Ⅳ.NTP，Inc.v.Research in Motion，Ltd.
418 F.3d 1282
United States Court of Appeals，
Federal Circuit.
NTP，Inc.v.Research in Motion，Ltd.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct.7，2005.[4]
Background：Owner of patents for method of enabling mobile users to receive e-mail over wireless network sued competitor for infringement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia，James R.Spencer，J.，2003 WL 23100881，entered judgment on jury verdict for owner，and competitor appealed.
Holdings：The Court of Appeals，Linn，Circuit Judge，held that：
（1）“originating processor”was separate from gateway or interface switches；
（2）accused system was used within United States，for purpose of determining whether system claims were infringed；and
（3）accused system was not used within United States，for purpose of determining whether method claims were infringed.
Affirmed in part，reversed in part，vacated in part，and remanded.
We conclude that the district court erred in construing the claim term“originating processor”，but did not err in construing any of the other claim terms on appeal.We also conclude that the district court correctly denied RIM's motion for judgment as a matter of law（“JMOL”），and did not abuse its discretion in denying evidentiary motions.Finally，we conclude that the district court was correct in sending the question of infringement of the system and apparatus claims to the jury，but erred as a matter of law in entering judgment of infringement of the method claims.Thus，we affirm-in-part，reverse-in-part，vacate-in-part，and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Infringement
RIM makes three arguments challenging the district court's judgment of infringement.First，RIM argues that the district court erred in its claim constructions，and under the correct claim constructions RIM's products do not infringe.Second，RIM contends that because the BlackBerry Relay is located in Canada，as a matter of law RIM cannot be held liable for infringement under 35 U.S.C.§271.Finally，RIM argues that the jury verdict of infringement lacked substantial evidence，and thus the district court should have granted RIM's motion for JMOL of non-infringement.We will discuss each argument in turn.
1.Claim Construction
A determination of infringement is a two-step process.The court must first correctly construe the asserted claims，and then compare the properly construed claims to the allegedly infringing devices，systems，or methods.Ethicon Endo-Surgery，Inc.v.U.S.Surgical Corp.，149 F.3d 1309，1315（Fed.Cir.1998）.We have determined that the district court's jury instructions contained an erroneous claim construction of the term“originating processor”.Thus，we are presented with the question of whether the jury verdict of infringement must be set aside as to the affected claims.
A jury verdict will be set aside，based on erroneous jury instructions，if the party seeking to set aside the verdict can establish that“those instructions were legally erroneous”，and that“the errors had prejudicial effect”.Advanced Display Sys.，Inc.v.Kent State Univ.，212 F.3d 1272，1281（Fed.Cir.2000）；see also Ecolab Inc.v.Paraclipse，Inc.，285 F.3d 1362，1373（Fed.Cir.2002）.More specifically，“a party seeking to alter a judgment based on erroneous jury instructions must establish that（1）it made a proper and timely objection to the jury instructions，（2）those instructions were legally erroneous，（3）the errors had prejudicial effect，and（4）it requested alternative instructions that would have remedied the error”.Advanced Display，212 F.3d at 1281（internal citations omitted）.“Prejudicial legal error exists when it‘appears to the court［that the error is］inconsistent with substantial justice’.”Id.at 1283（quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.61）.However，when the error in a jury instruction“could not have changed the result，the erroneous instruction is harmless”.Environ Prods.，Inc.v.Furon Co.，215 F.3d 1261，1266-67（Fed.Cir.2000）（citing 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.Miller，Federal Practice and Procedure§2886（2d ed.1995）（“Errors in instructions are routinely ignored if...the error could not have changed the result.”）；Weinar v.Rollform Inc.，744 F.2d 797，808（Fed.Cir.1984）（“［A］reversal...is not available to an appellant who merely establishes error in instructions...Where the procedural error was‘harmless’，i.e.，where the evidence in support of the verdict was so overwhelming that the same verdict would necessarily be reached absent the error，or the error was cured by an instruction，a new trial would be mere waste and affirmance of the judgment is required.”）.
