六、结　语

六、结　语

安德鲁·莫拉维奇克对于自由主义国际关系理论及其应用于国际法领域的研究表明，自由主义理论对于国际法研究具有重要的意义。国际法的制定、形式、内容、演化、实施等不仅是国家间权力、制度和观念的产物，更是国家偏好和国家间偏好作用下的产物。各种个人和社会群体经由国内和跨国法律过程而形成的国家偏好，对于国际法的生成、内容、形式、演化、裁判、实施等，都具有重要的型塑作用。从经验实证的角度来看，自由主义理论对于国际法的生成、内容、形式、演化、裁判、实施等各个过程的因果机理，都具有重要甚至决定性、优先性的具体和丰富的解释力。同时，自由主义理论对于国际法上的主权与民主正当性（合法性）等制度和概念的应然规范性研究，也具有重要贡献。自由主义理论不仅适用于经济等低政治领域国际法的解释，也适用于核不扩散等高政治领域国际法的解释。自由主义国际法理论甚至澄清了诸多本来属于自由主义，却长期被误认为是现实主义的国际法理论，从而有助于分清哪些是自由主义理论的贡献，哪些是现实主义理论的贡献。因而，自由主义国际法理论与既有的现实主义、制度主义、建构主义的国际法理论之间是一种竞争和互补的关系。任何国际法现象都需要从自由主义、现实主义、制度主义、建构主义等多种不同理论视角予以观察、解释、预测、评估，才能够得到更好的解释。一种完整的“社科国际法学”（借用时下流行的“社科法学”一语，社科国际法学是指与实证法学国际法理论相对应的社会科学国际法理论）需要综合应用自由主义、现实主义、制度主义、建构主义等各种国际关系理论为其提供支撑。

当然，相对于现实主义、制度主义、建构主义的国际法理论而言，自由主义国际关系理论应用于国际法研究还处于初步阶段，自由主义理论对于国际法研究的贡献还有待于国际法与国际关系跨学科学者有效地将自由主义理论应用于国际法各个领域，才能够得到检测和验证。同时，作为自由主义理论硬核概念的国家偏好在多大程度上受到现实主义的国际权力结构、国际制度结构和国际观念结构的影响，或者说，偏好、权力、制度和观念之间的关系和互动，仍然有待于进一步探讨。自由主义国际法理论前景广阔。

（本文编辑：胡宽）

【注释】

[1]本文编译自Andrew Moravcsik，Liberal Theories of International Law，in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations：The State of the Art，Jeffrey L.Dunoff and Mark A.Pollack（eds.），Cambridge University Press，2013，pp.83～118.在不改动原文的基础上，译者增加了部分文字与段落。此外，为了给读者提供进一步了解的便利，保留了原文相应部分的英文注释。

[2]安德鲁·莫拉维奇克（Andrew Moravcsik）系美国普林斯顿大学政治学系和伍德罗·威尔逊学院政治与国际事务教授、欧洲联盟研究项目主任。

[3]王菲系甘肃政法学院硕士研究生。王彦志系吉林大学法学院副教授。

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[84]Andrew Moravcsik，The New Abolitionism：Why Does the U.S.Practice the Death Penalty While Europe Does Not？，European Studies Newsletter，Vol.4，2001-9-2（1）；Andrew Moravcsik，The Paradox of U.S.Human Rights Policy，in American Exceptionalism and Human Rights，Michael Ignatieff（ed.），Princeton University Press，2005，pp.147～197.

[85]Laurence R.Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter，Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication，Yale Law Journal，Vol.107，1997，pp.314～318.

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[90]Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter，International Law，International Relations and Compliance，in Handbook of International Relations，Walter Carlsnaes，Thomas Risse and Beth A.Simmons（eds.），Sage Publications，Ltd.，2002，p.545.

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[93]Eric A.Posner and John C.Yoo，Judicial Independence in International Tribunals，California Law Review，Vol.93，2005，pp.1～74.

[94]Eric A.Posner and John C.Yoo，Judicial Independence in International Tribunals，California Law Review，Vol.93，2005，p.55.

[95]Eric A.Posner，International Law and the Disaggregated State，Florida State U-niversity Law Review，Vol.32，2005，pp.797～842.

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