Ⅲ.Limelight Networks，Inc.v.Akamai Technologies，Inc...
Supreme Court of the United States
Limelight Networks，Inc.v.Akamai Technologies，Inc.，et al.
No.12-786.
Argued April 30，2014.
Decided June 2，2014.
Background：Patentee brought infringement action against competitor，alleging infringement of patent for method of delivering electronic data using a content delivery network（CDN）.Following jury finding of patent infringement and award of$45.5 million in damages，the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts，Zobel，J.，614 F.Supp.2d 90，granted competitor's motion for relief from judgment and for reconsideration of denial of motion for judgment as matter of law，and entered judgment in favor of competitor.Massachusetts Patentee appealed.On rehearing en banc，the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit，692 F.3d 1301，reversed and remanded，and certiorari was granted.
Holdings：The Supreme Court，JusticeAlito，held that：
（1）No single entity performed all claimed steps，and thus no direct infringement occurred，precluding inducement claim；
（2）Neither tort law principles，nor criminal aiding and abetting principles，nor pre-Patent Act patent law principles warranted contrary conclusion；
（3）Supreme Court would not review merits of rule announced by Federal Circuit in Muniauction，Inc.v.Thomson Corp.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a defendant may be liable for inducing infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C.§271（b）when no one has directly infringed the patent under§271（a）or any other statutory provision.The statutory text and structure and our prior case law require that we answer this question in the negative.We accordingly reverse the Federal Circuit，which reached the opposite conclusion.
I
A
Limelight disputes whether its customers actually“tag”within the meaning of the patent.Brief for Petitioner 7，n.4.We assume arguendo that Limelight's customers do in fact“tag”within the patent's meaning.
B
In 2006，respondents sued Limelight in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts，claiming patent infringement.The case was tried to a jury，which found that Limelight had committed infringement and awarded more than$40 million in damages.
Respondents'victorywas short-lived，however.After the jury returned its verdict，the Federal Circuit decided Muniauction，Inc.v.Thomson Corp.，532 F.3d 1318（2008）.In that case the Court of Appeals rejected a claim that the defendant's method，involving bidding on financial instruments using a computer system，directly infringed the plaintiff's patent.The defendant performed some of the steps of the patented method，and its customers，to whom the defendant gave access to its system along with instructions on the use of the system，performed the remaining steps.The court started from“the proposition that direct infringement requires a single party to perform every step of a claimed method”.Id.，at 1329.This requirement is satisfied even though the steps are actually undertaken by multiple parties，the court explained，if a single defendant“exercises‘control or direction’over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party”.Ibid.The court held that the defendant in Muniauction was not liable for direct infringement because it did not exercise control or direction over its customers'performance of those steps of the patent that the defendant itself did not perform.Id.，at 1330.
In light ofMuniauction，Limelight moved for reconsideration of its earlier motion for judgment as a matter of law，which the District Court had denied.The District Court granted the motion，concluding that Muniauction precluded a finding of direct infringement under§271（a）because infringement of the'703 patent required tagging and Limelight does not control or direct its customers’tagging.A panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed，explaining that a defendant that does not itself undertake all of a patent's steps can be liable for direct infringement only“when there is an agency relationship between the parties who perform the method steps or when one party is contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps”.629 F.3d，at 1320.Since neither of these conditions was met in the present case，the Federal Circuit panel held that Limelight could not be held liable for direct infringement.
The panel noted that Limelight's contracts instruct its customers to tag the components they wish to be stored on Limelight's CDN，but concluded that，because these contracts did not give Limelight control over its customers，the customers'tagging could not be attributed to Limelight.See 629 F.3d，at 1321.
