I.Menashe Business Mercantile Ltd.v.William Hill O...
R.P.C.47（2002）
Before：MR Justice Jacob
March 8 and 15，2002
Jacob
Analysis
Patent—Infringement—Secondaryinfringement—Claims to a linked host and terminal computer system—Defendant's host terminal outside United Kingdom—Whether supply of program in the United Kingdom amounted to secondary infringement—Whether invention“put into effect”in United Kingdom.
The claimants were the proprietors of European Patent No.0625760 for a gaming system.In simple terms，the claims were directed to a host computer，terminal computer（s），a communication means between them and a program means for operating the terminal computer.The defendant was a bookmaker.It operated a gaming system available to its customers in the United Kingdom who had a computer.The defendant supplied its customers with a program which，in effect，turned the customer's computer into a terminal computer in the defendant's system.
The defendant's host computer was located in the Netherlands Antilles.The claimants alleged that when communication via the Internet between the customer's terminal computer and the defendant's host computer was established the whole system fell within the claims of the patent.The defendant denied that what it did fell within the claims because the host computer was outside the jurisdiction.
The claimant also asserted that the supply within the United Kingdom to the customers of the program amounted to infringement under section 60（2）of the Patents Act 1977 in that the supply of the program within the United Kingdom amounted to the supply of an essential element of the invention for the purpose of putting the invention into effect in the United Kingdom.The parties requested the court to determine the following preliminary point：
“Is it a defence to the claim under section 60（2）of the Patent Act 1977，if otherwise good，that the host computer claimed in the patent in suit is not present in the United Kingdom，but is connected to the rest of the apparatus claimed in the patent？”
Representation
Mr Prescott Q.C.for the claimants says the supply of the computer programs in the United Kingdom falls within section 60（2）；thatit is“supplying...within the United Kingdom a person...with means relating to an essential element of the invention，for putting it into effect in the United Kingdom”.Mr Carr Q.C.for the defendants accepts（for present purposes）that the supply of the program is within the United Kingdom and that it is an essential element of the invention.But，says he，it is not for putting the invention into effect in the United Kingdom.For that you would need the claimed combination（host and terminal）to be in the United Kingdom.
Mr Prescott fastens on the words“effect in the United Kingdom”.That is not the same as saying the invention must actually be used in the United Kingdom.It is sufficient if there is the effect of use here.As a practical business matter William Hill are using the effect of the invention here.
Further，says Mr Prescott，if he were wrong there would be an enormous hole in the internationally agreed rules for infringement.His skeleton argument demonstrates the hole in the following way：
“Take the case of a someone who installs and sells a telecommunications apparatus which straddles the French German border.Suppose the patent claim calls for integers A+B.Both are essential integers.But A is in France and B is in Germany.If WH are right，no infringement.We respectfully submit it obviously would be infringement—else it would offend common sense.
That cannot be what the framers of the Convention intended.It is not purposive construction.We could give many other examples，and of great commercial and industrial importance.For instance，a constellation of satellites，not all passing over the United Kingdom at once，and a downlink here.“
Moreover，says Mr Prescott，the other language versions of the Treaty are not inconsistent with his argument.They read as follows：
·“French：‘demise en oeuvre，surce territoire，decette invention’；
·German：‘zur Benutzung der Erfindung in diesem Gebiet’；
·Italian：‘per utilizarre，in tale territorio，linvenzione’；
·Spanish：‘para llevarla en efecto en dichoterritory’；
·Portuguese：‘para executar，nesse território，a referida invencão’.”
He submits that none of these phrases compels the notion that the complete apparatus necessarily resides in any particular country.They are at least equally consistent with the notion of getting the invention to work so that its effect is enjoyed in the appropriate Territory.So，submits Mr Prescott，no version of the Treaty precludes his construction.
Next Mr Prescott prays in aid a second-order argument—an argument based onworking back from other provisions.He says look at the exception to Article 26.1 for the supply of staple commercial products.Article 26.2 says：
“Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the means are staple commercial products，except where the third party induces the person supplied to commit acts prohibited by Article 25.”
Article 25 sets out the rules for direct infringement，which are territorial.You are only liable for selling a staple commercial product if you induce a primary infringer to infringe within the territory.The contrast is between a direct reference to primary infringement（i.e.Article 25）and a reference to putting the invention into effect within the territory.The latter，submits Mr Prescott，conveys a wider notion.
Mr Prescott also praysin aid the philosophy of infringement to be found in the EPC Article 69 and its well-known Protocol.The EPC and CPC were drafted at the same time and they should be construed together at least so far as ascertaining their general purpose.The key provision of the Protocol demands“a fair protection for the patentee”.There would be nothing fair if United Kingdom punters were using the system yet it were held the system was not being put into effect here.
