五、结语
以往，不少学者都认为，肯尼迪政府将导弹交易视为是“不可想象的”，从一开始就拒绝考虑这一主张。[64]英国首相麦克米伦也曾称，在导弹交易问题上肯尼迪“是从不动摇的”。[65]而实际情况要复杂得多。
通过以上的初步考察可以看出，在美国应对古巴导弹危机的决策过程中，导弹交易始终是美国领导人讨论的一个现实方案；美苏领导人的确就导弹交易问题达成了秘密协议，而且这一协议构成了美苏解决危机的一个重要组成部分。由此可见，肯尼迪并没有听从那些“鹰派”顾问的意见，一味地凭借美国的军事和战略优势向对手施加压力，促其让步。以往有关他宁愿冒一场核战争的危险也不愿意在土耳其导弹问题上做出妥协的说法无疑是错误的，那种认为“是肯尼迪利用了美国的压倒性优势来迫使赫鲁晓夫在古巴导弹危机中退却”的观点显然是站不住脚的。事实恰恰相反。为了避免核战争的爆发，肯尼迪一直考虑在土耳其导弹问题上做出让步，不论是通过公开还是私下的渠道，并准备承担因导弹交易而带来的严重政治风险。[66]这也充分展示了肯尼迪在外交决策过程中灵活和理性的一面。美苏之间的秘密交易对美国与土耳其之间的关系造成了一定程度的负面影响。危机期间，土耳其政府一直坚定地站在美国一边，对美苏之间所达成的交易一无所知，并且确信美国不会违背自己的承诺，擅自做出让步，从而危及北约联盟的团结。美国撤出“木星”导弹的行动无疑令土耳其领导人和民众深感不安，认为土耳其不过是大国政治博弈的一枚棋子，北约的所谓“集体安全”是靠不住的。随后，土耳其对美国和北约的政策做出了一定的调整。鉴于对苏联构成威胁的“木星”导弹已被拆除，苏联和土耳其的关系则开始出现了缓和的迹象。
（原刊于《历史教学》2017年第8期）
【注释】
[1]McGeorge Bundy，“The Presidency and the Peace”，Foreign Affairs，Vol.42，No.3，1964，pp.359-360；Richard Smoke，National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma，New York：Random House，1987，p.121；Stanley Spangler，Force and Accommodation in World Politics，Maxwell Air Force Base：Air University Press，1991，p.252，266；John Spanier and Steven Hook，American Foreign Policy Since World War Ⅱ，Washington，D.C.：CQ Press，1998，p.106；Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow，Essence of Decision：Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis，New York：Longman，1999，p.129.
[2]相关研究参见Donald L.Hafner，“Bureaucratic Politics and Those Frigging Missiles：JFK，Cuba and U.S.Missiles in Turkey”，Orbis，Vol.21，Summer 1977，pp.307-333；Barton J.Bernstein，“The Cuban Missile Crisis：Trading the Jupiters in Turkey”，Political Science Quarterly，Vol.95，No.1，1980，pp.97-125；Philip Nash，“Nuisance of Decision：Jupiter Missiles and the Cuban Missile Crisis”，Journal of Strategic Studies，Vol.14，No.1，1991，pp.1-26；Nur B.Criss，“Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey：The Jupiter Affair，1959-1963”，Journal of Strategic Studies，Vol.20，No.3，1997，pp.97-122.
[3]Len Scott and R.Gerald Hughes eds.，The Cuban Missile Crisis：A Critical Reappraisal，London：Routledge，2015，pp.151-152；Don Munton，“Hits and Myths：The Essence，the Puzzles and the Missile Crisis”，International Relations，Vol.26，No.3，2012，pp.314，316.
[4]“Memorandum of Conference with the President”，June 17，1959，DNSA.
[5]Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali，One Hell of a Gamble：Khrushchev，Castro，and Kennedy，1958-1964，New York：Norton，1997，pp.196-197；William Taubman，Khrushchev：The Man and His Era，New York：Norton，2003，pp.536-537.
[6]Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein，We All Lost the Cold War，Princeton：Princeton University Press，1994，p.78.
[7]Philip Nash，“Nuisance of Decision：Jupiter Missiles and the Cuban Missile Crisis”，Journal of Strategic Studies，Vol.14，No.1，1991，pp.6-10.
[8]Sheldon M.Stern，The Week the World Stood Still：Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis，Stanford：Stanford University Press，2005，p.57.
[9]Ernest R.May and Philip D.Zelikow eds.，The Kennedy Tapes：Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis，Cambridge：Harvard University Press，1997，p.142；U.S.Department of State，Foreign Relations of the United States，1961-1963，Vol.11，Washington，D.C.：United States Government Printing Office，1996，p.121.
[10]Harriman，“Memorandum on Kremlin Reactions”，October 22，1962，DNSA.
[11]Frank Sieverts，The Cuban Crisis，August 22，1963，U.S.Declassified Documents Online，p.46.
[12]Lawrence Freedman，Kennedy's Wars：Berlin，Cuba，Laos and Vietnam，New York：Oxford University Press，2000，p.206；Frank Sieverts，The Cuban Crisis，August 22，1963，U.S.Declassified Documents Online，p.69.