At trial，RIM made a timely objection to the jury instructions pertaining to the district court's claim constructions，including its erroneous construction of the term“originating processor”.See J.A.at 14102-03.RIM also requested alternative instructions that would have remedied the error，including specifically an alternative jury instruction embodying its proposed claim construction of the term“originating processor”.See J.A.at 8368-73（instruction 16）.But to set aside the jury verdict，RIM must also establish that the error was prejudicial.Advanced Display，212 F.3d at 1281，
Prior to trial，RIM proffered a declaration by its expert Dr.Reed arguing that the accused BlackBerry products and services do not infringe under RIM's proposed claim constructions as contained in RIM's proposed jury instructions.This proffer addressed，inter alia，infringement as it relates to the“originating processor”limitation.However，the district court did not admit the Reed declaration into evidence or address the merits of the contentions in the Reed declaration.While RIM asserts that the court excluded all testimony arguing claim limitations different than or inconsistent with the court's claim construction，the court's actual ruling appears to have been directed only to the“separate and distinct physical housing argument and the RF indicator argument”.At the trial，testimony was presented with respect to infringement of the claims as construed by the district court.However，the extent to which the trial testimony and the exhibits actually admitted into evidence might relate to the issue of infringement under the correct construction of the term“originating processor”is unclear on the record before us.What is clear is that in the briefing of this appeal，the parties have not fully vetted the evidentiary record as it might relate to the correct construction of the term“originating processor”.Because the district court has a more direct understanding of the full record of trial proceedings in this case and is，thus，in a better position to make an informed determination of prejudicial error relating to the erroneous claim construction of the term“originating processor”，we decline to make that determination in the first instance on appeal and，instead，remand the same to the district court for proper resolution.
On remand，if RIM can establish that the erroneous claim construction prejudiced the jury's verdict as to the affected claims，the district court will have to set aside the verdict of infringement as to those claims.The affected claims are those that include the term“originating processor；”namely，claim 15 of the'960 patent；claim 8 of the'670 patent；and claim 40 of the'592 patent（through its parent claim 25）.10.
2.Section 271（a）
Section 271（a）of title 35 sets forth the requirements for a claim of direct infringement of a patent.It provides：
Except as otherwise provided in this title，whoever without authority makes，uses，offers to sell，or sells any patented invention，within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor，infringes the patent.
Ordinarily，whether an infringing activity undersection 271（a）occurs within the United States can be determined without difficulty.This case presents an added degree of complexity，however，in that：（1）the“patented invention”is not one single device，but rather a system comprising multiple distinct components or a method with multiple distinct steps；and（2）the nature of those components or steps permits their function and use to be separated from their physical location.
The question before us is whether the using，offering to sell，or selling of a patented invention is an infringement under section 271（a）if a component or step of the patented invention is located or performed abroad.The jury also was instructed on infringement by importation，which we discuss separately infra.Pursuant to section 271（a），whoever without authority“uses，offers to sell，or sells any patented invention，within the United States...during the term of the patent therefor，infringes the patent”.35 U.S.C.§271（a）.The grammatical structure of the statute indicates that“within the United States”is a separate requirement from the infringing acts clause.Thus，it is unclear from the statutory language how the territoriality requirement limits direct infringement where the location of at least a part of the“patented invention”is not the same as the location of the infringing act.