The Federal Circuit granted en banc review and reversed.The en banc court found it unnecessary to revisit its§271（a）direct infringement case law.Instead，it concluded that the“evidence could support a judgment in［respondents'］favor on a theory of induced infringement”under§271（b）.692 F.3d 1301，1319（2012）.This was true，the court explained，because§271（b）liability arises when a defendant carries out some steps constituting a method patent and encourages others to carry out the remaining steps—even if no one would be liable as a direct infringer in such circumstances，because those who performed the remaining steps did not act as agents of，or under the direction or control of，the defendant.The Court of Appeals did not dispute that“there can be no indirect infringement without direct infringement”，id.，at 1308，but it explained that“requiring proof that there has been direct infringement...is not the same as requiring proof that a single party would be liable as a direct infringer”.
Limelight sought certiorari，which we granted.571 U.S.——，187 L.Ed.2d 701，134 S.Ct.895（2014）.
Ⅱ
A
Neither the Federal Circuit，see 692 F.3d，at 1308，nor respondents，see Tr.of Oral Arg.44，dispute the proposition that liability for inducement must be predicated on direct infringement.This is for good reason，as our case law leaves no doubt that inducement liability may arise“if，but only if，［there is］...direct infringement”.
FN3.Aro addressed contributory infringement under§271（c），rather than inducement of infringement under§271（b），but we see no basis to distinguish for these purposes between the two，which after all spring from common stock.See Global-Tech Appliances，Inc.v.SEB S.A.，563 U.S.——，——，131 S.Ct.2060，2067-2068，179 L.Ed.2d 1167（2011）.
One might think that this simple truth is enough to dispose of this appeal.But the Federal Circuit reasoned that a defendant can be liable for inducing infringement under§271（b）even if no one has committed direct infringement within the terms of§271（a）（or any other provision of the patent laws），because direct infringement can exist independently of a violation of these statutory provisions.See 692 F.3d，at 1314.
The Federal Circuit's analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to infringe a method patent.A method patent claims a number of steps；under this Court's case law，the patent is not infringed unless all the steps are carried out.See，e.g.，Aro，supra，at 344，81 S.Ct.599（a“patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and...no element，separately viewed，is within the grant”）.This principle follows ineluctably from what a patent is：the conferral of rights in a particular claimed set of elements.“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention，”Warner-Jenkinson Co.v.Hilton Davis Chemical Co.，520 U.S.17，29，117 S.Ct.1040，137 L.Ed.2d 146（1997），and a patentee's rights extend only to the claimed combination of elements，and no further.
The Federal Circuit held in Muniauction that a method's steps have not all been performed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defendant，either because the defendant actually performed those steps or because he directed or controlled others who performed them.See 532 F.3d，at 1329-1330.Assuming without deciding that the Federal Circuit's holding in Muniauction is correct，there has simply been no infringement of the method in which respondents have staked out an interest，because the performance of all the patent's steps is not attributable to any one person.And，as both the Federal Circuit and respondents admit，where there has been no direct infringement，there can be no inducement of infringement under§271（b）.
The Federal Circuit's contrary view would deprive§271（b）of ascertainable standards.If a defendant can be held liable under§271（b）for inducing conduct that does not constitute infringement，then how can a court assess when a patent holder's rights have been invaded？What*2118 if a defendant pays another to perform just one step of a 12-step process，and no one performs the other steps，but that one step can be viewed as the most important step in the process？In that case the defendant has not encouraged infringement，but no principled reason prevents him from being held liable for inducement under the Federal Circuit's reasoning，which permits inducement liability when fewer than all of a method's steps have been performed within the meaning of the patent.The decision below would require the courts to develop two parallel bodies of infringement law：one for liability for direct infringement，and one for liability for inducement.
Section 271（f）（1）reinforces our reading of§271（b）.That subsection imposes liability on a party who“supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention...in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States”（emphasis added）.As this provision illustrates，when Congress wishes to impose liability for inducing activity that does not itself constitute direct infringement，it knows precisely how to do so.The courts should not create liability for inducement of non-infringing conduct where Congress has elected not to extend that concept.
