Ⅱ.Centillion Data Systems，Llc.v.Qwest Communicatio...
United States Court of Appeals，
Federal Circuit.
631F，3d 1279
Centillion Data Systems，Llc，Plaintiff-Appellant，v.Qwest Communications International，Inc.，Qwest Corporation，and Qwest Communications Corporation，Defendants-Cross Appellants.
Rehearing En Banc Denied April 25，2011.
A.“Use”of a System Claim Under Section 271（a）
This case turns on what constitutes“use”of asystem or apparatus claim under§271（a）.Centillion argues that the district court adopted an overly narrow interpretation and that“use”simply means“the right to put into service any given invention.”Appellant's Br.22.It argues that use does not require that a party“practice”every element，only that it use the system as a collective.In other words，Centillion argues that operation of one component of an invention may“put into service”the invention even if the accused infringer does not directly interact with other components.It argues that we explicitly defined“use”under§271（a）in NTP.
We have never directly addressed the issue of infringement for“use”of asystem claim that includes elements in the possession of more than one actor.However，we defined the term in a very similar scenario in NTP.In NTP，the issue was whether infringement occurred within the United States.Id.at 1313.The claims and the accused product involved a handheld device operated by a customer as well as a number of relays operated by a service provider.One of these relays was located outside the United States.We had to determine whether a“use”by a customer of the entire system amounted to a“use”within the United States.
We stated that“courts have interpreted the term‘use’broadly”.Id.at 1316.Citing Bauer & Cie v.O'Donnell，229 U.S.1，33 S.Ct.616，57 L.Ed.1041（1913），we stated that the term use means“the right to put into service any invention.”NTP，418 F.3d at 1316-17.
We went further to distinguish use of a claimed method from that of a claimedsystem and to hold that“［t］he use of a claimed system under section 271（a）is the place at which the system as a whole is put into service，i.e.，the place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system obtained.”Id.at 1317.Applying this rule to the facts of the case in NTP，we held that customers located in the United States who sent messages via the accused product used the overall system and the location of the use was in the United States.
AlthoughNTP dealt with the situs of infringement rather than the nature of the infringing act，it interpreted the definition of“use”under§271（a）.We hold that to“use”a system for purposes of infringement，a party must put the invention into service，i.e.，control the system as a whole and obtain benefit from it.NTP，418 F.3d at 1317.The district court correctly determined that this definition from NTP was the proper one to apply.Opinion at 22.
The district court erred，however by holding that in order to“use”asystem under§271（a），a party must exercise physical or direct control over each individual element of the system.The“control”contemplated in NTP is the ability to place the system as a whole into service.In other words，the customer in NTP remotely“controlled”the system by simply transmitting a message.418 F.3d at 1317.That customer clearly did not have possession of each of the relays in the system，nor did it exert the level of direct，physical“control”that the district court requires.To accept the district court's interpretation of“use”would effectively overturn NTP because the predicate“use”in that case would no longer fall under the definition of“use”.
We agree that direct infringement by“use”of a system claim“requires a party...to use each and every...element of a claimed［system］”.In order to“put the system into service”，the end user must be using all portions of the claimed invention.For example，in NTP，the end user was“using”every element of the system by transmitting a message.It did not matter that the user did not have physical control over the relays，the user made them work for their patented purpose，and thus“used”every element of the system by putting every element collectively into service.
1.“Use”by Qwest's Customers
Centillion argues that，under the correct definition of“use”from NTP，Qwest's customers put the claimed system into service.It argues that a system is put into service“when it is engaged to accomplish the purposes for which it is intended”.Appellant's Reply Br.32.It argues that Qwest's customers use the system by subscribing，thus causing the back-end portions of the system to act and then downloading the reports.It argues that this is sufficient to put the entire system into service.
Qwest argues that its customers do not“use”thesystem because they do not control the back-end processing.It argues that Qwest performs the back-end processing and provides the result—not the processing itself—to the customer.It argues that the customer then chooses autonomously whether to download this information*1285 and whether to install and use the Qwest software.It argues that under Cross Medical，a customer could only be liable for use of the system if Qwest actually provided the back-end processing hardware and software to the customer so that the customer could control it.
There are two different manners of operation of the Qwestsystem relevant to this appeal.First，there is an on-demand function where a customer“seeks particular and specified information”by creating a query that the Qwest back-end system processes and provides a result for download（on-demand operation）.Appellee's Br.44.Second，during the normal functioning of the system after a user subscribes，Qwest's back-end systems create periodic summary reports（standard operation）which are available for the user to download.
