五、结语
尽管肯尼迪政府制订了旨在推翻古巴政府的作战计划，但由于受到诸多复杂因素的制约，使其未能付诸实施。其一，通过支持反对派来实现一个国家的政权更迭是美国的惯用手法，但不论是在古巴国内还是国外，都缺乏一个强有力的反对派，美国的情报部门也多次指出古巴政府赢得了大多数古巴民众的支持，国内政局稳定，美国策划的骚乱或反叛行动不可能取得成功，这就使美国失去了军事干涉的基本前提。
其二，无论是空袭还是入侵古巴这样一个小国都会在全世界特别是拉美地区引发一场反美浪潮，在政治上给美国造成严重的负面影响，并使美国与盟国的关系复杂化。正因为如此，美国国务院一直对采取军事手段解决古巴问题持反对态度。即使在美国国内，绝大部分民众也不赞成采取大规模空袭或入侵这样的战争行动，担心这将引发一场更大的战争。[92]
其三，美国要为军事干涉付出高昂的代价，且行动后果难以预料。军方估计，在行动的第一天美军就将伤亡4462人，10天之内伤亡人数为1.85万人。[93]当时美国情报部门推测在古巴的苏军只有8000人，至多1万人，更不清楚苏军配备有大量战术核武器。很显然，其对伤亡数字的估计是非常不准确的。事实上，古巴导弹危机发生时，苏联在古巴驻军41902人，拥有42枚中程和中远程导弹、576枚地对空导弹、80枚巡航导弹、12枚战术导弹和158颗核弹头。如前所述，美国军方并不能确保大规模空袭就能彻底摧毁苏联在古巴的导弹，也不能保证美国免遭报复。倘若美军实施对古巴的应急作战计划，其结果只能是一场灾难。当时，美国已经完成的庇护所能容纳6000万人，不到美国总人口的1/3。负责民防事务的助理国防部部长曾向肯尼迪汇报说，9200万美国人和58个人口超过10万人的城市处于古巴导弹的射程之内。因而，民防成为肯尼迪面临的一大难题。他特别担心，如果美国对古巴发动进攻，会有数枚导弹击中美国。他曾考虑对东南沿海若干大城市的居民进行疏散，但鉴于此举势必会造成全国范围的恐慌而作罢。[94]入侵带来的问题也很多，古巴27万人的部队和数量庞大的民兵组织以及广大民众将对美军实施游击战，4万苏军也将与古巴军民一道抗击入侵者，从而使得大量美军旷日持久地陷入古巴战争的泥潭。肯尼迪明确地告诫下属：“我认为我们应该牢记英国人在布尔战争、苏联人在苏芬战争以及朝鲜战争的教训。”[95]更为重要的是，美国决策者非常担心空袭或入侵古巴会导致同苏联的战争，这很可能是两国之间的一场核较量。美国国家资源评估中心曾用计算机模拟系统就苏联对美国发动大规模核打击的可能后果进行了分析，称在2天之内，苏联可向美国投掷355件核武器，即便其攻击的目标限于军事基地而不是城市，仍会有50个城市的中心地区遭受严重破坏，3400多万人将严重缺水，48%的工厂设施不能使用，有25个州的州政府因受到辐射和爆炸冲击波的影响至少在3个月内不能正常运转。[96]
此外，美国领导人也高度关注当时另一个热点地区，那就是柏林。肯尼迪及其主要顾问大都认为，柏林局势与古巴紧密相连，如果美国对古巴采取行动，苏联势必会在柏林做出反应，夺取整个柏林。
美国军方和政府中的一些“鹰派”分子一味地要求使用武力解决问题，确信导弹危机为美国推翻古巴政府提供了难得的机会。军方领导人先后提交了24份报告要求采取军事行动，认为不论是在战略力量还是常规力量方面美国都具有明显的优势，这意味着如果美国对古巴采取行动不会有“真正的战争危险”，苏联进行报复或做出军事反应的可能性很小，甚至完全没有，除了退却之外别无选择；美国面临的最大危险是无所作为，而不是空袭、入侵古巴这类具有决定性意义的行动。[97]这显然是大大低估了当时的战争风险。肯尼迪坚持军事行动必须同外交谈判协调起来，并服从于政治的需要，通过妥协的方式谋求危机的解决。对他而言，军事部署乃是向苏联和古巴施加压力、促其妥协的重要手段，是实现其政治目标的工具。肯尼迪政府对古巴的应急作战计划清晰地折射出美国对古巴政策的复杂性以及冷战的一些基本特征，也揭示出美国霸权的限度。
（原刊于《历史研究》2013年第2期）
【注释】
[1]James G.Blight，Bruce J.Allyn and David A.Welch eds.，Cuba on the Brink：Castro，the Missile Crisis，and the Soviet Collapse，New York：Pantheon Books，1993，pp.141，160-161，289-290；Bruce J.Allyn，James G.Blight and David A Welch eds.，Back to the Brink：Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis，Lanham：University Press of America，1992，p.9；James G.Blight and David A.Welch eds.，On the Brink：Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis，New York：Hill & Wang，1989，pp.249-250.
[2]Raymond F.Garthoff，Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis，Washington，D.C.：Brookings Institution，1989，pp.6-7，9，50；Bruce J.Allyn，James G.Blight and David A.Welch，“Essence of Revision：Moscow，Havana and the Cuban Missile Crisis”，International Security，Vol.14，No.3，Winter 1989/1990，pp.146-147.
[3]James G.Hershberg，“Before the Missiles of October：Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba？”，Diplomatic History，Vol.14，No.2，Spring 1990；Michael C.Desch，“That Deep Mud in Cuba：The Strategic Threat and U.S.Planning for a Conventional Response during the Missile Crisis”，Security Studies，Vol.1，No.2，1991.
[4]Wayne S.Smith，The Russian Arent Coming：New Soviet Policy in Latin America，Boulder：Lynne Rienner Publishers，1992，p.163；James G.Blight，Bruce J.Allyn and David A.Welch eds.，Cuba on the Brink：Castro，the Missile Crisis，and the Soviet Collapse，New York：Pantheon Books，1993，p.151.
[5]Herbert Parmet，JFK：The Presidency of John F.Kennedy，New York：Penguin Books，1986，pp.46-47；Trumbull Higgins，The Perfect Failure：Kennedy，Eisenhower，and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs，New York：Norton，1987，pp.58-59.
[6]Mike Mansfield，“The Cuban Aftermath”，May 1，1961，DNSA/Cuba；Arthur S.Schlesinger，Robert Kennedy and His Times，Boston：Houghton Mifflin，1978，p.473.
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