The Federal Circuit seems to have adopted the view that Limelight induced infringement on the theory that the steps that Limelight and its customers perform would infringe the'703 patent if all the steps were performed by the same person.But we have already rejected the notion that conduct which would be infringing in altered circumstances can form the basis for contributory infringement，and we see no reason to apply a different rule for inducement.In Deepsouth Packing Co.v.Laitram Corp.，406 U.S.518，92 S.Ct.1700，32 L.Ed.2d 273（1972），a manufacturer produced components of a patented machine and then exported those components overseas to be assembled by its foreign customers.FN4（The assembly by the foreign customers did not violate U.S.patent laws.）In both Deepsouth and this case，the conduct that the defendant induced or contributed to would have been infringing if committed in altered circumstances；in Deepsouth if the machines had been assembled in the United States，see id.，at 526，92 S.Ct.1700，and in this case if performance of all of the claimed steps had been attributable to the same person.In Deepsouth，we rejected the possibility of contributory infringement because the machines had not been assembled in the United States，and direct infringement had consequently never occurred.See id.，at 526-527，92 S.Ct.1700.Similarly，in this case，performance of all the claimed steps cannot be attributed to a single person，so direct infringement never occurred.Limelight cannot be liable for inducing infringement that never came to pass.
FN4.Section 271（f）now prohibits the exporter's conduct at issue in Deepsouth.FN4.
B
Respondents'arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's reading of the statute are unpersuasive.First，respondents note that tort law imposes liability on a defendant who harms another through a third party，even if that third party would not himself be liable，and respondents contend that，given the background tort principles against which the Patent Act of 1952 was enacted，it should not matter that no one is liable for direct infringement in this case.But the reason*2119 Limelight could not have induced infringement under§271（b）is not that no third party is liable for direct infringement；the problem，instead，is that no direct infringement was committed.Muniauction（which，again，we assume to be correct）instructs that a method patent is not directly infringed—and the patentee's interest is thus not violated—unless a single actor can be held responsible for the performance of all steps of the patent.Because Limelight did not undertake all steps of the'703 patent and cannot otherwise be held responsible for all those steps，respondents'rights have not been violated.Unsurprisingly，respondents point us to no tort case in which liability was imposed because a defendant caused an innocent third party to undertake action that did not violate the plaintiff's legal rights.
In a related argument，respondents contend that，at tort，liability sometimes attaches where two or more defendants inflict injury，even if each defendant's conduct，standing alone，would not be actionable.See W.Keeton，D.Dobbs，R.Keeton，& D.Owen，Prosser and Keeton on Torts§52，p.354（5th ed.1984）（multiple defendants who each add negligible impurities to stream liable if aggregate impurities cause harm）.But the rationale for imposing liability in these circumstances is that the defendants collectively invaded the plaintiff's protected interests.See ibid.By contrast，under the Muniauction rule，respondents'interests in the'713 patent have not been invaded.
Second，respondents seek to analogize§271（b）to the federal aiding and abetting statute，18 U.S.C.§2，and they argue that two parties who divide all the necessary elements of a crime between them are both guilty under§2.The analogy does not hold up.The aiding and abetting statute must be read“against its common-law background”，Standefer v.United States，447 U.S.10，19，100 S.Ct.1999，64 L.Ed.2d 689（1980），and at common law two or more defendants，each of whom committed an element of a crime，were liable as principals.See e.g.，1 J.Bishop，Commentaries on the Criminal Law§649，p.392（7th ed.1882）.While we have drawn on criminal law concepts in the past in interpreting§271（b），see Global-Tech Appliances，Inc.v.SEB S.A.，563 U.S.，131 S.Ct.2060，2068-2070，179 L.Ed.2d 1167（2011），we think it unlikely that Congress had this particular doctrine in mind when it enacted the Patent Act of 1952，given the doctrine's inconsistency with the Act's cornerstone principle that patentees have a right only to the set of elements claimed in their patents and nothing further.