We hold that the on-demand operation is a“use”of thesystem as a matter of law.1 The customer puts the system as a whole into service，i.e.，controls the system and obtains benefit from it.The customer controls the system by creating a query and transmitting it to Qwest's back-end.The customer controls the system on a one request/one response basis.This query causes the back-end processing to act for its intended purpose to run a query and return a result.The user may then download the result and perform additional processing as required by the claim.
If the user did not make the request，then the back-end processing would not be put into service.By causing thesystem as a whole to perform this processing and obtaining the benefit of the result，the customer has“used”the system under§271（a）.It makes no difference that the back-end processing is physically possessed by Qwest.The customer is a single“user”of the system and because there is a single user，there is no need for the vicarious liability analysis from BMC or Cross Medical.
We also hold that the standard operation is a“use”as a matter of law.The standard operation allows users to subscribe to receive electronic billing information on a monthlybasis.Once a user subscribes，Qwest's back-end system generates monthly reports and makes them available to the customer by download or other means.Qwest also makes available to customers software to load on their PCs to further exploit these monthly reports.Unlike the on-demand operation，this is not a one request/one response scenario.
By subscribing a single time，the user causes the back-end processing to perform its function on a monthly basis.Like the on-demand operation，the backend processing in normal operation is performed in response to a customer demand.The difference though is that a single customer demand（the act of subscribing to the service）causes the back-end processing monthly.But in both modes of operation，it is the customer initiated demand for the service which causes the back-end system to generate the requisite reports.This is“use”because，but for the customer's actions，the entire system would never have been put into service.This is sufficient control over the system under NTP，and the customer clearly benefits from this function.
Because the district court concluded as a matter of law that no single party could be liable for“use”of the patented invention，it did not compare the accused system to the claim limitations.We note that，although the customers“use”the system as a matter of law，this does not settle the issue of infringement.We will not decide，as Qwest requests，whether the accused products satisfy the“as specified by the user”limitations for the first time on appeal.Likewise，we decline to determine for the first time on appeal whether any individual customer has actually installed the Qwest software，2 downloaded records，and analyzed them as required by the claims.3 Because the issue has not been raised on appeal here，we make no comment on whether Qwest may have induced infringement by a customer.
2.“Use”by Qwest
We agree with Qwest that，as a matter of law，it does not“use”the patented invention under the appropriate test fromNTP.To“use”the system，Qwest must put the claimed invention into service，i.e.，control the system and obtain benefit from it.NTP，418 F.3d at 1317.While Qwest may make the back-end processing elements，it never“uses”the entire claimed system because it never puts into service the personal computer data processing means.Supplying the software for the customer to use is not the same as using the system.
The only way that Centillion can establish“use”by Qwest is if Qwest is vicariously liable for the actions of its customers such that“use”by the customers may be attributed to Qwest.Our precedents on vicarious liability，BMC，Muniauction，Inc.v.Thomson Corp.，532 F.3d 1318，1328-29（Fed.Cir.2008），Akamai Technologies，Inc.v.Limelight Networks，Inc.，629 F.3d 1311（Fed.Cir.2010），and Cross Medical，analyze the circumstances in which the actions of one party ought to be attributed to a second party for purposes of direct infringement—vicarious liability.In BMC，we noted that“［f］or process patent or method patent claims，infringement occurs when a party performs all of the steps of the process”.498 F.3d at 1378-79.
However，we noted that in some instances，one party could be liable for infringement of a method claim even if it did not perform all of the steps.This vicarious liability arises when one party controls or directs the actions of another to perform one or more steps of the method.Id.at 1379.We confirmed this approach for method claims in Muniauction，532 F.3d at 1328-29 and recently explained in Akamai Technologies that for infringement to be found when more than one party performs the steps of a method claim，an agency relationship or other contractual obligation to perform the steps must exist.See Akamai Techs.，629 F.3d at 1320.
In Cross Medical，we considered the issue of vicarious liability for making a claimed apparatus or system under§271（a）.The claim related to a medical device and，as properly construed，required contact between the device and human bone.424 F.3d at 1310-11.In the particular facts of that case，the accused manufacturer created the accused product，but did not perform surgeries to bring the device into contact with bone.We held that the manufacturer did not“make”the claimed apparatus.We held that if anyone made the claimed apparatus，it was the surgeon who implanted the accused device，possibly bringing it into contact with bone.Id.at 1311.We noted that the manufacturer would not be liable for the surgeon's direct infringement unless the surgeon acted as an agent of the manufacturer.Id.