He closes with a flourish：“The system is what is claimed in the patent.It actually claims‘a system’.Therefore it makes sense to speak of the invention being put into effect in this country.If not in this country，then where？”
Mr Carr Q.C.for William Hill ripostes by pointing to the double reference to“United Kingdom”in section 60（2）.This corresponds to the EPC's use of“territories of the Contracting States”and“therein”—again a double use.Moreover，he points out that the second use is particularly deliberate having received specific consideration during the treaty negotiations.“Therein”was specifically added to an earlier draft on the suggestion of the AIPPI.
Mr Carr realised the force of Mr Prescott's“hole”point.He sought to answer it by saying that it was a hole which，if the patentee's agent had been more ingenious，could have been plugged.All the agent had to do was to insert separate claims to the terminal and the host computers.Mr Carr handed me claims for the terminal and host which，he said，would have done the job.They took the form“A terminal（host）computer for using in a gaming system［then defined］，the terminal computer comprising...”And he answered Mr Prescott's flourish by saying that in the case of the system claim the invention was not put into effect in any one country.
Mr Carr also had a second order argument.He relied on the ships and aircraft exemption contained in section 60（5）（d）—itself derived from Article 27（d）of the CPC though it is expressed in the United Kingdom Act in unnecessarily different language.This exempts from infringement use of an invention on board a vessel temporarily within the waters of a Contracting State.Suppose，submitted Mr Carr，a man supplied a“means essential”to such a ship.There would be no infringement on board—so why would the supplier be an infringer？Yet he would be if the patentees were right.
Mr Carr's main point，however，was that to give into effect in the United Kingdom the wide meaning suggested by the patentees would be far too uncertain.What effect would do？Receiptof money here？You would have to look at the effect in a wide range of cases and it would be quite uncertain what sort of effect（financial，economic，direct or indirect）would count.
I have no hesitation in accepting the arguments of Mr Prescott and rejecting those of Mr Carr.I do so without regret.Any other result would be monstrous—allowing a defendant to use supposed cross-border problems to avoid infringement of a system anywhere.My detailed reasons for rejecting Mr Carr's argument follow.
First the double reference to the United Kingdom.Mr Carr overlooks the fact that the second reference（into effect in the United Kingdom）looks to effect within the United Kingdom not use within the United Kingdom.The fact that second reference（“therein”）was added during the negotiations is understandable but irrelevant.
All that did was to identify the territory within which the effect was to be identified—to make sure that both the supply of the essential means and its effect were within the same territory.Mr Prescott's second order point is telling—why speak of“putting invention into effect in the United Kingdom”if you simply meant“infringe the United Kingdom patent”.I can see no purposive construction of the Treaty which would make sense in this context.
Next，the hole.I do not think Mr Carr's answer is either rational or correct.The patentee's invention is in substance the combination of elements.It is the system.To say that a claim to the heart of the inventive concept would not suffice to provideprotection is to suggest that patentees should play games with the patent system.Here the game is to pretend that the invention is a terminal when programmed，whereas really the invention is a system.Moreover，the argument is flawed.It is trite patent law that individual items of a combination may be old or obvious，yet the combination not.
As to Mr Carr's argument about ships，I find that fanciful.I called it a second order argument.More accurately I think it is well down the order to second—construing a main provision by way of a very minor exception is hardly ever productive，especially in the context of an international Treaty.
In this case in any event it is wrong：the point of the exemption is to exempt the use of the invention on board，not toexempt suppliers.A ship which came to the United Kingdom temporarily for repairs would not infringe，but someone who supplied a device which was an essential element of an invention used on board would infringe.
Finally there is Mr Carr's“uncertainty”argument—that if“effect”meant any effect it was too vague.Mr Prescott shrewdly noticed a parallel with the Brussels Convention，Article 5（3）.This confers tort jurisdiction on a court in a Member State where“the harmful event occurred”.If anything that is a vaguer test than“effect”yet it has proved reasonably workable.(https://www.daowen.com)
In any event，just because there may be borderline cases of difficulty is no reason for not holding that an obvious case falls within the rule.No businessman would think for a moment that the effect of the invention is not within the United Kingdom when the whole point of the defendants'system is to get United Kingdom punters to play their system.
Accordingly I reject this defence.The answer to the question is“no”.I order that the appropriate paragraphs of the pleading be struck out.If William Hill have a defence it must be that they are not using a system within the claims of the patent or that the patent is invalid.The wheeze of putting the host computer abroad is of no help to them.