Third，respondents contend that patent law principles established before the enactment of the Patent Act demonstrate that a defendant that performs some steps of a patent with the purpose of having its customers perform the remaining steps is liable for inducing infringement.But here，too，the nature of the rights created by the Patent Act defeats the notion that Congress could have intended to permit inducement liability where there is no underlying direct infringement.According to respondents，their understanding of the pre-1952 doctrine casts doubt on the Muniauction rule for direct infringement under§271（a），on the ground that that rule has the indirect effect of preventing inducement liability where Congress would have wanted it.But the possibility that the Federal Circuit erred by too narrowly circumscribing the scope of§271（a）is no reason for this Court to err a second time by misconstruing§271（b）to impose liability for inducing infringement where no infringement has occurred.
Finally，respondents，like the Federal Circuit，criticize our interpretation of§271（b）as permitting a would-be infringer to evade liability by dividing performance of a method patent's steps with another whom the defendant neither directs nor controls.We acknowledge this concern.Any such anomaly，however，would result from the Federal Circuit's interpretation of§271（a）in Muniauction.A desire to avoid Muniauction's natural consequences does not justify fundamentally altering the rules of inducement liability that the text and structure of the Patent Act clearly require—an alteration that would result in its own serious and problematic consequences，namely，creating for§271（b）purposes some free-floating concept of“infringement”both untethered to the statutory text and difficult for the lower courts to apply consistently.
Ⅲ
Respondents ask us to review the merits of the Federal Circuit's Muniauction rule for direct infringement under§271（a）.We decline to do so today.(https://www.daowen.com)