Following our vicarious liability precedents，we conclude，as a matter of law，that Qwest is not vicariously liable for the actions of its customers.Qwest in no way directs its customers to perform nor do its customers act as its agents.While Qwest provides software and technical assistance，it is entirely the decision of the customer whether to install and operate this software on its personal computer data processing means.
B.Liability for“Making”under§271（a）
The district court did not address this issue in its opinion，likely because Qwest's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and Centillion's response focused on“use”.Centillion argues that the issue is not waived because，in its response to Qwest's motion，it incorporated by reference its own motion for partial summary judgment of infringement that mentioned Qwest's liability for“manufacture”of the accused systems.J.A.6323.We need not reach the issue of whether a single statement in an incorporated brief is sufficient to preserve an issue，because Qwest does not“make”the patented invention under§271（a）as a matter of law.Qwest manufactures only part of the claimed system.In order to“make”the system under§271（a），Qwest would need to combine all of the claim elements—this it does not do.The customer，not Qwest，completes the system by providing the“personal computer data processing means”and installing the client software.
Further，Qwest is not vicariously liable for the actions of its customers；as discussed above，Qwest's customers do not act as Qwest's agents as a matter of law nor are they contractually obligated by Qwest to act.See Akamai Techs.，629 F.3d at 1320；Cross Medical，424 F.3d at 1311.(https://www.daowen.com)
631 F.3d 1279
美国联邦巡回上诉法院
Centillion数据系统有限责任公司（原审原告、上诉人）
Qwest国际通信股份有限公司、Qwest股份有限公司、Qwest通讯股份有限公司（反诉的被告人、上诉人）
2011年4月25日
A.《专利法案》第271条（a）款系统专利权利要求中的“使用”
该案关注这样一个命题，根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款的规定，哪些行为构成对系统、机器专利权利要求的“使用”。Centillion数据系统有限公司诉称，一审地区法院对“使用”行为的理解过于狭隘，将其视为仅仅是“一项将已有发明投入使用的权利”。上诉人在上诉词第22项中诉称：“使用”并不要求某主体实施了每一个构成要件，只要是将系统作为整体进行了利用，也构成“使用”。换句话说，Centillion数据系统公司认为，根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款在NTP案法律适用中对“使用”的清晰界定，尽管被控侵权人可能与发明的其他组件没有直接关系，但是只要操控使用了发明中的一个组件，那么也可能是将该发明“投入使用”。