[13]Sheldon M.Stem，The Week the World Stood Still：Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis，Stanford：Stanford University Press，2005，p.75；Mark J.White，The Cuban Missile Crisis，London：Macmillan Press，1996，p.173.
[14]Arthur M.Schlesinger，Jr.，Robert Kennedy and His Times，Boston：Houghton Mifflin，1978，p.516.
[15]Frank Sieverts，The Cuban Crisis，August 22，1963，U.S.Declassified Documents Online，pp.126-127.
[16]U.S.Deaprtment of State，Foreign Relations of the United States，1961-1963，Vol.11，Washington，D.C.：United States Government Printing Office，1996，pp.180-181；George Ball，The Past Has Another Pattern：Memoirs，New York：Norton，1982，p.295.
[17]U.S.Deaprtment of State，Foreign Relations of the United States，1961-1963，Vol.11，Washington，D.C.：United States Government Printing Office，1996，pp.213-215；Finletter to Rusk，October 25，1962，DNSA.
[18]Hare to Secretary of State，October 26，1962，DNSA；Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh eds.，The Cuban Missile Crisis，1962：A National Security Archive Documents Reader，New York：The New Press，1992，pp.231-232.
[19]James Nathan ed.，The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited，New York：St.Martin's Press，1992，p.76.
[20]Michael Beschloss，The Crisis Years：Kennedy and Khrushchev，New York：HarperCollins，1991，pp.529-530.
[21]Barton J.Bernstein，“The Cuban Missile Crisis：Trading the Jupiters in Turkey”，Political Science Quarterly，Vol.95，No.1，1980，pp.115-116.
[22]Nasuh Uslu，The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003，New York：Nova Science，2003，pp.156-157.
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[36]Ernest R.May and Philip D.Zelikow eds.，The Kennedy Tapes：Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis，Cambridge：Harvard University Press，1997，pp.529-530.
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[38]James Nathan ed.，The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited，New York：St.Martin's Press，1992，p.91.
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[40]Dean Rusk，As I Saw It，New York：Norton，1990，p.240；James Blight and David Welch eds.，On the Brink：Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis，New York：Hill and Wang，1989，p.174.
[41]Robert Kennedy，Thirteen Days：A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis，New York：Norton，1969，pp.108-109；Anatoly Dobrynin，In Confidence：Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents，New York：Random House，1995，pp.87-88；“Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry”，October 27，1962，Cold War International History Project Bulletin，Spring 1995，pp.79-80.
[42]Raymond L.Garthoff，Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis，Washington，D.C.：The Brookings Institution，1989，pp.95-96；Dean Rusk，As I Saw It，New York：Norton，1990，p.241.
[43]L.V.Scott，Macmillan，Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis，New York：St.Martin's Press，1999，pp.173-174.
[44]James Blight and David Welch eds.，On the Brink：Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis，New York：Hill and Wang，1989，pp.162，171.
[45]U.S.Deaprtment of State，Foreign Relations of the United States，1961-1963，Vol.11，Washington，D.C.：United States Government Printing Office，1996，pp.276-277.
[46]David Gioe，Len Scott and Christopher Andrew eds.，An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis，London：Routledge，2014，p.211；Nigel Ashton，Kennedy，Macmillan and the Cold War，London：Palgrave，2002，p.83.
[47]Oleg Troyanovsky，“The Caribbean Crisis”，International Affairs，April/May 1992，p.154.
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[49]Dean Rusk，As I Saw It，New York：Norton，1990，p.240.
[50]U.S.Deaprtment of State，Foreign Relations of the United States，1961-1963，Vol.6，Washington，D.C.：Uinited States Government Printing Office，1996，pp.189-190.
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[53]McGeorge Bundy，Danger and Survival：Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years，New York：Random House，1988，p.434.
[54]Philip Nash，The Other Missiles of October：Eisenhower，Kennedy，and the Jupiters，1957-1963，Chapel Hill：The University of North Carolina Press，1997，pp.157-160；Sheldon Stem，Averting the Final Failure：John F.Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings，Stanford：Stanford University Press，2003，p.388.
[55]United States Congress，Senate，Committee on Foreign Relations，Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee，Vol.15，Washington，D.C.：United States Government Printing Office，1987，pp.105-106，111；James Nathan ed.，The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited，New York：St.Martin's Press，1992，p.23.
[56]James Blight and David Welch eds.，On the Brink：Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis，New York：Hill and Wang，1989，pp.173-174，190-191.
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[61]Norstad to JCS，December 28，1962，U.S.Declassified Documents Online，CK2349094415.
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[63]Memorandum of Conversation，December 14，1962，DNSA.
[64]Richard Neustadt and Ernest May，Thinking in Time，New York：Free Press，1986，p.14.
[65]麦克米伦：《麦克米伦回忆录》（六），陈体芳译，北京：商务印书馆，1980年，第204页。
[66]Stephen E.Ambrose，“The Presidency and Foreign Policy”，Foreign Affairs，Vol.70，No.5，Winter 1991/1992，p.129；David Gioe，Len Scott and Christopher Andrew eds.，An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis，London：Routledge，2014，p.268.