In the first place，the question presented is clearly focused on§271（b），not§271（a）.We granted certiorari on the following question：“Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C.§271（b）even though no one has committed direct infringement under§271（a）.”Pet.for Cert.i.The question presupposes that Limelight has not committed direct infringement under§271（a）.And since the question on which we granted certiorari did not involve§271（a），petitioner did not address that important issue in its opening brief.Our decision on the§271（b）question necessitates a remand to the Federal Circuit，and on remand，the Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to revisit the§271（a）question if it so chooses.
2012年786号
2014年4月30日庭审辩论
2014年6月2日判决
背景：专利权人对被告提起侵权诉讼，指控被告侵犯其利用内容分发网络传输电子数据的方法专利，根据美国地方法院陪审团意见，判决专利侵权成立，赔偿损害4550万美元，专利权人上诉到联邦巡回法院。最高法院撤销联邦巡回法院的联席判决并发回重审，复审令已经通过。
观点：联邦最高法院Alito法官认为。
（1）没有单一主体实施权利要求中的所有步骤，因此不存在直接侵权，同时排除引诱侵权。
（2）无论是侵权法原则，刑事上的帮助和教唆原则，还是先前专利法中的专利侵权原则，都不会得出侵权的结论。
（3）最高法院不会借鉴联邦巡回法院在Muniauction，Inc.v.Thomson Corp.案中确定的规则。
撤销判决并发回重审。
Alito法官发表了法院的意见。
这个案件存在的问题是，当根据第271条（a）款或者其他任何法律规定不存在直接侵犯专利权的主体，那根据第271条（b）款被告是否要承担引诱侵犯专利权的责任。依据法定的条文和结构，以及我们之前的判例法，我们对这个问题的回答是否定的。因此，我们推翻了联邦巡回法院的判决，得出相反的结论。
I
A
Limelight案争论在于他的用户是否真正实施了专利法意义上的标记行为。在辩论过程中，我们假设Limelight的用户实际实施了专利法意义上标识行为。
B
在2006年，被告人在美国马萨诸塞州地方法院控告Limelight公司侵犯专利权，该案经陪审团审理，判决Limelight公司侵权并支付损害赔偿金4000多万美元。
然而，被告的胜利是短暂的。在陪审团作出判决后，联邦巡回上诉法院审理了Muniauction，Inc.v.Thomson Corp.一案，在该案中，上诉法院驳回了被告利用计算机系统在金融设备上投标的方法直接侵犯原告专利权的诉求。被告实施了方法专利权利要求的一些步骤，并为其用户提供进入系统的途径和使用系统的说明，让这些用户实施了剩余步骤。法院判决从直接侵权要求单一主体实施了专利权利要求的所有步骤这一规定开始。法院解释说，即使这些步骤实际上是由多个主体实施的，如果某个被告对整个过程实施了“控制或指挥”行为，使每个步骤的实施都可归因于该被告，那么同样满足这一规定。同上。法院认为Muniauction案中的被告不应当承担直接侵权责任，因为被告既没有自己实施专利权利要求中的那些步骤，也没有控制或指挥其用户去实施。
对照Muniauction一案，Limelight请求复审其最初被地方法院驳回的议案。地方法院通过了该议案，认为依据第271条（a）款规定，Muniauction一案的判决排除了（Limelight）直接侵权，因为侵犯703专利需要有标记行为，但是Limelight公司并没有控制或指挥其用户实施标记行为。联邦巡回上诉法院的一个陪审团断言，只有当“实施方法专利所有步骤的各方主体之间存在代理关系，或者一方因向另一方履行合同义务而实施这些步骤”时，没有亲自实施某个专利权利要求中所有步骤的被告，才应当承担直接侵权的责任。在本案中，由于这些条件都不满足，联邦巡回上诉法院陪审团认为Limelight不应当承担直接侵权责任。