我们一直没有解决这种情况下的侵权问题：行为人“使用”了一项系统专利权利要求，而这项权利要求中的技术特征被多个主体所掌握。尽管如此，NTP案进行的专业的界定与此情形非常相似。在NTP案中的争议在于，当专利权利要求和被控产品都包括一个由用户操控的手持设备以及一些由服务提供者操控的系统终端，而其中一些继电器并不在美国境内，此时是否构成侵权？所以我们不得不判断，在美国由用户对整个系统的使用行为是否就等同于专利法中规定的“使用”行为。
本院认为：“法院对术语‘使用’进行了过于扩大的解释”，引用Bauer & Cie v.O'Donnell，229 U.S.1，33 S.Ct.616，57 L.Ed.1041（1913）中的陈述，我们认为术语“使用”的含义就是“将已有技术投入使用”。[2]
本院进一步区分方法专利权利要求的“使用”行为和系统专利权利要求的“使用”行为，进而根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款规定，系统专利权利要求的“使用”行为必须达到将整个系统投入使用的程度，也就是说，对系统的控制需要将系统投入使用并且用于营利目的。如将这个规则适用于NTP案的事实问题，本院认为：在美国的用户使用被控产品发送信息的行为已经等于使用了整个系统，并且该使用行为的发生地也在美国。
NTP案解决了侵权认定的问题但是并没有解决侵权行为的本质问题，因为法院只是根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款的规定对“使用”作出了界定。本院认为，如果因为使用一个系统而构成侵权，那么行为主体必须将该系统投入使用，也就是说，控制整个系统并从中获利。在NTP案中，地区法院作出了正确的决择，NTP案中对于“使用”的定义可以援引到本案中。
尽管如此，地区法院作出了不正确的认定：它认为一个主体必须通过物理手段或者直接控制系统的每一个具体的技术特征才算是《专利法案》第271条（a）款中规定的“使用”该系统的行为。但是NTP案中认定的“控制”就是能够将整个系统投入使用。换言之，NTP案中的用户只需要简单地发送一条信息就可以做到远程“控制”该系统。[3]很明显，NTP案中的用户既没有如地区法院所描述的占有该系统的每一个技术特征的行为，也没有达到直接、物理地控制的程度。认同地区法院对“使用”做出的定义将会直接颠覆NTP案，因为该定义已经超出了“使用”的范围。
法院同意这个观点：“如果某主体实施一项系统专利权利要求的行为构成直接侵权，那么他必须使用该项权利要求中的每一个技术特征。”为了将系统投入使用，终端使用者必须使用整项专利。举例说，在NTP案中，终端使用者通过发送信息就已经使用了系统的每一个技术特征，用户没有用物理手段控制系统终端，但这并不重要，他们用这些终端为自己的专利目的而工作，从而通过把每个技术特征集中投入使用的方式来“使用”系统的每个技术特征。
1.Qwest公司用户的“使用”行为
Centillion公司诉称，根据NTP案中对“使用行为”的定义，Qwest的用户将专利系统投入了使用。Centillion认为，“当系统被用来完成计划目的时”，该系统就已经被投入使用了，参见上诉人辩护词第32项。Centillion认为Qwest的用户通过订阅使用了该系统，该订阅会导致系统的后台程序启动，然后用户就可以下载系统生成的报告。Centillion认为，这个订阅行为足以将整个系统投入使用。
Qwest辩称，它的用户没有使用该系统，因为用户没有控制后台程序；Qwest运行后台程序并提供结果给用户，而不是提供程序本身给用户；然后，用户自主选择是否下载此信息，是否安装和使用Qwest的软件；根据红十字会案，只有在Qwest向用户提供后台程序的硬件、软件以便用户能够控制该程序的情况下，用户才会因为使用了该系统而承担责任。
Qwest的涉案系统有两种不同的运行方式。第一种是点播模式。该系统有一个“点播”功能，用户通过发出请求指令来“搜索特定和指定的信息”，然后Qwest的后台系统就会处理这些请求并提供结果给用户下载，参见被上诉人辩护词第44项。第二种是标准模式。用户进行订阅之后，该后台系统在正常功能范围会定期产生总结报告供用户下载。
本院认为：点播模式的运作是对系统的使用行为。用户将整个系统投入使用，即是说，控制了该系统并从中获利。用户通过创建请求指令并传输到Qwest后台的方式来控制该系统。用户基于“请求—反馈”的模式来控制系统。请求指令会启动后台程序，使其运行这个指令并反馈结果。用户接下来可能会下载结果并运行权利要求中记载的附加程序。
如果用户不曾创建请求指令，那么后台程序就不会被投入使用。根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款，用户通过将整个系统用以运行后台程序并从反馈结果中获得利益的方式“使用”了该系统。即使后台程序在物理上是由Qwest拥有，这也并没有什么区别。用户是单独的系统使用者，正因如此，我们就没有必要在该案中援引BMC或Cross Medical案中关于替代责任的分析。
本院还认为：标准模式的运行也是对系统的“使用”行为。标准模式可以被用户订阅，然后用户每个月可以接收到电子账务信息。一旦用户订阅之后，Qwest的后台系统就会每月生成报告，使得用户可以通过下载或者其他方式得到此报告。Qwest还可以让用户将软件安装到个人电脑上以便于用户进一步利用每个月的报告。与点播模式不同，这并不是“请求—反馈”模式。