摘要
专利—侵权—间接侵权—针对连接的主机和终端计算机系统—被告的英国域外的主机终端—在英国提供程序是否构成间接侵权—专利是否在英国“付诸实施”。
原告是一个欧洲专利号为0625760的游戏系统的权利人。简单地说，该专利的权利要求是针对主机、终端计算机及它们之间的通信装置以及能够操作计算机的程序命令。被告是这个系统的操控人，其经营的游戏系统向其用户提供了一个程序，使在英国只要有计算机的用户均能够使用。实质上，被告的这一程序是把用户的计算机变成被告系统中的终端计算机。
被告的主机位于荷属安的列斯群岛。原告主张，当用户的终端计算机和被告的主机之间的互联网通信时，整个系统就落在专利权的保护范围之内了。被告否认自己的做法落入了专利权的保护范围，因为计算机主机不在专利权管辖范围内。
原告还声称，根据1977年《专利法案》第60条第2款，被告在英国为用户提供程序已经构成侵权，因其在英国提供的程序是发明的一项重要技术特征并且旨在将该发明在英国付诸实施。当事人请求法院解决下列要点：
当专利权利要求的必要技术特征中的主机没有存在于英国，其余部分在专利权利要求范围内，根据1977年《专利法案》第60条第2款，这是否能构成对这一主张的抗辩？
法官意见[1]
Mr Prescott Q.C.为原告主张说：在英国提供计算机程序落入了《专利法案》第60条第2款的范围之内，该款的原文是：“在英国为他人提供与发明有关的重要技术特征，旨在将它在英国付诸实施。”被告辩护人Mr Carr Q.C.就目前而言，承认在英国提供了程序，且该程序是此发明的重要技术特征。但是，这并不是将发明在英国付诸实施。针对付诸实施这一做法来说需要主机和终端计算机都在英国。
Mr Prescott抓住了“在英国付诸实施”这个重点。这与此发明实际上在英国使用不一样。如果使用产生的效果发生，就足够证明被告的侵权行为成立。作为实际的商业问题，在这个案件中威廉希尔正在利用本发明的效果。
此外，Mr Prescott强调说，如果他的观点错误，那么在国际上公认的侵权规则就会存在一个巨大的漏洞。他概括性地阐述了这个漏洞：
以一个人在法国、德国跨境安装或者销售电信设备为例。假定专利权利要求是由技术特征A+B组成的，A和B都是必要技术特征，但技术特征A在法国，技术特征B在德国。如果威廉希尔那方认为没有侵权的观点是正确的，我尊重他的观点，但我主张这显然是侵权，否则违反常识。
这不可能是该公约制定者的初衷。它不符合目的论的解释。我们可以给出很多具有商业和工业方面意义的典型例子。例如，人造卫星并不止一次同时在英国领域经过，它还有一个下行线路。
此外，Mr Prescott的观点在该条约的其他语言版本中都能够找到依据。比如，
法语：本发明在该地区的实施。
德语：在这一领域使用本发明的方法。
意大利语：在该领域使用本发明。
西班牙语：发明在该地区的影响。
葡萄牙语：为了在该地区执行这一发明。
他认为这些措辞都没有强制要求设备完整存在于某一特定国家。它们至少等同于这样的概念：使发明运作起来，以至于它的效果在适当的地域能被利用。因此，Mr Prescott的观点依据众多。
Mr Prescott进而认为，还可以从条文第26条第1款所说的主要商业元器件供应的例外情况来说明。《专利法》第26条第2款规定：
当方法属于主要的商业元器件时，第一段的观点不能适用，除非第三方引诱供应商实施了《专利法》第25条所禁止的犯罪行为。
第25条规定了基于一国领域的直接侵权规则。如果唆使一个主要侵权者在一国领域内侵权，那么销售者对其销售行为担责。就主要侵权规则（第25条）和在一国领域内将发明付诸实施规则的两个概念，Mr Prescott认可后者，且表达了更为宽泛的意义。
Mr Prescott试图在《欧洲专利公约》第69条以及最著名的议定书中寻找侵权的理论依据。EPC和CPC是在同一时期起草的，应该放在一起对比理解，以确定其总体目的。EPC的关键条款要求“为专利权人提供一种公平的保护”。如果英国的用户一边使用这个系统，一边又说这个系统没有在这里付诸实施，那么就没有公平可言。
他最后这样总结：“在专利要求中所主张的客体实际上是‘一个系统’。因此，在这个国家说到发明被付诸实施才是有意义的。如果不在这个国家，那么在哪里？”