陪审团注意到，虽然Limelight公司的合同指导用户去标记他们想要存储在Limelight CDN上的内容组件，但是由于这些合同并没有构成Limelight公司对其用户的控制，因此用户的标记行为不能归因于Limelight公司。
联邦巡回上诉法院授权全席法官共同重新审理并撤销原判。全席法庭认为没有必要重新审查第271条（a）款规定下的判例法。相反，法庭认为现有证据可以支持基于第271条（b）款规定的引诱侵权理论作出的判决。当被告实施了方法专利权利要求中的某些步骤并鼓励他人实施其余步骤时，即使在这种情况下，没有人构成直接侵权（因为这些实施其余步骤的人并不是作为被告的代理人或基于被告的指挥或控制而实施这些行为），也同样会产生第271条（b）款规定下的法律责任。对于“没有直接侵权就不存在间接侵权”的观点，上诉法院没有异议，但上诉法院认为“要求证明存在直接侵权，不等于要求证明某个单一主体作为直接侵权人承担责任”。
Limelight sought certiorari，which we granted.571 U.S.，187 L.Ed.2d 701，134 S.Ct.895（2014）已经通过复审令。
Ⅱ
A
联邦巡回上诉法院和被告，对于引诱侵权责任必须以直接侵权为依据的主张，都没有争议。理由很充分，因为我们的判例法明确表示，引诱侵权责任的产生有且只有一个前提，就是存在直接侵权。
Aro一案中提到了第271条（c）款规定的共同侵权，而没有提到第271条（b）款规定的引诱侵权，但是我们无法区分两者的目的，因为二者都源于共同的理论基础。
或许有人认为这样一个简单的事实足以处理这个上诉案件。但是联邦巡回法院解释说，即使依据第271条（a）款或者专利法的其他任何规定，没有主体构成直接侵权，被告同样有可能构成引诱侵权，因为直接侵权可能违背这些法律规定而独立存在。
联邦巡回上诉法院从根本上误解了侵犯方法专利的含义。方法专利的权利要求包含若干步骤，根据本法院的判例法，只有当所有步骤都被实施时，专利权才受到侵犯。专利权仅涵盖权利要求中所有技术特征的整体，单独的技术特征不受保护，这一原则遵从专利的定义：将权利赋予特定要求的技术特征的集合，包含在专利权利要求中的每个技术特征都被视为限定专利发明范围的材料，专利权人的权利只能延伸到权利要求中各技术特征的组合，不能更广。
联邦巡回上诉法院在Muniauction一案中持有的观点是，除非某个被告事实上实施了方法专利权利要求中的所有步骤，或者他指挥或控制他人实施了这些步骤，使这些步骤的实施行为可以全部归因于该被告，否则就不视为方法专利权要求中的步骤被全部实施。假设联邦巡回上诉法院在Muniauction案中的决定是错误的，那就不存在对被告投入许多利益的方法专利的侵犯，因为专利权要求的步骤不能全部归因于某个单一主体。联邦巡回上诉法院和被告都认可的是，根据第271条（b）款的规定，不存在直接侵权，就不存在引诱侵权。
联邦巡回上诉法院所持的相反观点忽视了第271条（b）款规定的既定标准。如果依据第271条（b）款，让被告对引诱非侵权行为承担法律责任，那么法院如何判定专利权人的权利何时受到侵犯？如果被告花钱雇另外一个人去实施具有12个步骤的方法专利中的一个步骤，其余步骤没有人去实施，但是该步骤被视为整个方法专利中最关键的一步，这时又该怎么办？在这种情况下，被告没有鼓励侵权，但是根据联邦巡回上诉法院的推理，没有任何规则排除他的引诱侵权责任，这就使得，当方法专利权利要求中的步骤没有被全部实施时，引诱侵权责任同样会产生。这一观点将导致法院设立两个平行的侵权法体系：一种是直接侵权责任，另一种是引诱侵权责任。
第271条（f）款（1）强化了我们对第271条（b）款的解读。该条款要求以下主体承担法律责任：在美国境内提供或引诱他人向自己提供，或者提供或引诱他人向自己提供源自美国的，全部或大部分已获得专利的发明的实施要件。实际上以这样的方式（诱使他人）将位于美国境外的实施要件组合在一起和直接将位于美国境内的实施要件组合在一起侵犯专利权，是一样的。正如本规定所示，当国会要对本身不构成直接侵权的引诱行为规定法律责任时，它明确知道如何操作。法院不应当对引诱非侵权行为创设法律责任，国会也不会选择去扩充这一概念。
联邦巡回上诉法院似乎已经采纳了这样的观点：如果专利权要求的所有步骤由相同主体实施，那么Limelight及其用户就侵犯了703专利，在这一理论基础上，Limelight构成引诱侵权。但我们已经否决了不同情况下的侵权行为可以作为共同侵权依据的观点，并且我们认为没有理由为引诱侵权适用不同的规则。在Deepsouth Packing Co.v.Laitram CorP.一案中，一个制造商制造出某个专利机器的零部件，然后将这些零部件出口到海外，由其国外用户进行组装。国外用户的组装行为没有侵犯美国的专利法。在Deepsouth案和本案中，被告引诱或者帮助实施的行为换一种情况就会构成侵权，在Deepsouth一案中，如果机器实在美国境内组装的，在本案中，如果权利要求中所有步骤的实施都可归因于同一个主体。Deepsouth一案中，我们排除了构成共同侵权的可能性，因为机器不是在美国境内组装的，直接侵权从来都不存在。类似地，在本案中，权利要求中所有步骤的实施行为无法归因于某个单一主体，所以直接侵权从来都不存在。Limelight也不用对从未存在过的引诱侵权承担责任。