通过一次订阅，用户就可以让后台程序按月运行。类似于点播模式，标准模式的后台程序也会根据用户的要求而运行。区别在于，标准模式的用户的一次订阅会让后台程序按月运行。但是两种模式的共同之处在于，导致后台程序启动并生成需要的结果的原因都是来自于用户主动的需求。用户的行为使用了系统，因为要是没有用户的这些行为，那么整个系统根本不会被投入使用。根据NTP案，这就足够构成对系统的控制，而且很明显，用户也从系统功能中获利。
地区法院没有将被控系统和权利要求的条件作比较，因为地区法院作出判决，认为没有任何主体会因为使用了发明专利而承担责任。本院注意到，尽管用户使用了系统，但是这个法律事实不能解决是否侵权的争议。本院不会根据Qwest的请求去认定第一次上诉时，被控产品是否符合“用户指定”这个限制条件；同样，本院不会认定，在第一次上诉时，个体用户是否如权利要求所描述，真的安装了Qwest的软件、下载了记录，以及分析了这些记录。本院不对Qwest是否被用户引诱侵权这个问题作评价，因为在上诉中这个争议没有被提出来。
2.Qwest的“使用”行为
本院支持Qwest的观点：根据NTP案中对“使用”的定义，Qwest没有使用发明专利。如果Qwest使用了该系统，那么它必须将该系统投入使用，即是说，控制该系统并从中获利，参见NTP案418 F.3d at 1317。尽管Qwest可能编制了后台程序，但是它从来没有使用整个系统，因为Qwest从没有将此程序装载到个人电脑数据处理装置中。向用户提供软件并不等同于使用了该系统。
Centillion能够证明Qwest使用了该系统的唯一路径就是：Qwest是否可能会因为它的用户的行为而承担替代责任，用户的使用行为是否可能归咎于Qwest，参见BMC，Muniauction，Inc.v.Thomson Corp.，532 F.3d 1318，1328-1329（Fed.Cir.2008），Akamai Technologies，Inc.v.Limelight Networks，Inc.，629 F.3d 1311（Fed.Cir.2010）。红十字会案分析了这样一种情形：一个主体应该对第二个主体的直接侵权行为承担责任，即替代责任。当某个主体执行了过程专利或方法专利的权利要求中的所有步骤时，侵权行为就发生了。参见BMC案，498卷1378-79。
尽管如此，本院注意到，在某些情形中，尽管主体没有实施所有的步骤，但还是会因为侵犯方法专利权利要求而承担法律责任。当一个主体控制或者诱导另一个主体实施了方法专利中的一个或者多个步骤时，替代责任就会被适用，参见Id.at 1379。本院认可Muniauction案532 F.3d at 1328-29中法院对方法专利权利要求的解释，还认可最近Akamai案，629 F.3d at 1320中法院对侵权作出的解释，即当超过一个主体实施了方法专利权利要求中记载的步骤时，那么在主体之间必然存在关于实施这些步骤的代理关系或者合同义务。
在红十字会案中，本院根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款，考量了因为实施系统专利或机器专利而导致的替代责任的问题。该专利的权利要求与一项医疗设备有关，准确地说，权利要求记载设备与人体骨骼有某种连接，参见424 F.3d at 1310-11。案件事实的特殊性在于，被控制造商制造了被控产品，但是其并没有通过手术将医疗设备与人体骨骼连接起来。本院认为，制造商没有“实施”该机器专利。如果要认定谁实施了该机器专利，那么他可能就是植入设备的外科医生，因为他很可能将设备植入人体从而与骨骼连接起来，参见Id.at 1311。本院认为，只有在外科医生作为制造商的代理商的时候，制造商才会因为外科医生的直接侵权承担责任。
遵循有关替代责任的判例，本院认定，Qwest不应该为它的用户的行为承担替代责任。Qwest没有通过任何方式引导其用户实施专利，也没有引导用户成为它的代理商。尽管Qwest向用户提供了软件和技术支持，但是否在个人电脑数据处理设备上安装和运行该软件，取决于用户自己。
B.《专利法案》第271条（a）款规定的关于“制造”专利产品的法律责任
可能由于Qwest请求判决不侵权的诉求以及Centillion的辩论都围绕着“使用”这一定义而进行，地区法院在判决中没有解决关于“制造”的争议。Centillion认为，此争议没有被放弃，因为在Centillion针对Qwest诉求的答辩意见中，Centillion请求法院在简易判决中判决Qwest因为制造被控系统而承担责任，参见J.A.6323。本院没有必要审查答辩意见中的一个单独的陈述是否可以构成一项诉求，因为根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款，Qwest根本没有“制造”发明专利。Qwest只制造了涉案系统的一部分。根据《专利法案》第271条（a）款，如果Qwest制造了整个系统，那么它必须要将专利权利要求中的所有构成要件组合起来，显然Qwest没有这样做。做成整个系统的不是Qwest，而是用户，因为用户提供了“个人电脑数据处理设备”以及安装了用户端软件。
进一步说，Qwest不用为其用户的行为承担替代责任；如上述讨论结果，Qwest的用户不以Qwest代理商的身份活动，也不对Qwest负有合同义务，参见Akamai Techs.，629 F.3d at 1320；Cross Medical，424 F.3d at 1311。