代表威廉希尔公司的Mr Carr Q.C.通过指向第60（2）条对“英国”的双重规则进行激烈的辩驳，这相当于欧洲专利公约在“缔约国的领土”和“以内”使用——双重使用。此外，他指出，第二个使用是在条约谈判过程中曾收到的具体意见。“以内”曾经特别添加到AIPPI意见的一个早期草案中。
Mr Carr意识到Mr Prescott所说的“漏洞”观点的威胁。他认为：“如果专利权人的代理人处理得更加巧妙，这个漏洞是可以避免的。所有的代理人必须做的是对终端和主机计算机加上独立的权利要求。Mr Carr将终端和主机之间的权利要求交给我时，应当已经完成这项工作。他们采取的形式是‘在终端（主机）计算机中使用游戏系统（然后被定义），终端计算机包括……’”对Mr Prescott的主张，他回答，就此系统专利的申请来说，该发明没有在任何一个国家付诸实施。
此外，Mr Carr援引第60条第5款第4项所规定的临时过境予以抗辩。临时过境规则本身来自CPC条文中第27条第4款，在英国法案中也以其他译文的形式有所记载。对在缔约国水域内临时停靠的船舶使用发明的情形，认为是侵权豁免。假设按照Mr Carr的观点，一个人对这艘船提供了至关重要的方法来使用发明，将不被认为是侵权行为，那供应商为什么是侵权人？如果专利权人的观点是正确的，那么供应商也是侵权人。
不过，Mr Carr的主要观点是，专利权人提出的“发明在英国生效”这样含义宽广的说法将带来不确定性。会产生什么样的效果？从中获利了吗？必须综合整个案件来考虑其中的“影响”，并且很难确定哪种影响（金融、经济、直接或间接）会更有价值。
我毫不犹豫接受Mr Prescott（原告代理人））而不是Mr Carr（被告代理人）的观点。允许被告使用假定的跨境问题避免系统侵权，其后果是难以想象的。详细理由如下：
首先，是对英国的双重定义。Mr Carr忽略了一个事实：第二个定义（在英国生效）关注点是在英国的效果，而不是实际使用。在谈判期间增加第二个点（“以内”）的事实是可以理解的，但与此案不相关。
所做的一切只是确定发明产生效果的领域，以确保必要方法的提供及其效果在同一领域内。Mr Prescott的第二个观点指出，如果只是“侵犯英国专利”，为什么要说“将发明在英国付诸实施”。在这方面，我看到的都是不符合条约目的的解释，也与条约上下文逻辑不符。
其次，Mr Carr对于漏洞的回答既不理性也不正确。专利权人的发明实质上是各项技术特征的组合，作为一个系统，可以说对发明的权利要求不提供足够保护也就暗示着专利制度在敷衍专利权人。在此案中，当编程时游戏的终端计算机被假定为发明，而实际上的发明是一个系统。此外，这个观点是有缺陷的。根据旧的专利法，组合的单个组件也许是过时的或缺乏新颖性的，但是技术方案的整体却并不会缺乏新颖性。
至于Mr Carr关于临时过境规则的观点，那是假想，并没有根据。准确地说，它应该处于第二层次，在一项国际条约的背景下，通过临时过境的侵权豁免这种非常小的专利侵权例外分析一项主要规定几乎是没有成效的。
在这种情况下无论如何都是错误的：豁免指的是豁免在船舶或航空器上使用发明的行为，并不是豁免供应商。临时过境在英国进行修理的船舶不构成侵权，但是如果有人提供了在船上使用的某发明的重要部件，则提供者可能构成侵权。
最后，Mr Carr的有关“不确定性”论证有问题。如果“效果”意味着任何效果则太模糊。Mr Prescott敏锐地注意到这与《布鲁塞尔公约》第5条第3款相似。这授予了“发生有害事件”的会员国法院对侵权的管辖权。如果将一件事情看做一个模糊的测试而不是实际产生的“效果”，即使它已被证明是合理可行的，但对实际效果而言仍无意义。
无论如何，仅因为案件涉及跨境的难题，是不足以否认这样明显的案件的法律适用。当被告的所投入的系统的总体目的是让英国的用户使用其系统时，没有人会想到实施发明的这一行为不在英国。
因此，我拒绝这种抗辩。对这个问题的回答是“否”。我裁定剔除该诉状的几点主张。如果威廉希尔有辩护理由，一定是他们没有使用在该权利要求保护范围内的系统，或者该专利本身无效。主机在国外的抗辩对他们没有任何帮助。