第271条（f）款现已禁止了出口商在Deepsouth一案中的行为。
B
被告支持联邦巡回上诉法院对法规的理解，没有说服力。首先，被告提出，侵权责任法规定，即使第三方无须承担侵权责任，利用该第三方侵犯他人权利的主体也将被施加侵权责任，鉴于1952年《专利法案》是以侵权法原则为背景颁布的。所以本案中没有人承担直接侵权责任并不重要。但是Limelight不构成第271条（b）款规定下的引诱侵权不是因为没有第三方承担直接侵权责任，而是因为没有发生直接侵权。Muniauction一案表明，除非存在单一主体对方法专利权利要求中所有步骤的实施行为负责，否则方法专利就没有被直接侵犯，专利权人的利益也没有受损。因为Limelight公司没有实施703专利权利要求的所有步骤，对这些步骤的实施行为也没有责任，所以被告的权利没有受到侵犯。不出所料，应诉者指出，被告由于引诱一个无辜第三方实施未侵犯原告合法权利的行为而被施加法律责任，没有这样的侵权案例。
在相关论述中，应诉者指出，在侵权案件中，责任有时产生于双方或多方被告共同造成损害的情况，即使每个被告的行为单独都不具有可诉性。多个被告的行为单独都不需要承担法律责任，但聚合在一起会造成损害。这种情况下规定法律责任的理由是，被告共同侵犯了原告的受保护利益。相反，根据Muniauction一案中确立的规则，应诉者的712专利权益没有受到侵犯。
其次，应诉者试图将第271条（b）款类推适用到帮助和教唆的原则中，他们认为拆分实施犯罪构成要件的双方都有罪。这种类推不能成立。解读帮助和教唆原则必须以违反一般法为基础。在一般法中，两个或两个以上的被告，每人实施犯罪的一个构成要件，原则上都要追究责任。尽管我们在解释第271条（b）款的时候曾经参考刑法上的概念，我们认为国会在颁布1952年《专利法案》时，不可能将这一特定法条考虑在内，因为这一法条和专利法的基本原则不一致，即专利权人仅享有权利要求中一系列技术特征限定的权利，不会更广。
再次，应诉者指出，专利法颁布以前就存在的专利法原则表明，被告实施了专利权要求的某些步骤，旨在使其用户实施其余步骤，要承担引诱侵权责任。但是这里专利法所创设权利的本质推翻了国会的观点，即在不存在潜在直接侵权的情况下可以施加引诱侵权责任。应诉方对1952年《专利法案》前的既存原则的理解，对Muniauction一案中以第271条（a）款为基础确立的直接侵权规则提出了质疑，理由是该规则具有阻碍国会在需要时施加引诱侵权责任的间接作用。联邦巡回上诉法院可能由于过分狭隘地限制直接侵权规定的适用范围而错判，但这并不能为最高法院的再次错判提供理由，即错误地适用引诱侵权规定，在不存在直接侵权的情况下判决被告承担引诱侵权责任。
最后，应诉方和联邦巡回上诉法院一样，指责我们对第271条（b）款的解释，是允许潜在的侵权人，通过与其没有指挥或控制关系的他人，拆分实施某个方法专利权利要求中的所有步骤，来规避法律责任。我们认可这一担忧。然而，这样的异常情况都源自联邦巡回上诉法院在Muniauction一案中对第271条（a）款的解释。想要避免Muniauction一案出现的自然后果，并不足以证明从根本上改变了专利法条文和结构明确要求的引诱侵权责任规则。这种改变自身会引发许多严重的有问题的后果，换句话说，故意给第271条（b）款创设一些自由浮动、含义不清的“侵权”概念，这些概念不受法律文本约束，使得下级法院难以统一适用。
Ⅲ
应诉者请求我们借鉴联邦巡回上诉法院在Muniauction一案中基于第271条（a）款创设的直接侵权规则，我们拒绝了。
现在存在的问题明显集中在第271条（b）款，而不是第271条（a）款。我们针对以下问题发出复审令：依据第271条（a）款没有主体构成直接侵权时，联邦巡回上诉法院是否依然错误地坚持，被告应该承担第271条（b）款规定的引诱侵权责任。这一问题的前提假设是依据第271条（a）款，Limelight没有构成直接侵权。因为我们下发的复审令中的问题不涉及第271条（a）款，上诉方在开头的提要中就没有提出这一关键问题。我们针对第271条（b）款中有关问题的决定是，撤销联邦巡回上诉法院的判决，发回重审，联邦巡回上诉法院将有机会重新审查有关第271条（a）款的问题。