334；20 April 2004，pp.2-7.
[48]Martin N.Murphy，Small Boats，Weak States，Dirty Money：The Challenge of Piracy（New York：Columbia University Press，2009），p.397.
[49]IMO website，http：//www.imo.org/Facilitation /mainframe.asp？topic_id=388.
[50]Efhimios E.Mitropoulos，Opening Address of Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore：Enhancing Safety，Security and Environmental Protection Singapore，Tuesday，4 September 2007”.IMO/SGP 1/INF.7.