Although Deepsouth does not resolve these issues，our predecessor court's decision in Decca Ltd.v.United States，210 Ct.Cl.546，544 F.2d 1070（1976），is instructive.In Decca，the plaintiff sued the United States for use and manufacture of its patented invention under 28 U.S.C.§1498.The claimed invention was a radio navigation system requiring stations transmitting signals that are received by a receiver，which then calculates position by the time difference in the signals.At the time of the suit，the United States was operating three such transmitting stations，one of which was located in Norway and thus was outside the territorial limits of the United States.Only asserted claim 11 required three transmitting stations.Thus，in considering infringement of claim 11，the court considered the extraterritorial reach of the patent laws as applied to a system in which a component was located outside the U-nited States.The court recognized that Deepsouth did not address this issue.In analyzing whether such a system was“made”in the United States，however，the court focused on the“operable assembly of the whole”language from Deepsouth and concluded that“［t］he plain fact is that one of the claimed elements is outside of the U-nited States so that the combination，as an operable assembly，simply is not to be found solely within the territorial limits of this country”.The court recognized that what was located within the United States was as much of the system as was possible，but the court reached no clear resolution of whether the accused system was“made”within the United States.Nevertheless，the court said，“Analyzed from the standpoint of a use instead of a making by the United States，a somewhat clearer picture emerges.”Id.The court concluded that“it is obvious that，although the Norwegian station is located on Norwegian soil，a navigator employing signals from that station is，in fact，‘using’that station and such use occurs wherever the signals are received and used in the manner claimed”.In reaching its decision，the court found particularly significant“the ownership of the equipment by the United States，the control of the equipment from the United States and...the actual beneficial use of the system within the United States”.Id.Although Decca was decided within the context of section 1498，which raises questions of use by the United States，the question of use within the United States also was implicated because direct infringement under section 271（a）is a necessary predicate for government liability under section 1498.
Decca provides a legal framework for analyzing this case.As our predecessor court concluded，infringement under section 271（a）is not necessarily precluded even though a component of a patented system is located outside the United States.However，as is also evident from Decca，the effect of the extraterritorial component may be different for different infringing acts.In Decca，the court found it difficult to conclude that the system had been made within the United States but concluded that the system had been used in the United States even though one of the claim limitations was only met by including a component located in Norway.Not only will the analysis differ for different types of infringing acts，it will also differ as the result of differences between different types of claims.See Minton v.Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.Dealers，Inc.，336 F.3d 1373，1378（Fed.Cir.2003）（“It is not correct that nothing in§102（b）compels different treatment between an invention that is a tangible item and an invention that describes a series of steps in a process.The very nature of the invention may compel a difference.”（quotation marks omitted）.Because the analytical frameworks differ，we will separately analyze the alleged infringing acts，considering first the system claims and then the claimed methods.
a.“uses...within the United States”
The situs of the infringement“is wherever an offending act of infringement is committed.”N.Am.Philips Corp.v.Am.Vending Sales，Inc.，35 F.3d 1576，1579（Fed.Cir.1994）（“Section 271 on its face clearly suggests the conception that the‘tort’of patent infringement occurs where the offending act is committed and not where the injury is felt.”）.The situs of the infringing act is a“purely physical occurrence［］.”Id.In terms of the infringing act of“use”，courts have interpreted the term“use”broadly.In Bauer & Cie v.O'Donnell，229 U.S.1，33 S.Ct.616，57 L.Ed.1041（1913），the Supreme Court stated that“use”，as used in a predecessor to title 35，is a“comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the right to put into service any given invention”.Id.at 10-11，33 S.Ct.616.The ordinary meaning of“use”is to“put into action or service”.Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2523（1993）.The few court decisions that address the meaning of“use”have consistently followed the Supreme Court's lead in giving the term a broad interpretation.
We reach a different conclusion as to NTP's asserted method claims.Under section 271（a），the concept of“use”of a patented method or process is fundamentally different from the use of a patented system or device.In re Kollar，286 F.3d 1326，1332（Fed.Cir.2002）（recognizing“the distinction between a claim to a product，device，or apparatus，all of which are tangible items，and a claim to a process，which consists of a series of acts or steps...［A process］consists of doing something，and therefore has to be carried out or performed.”）；see Joy Techs.，Inc.v.Flakt，Inc.，6 F.3d 770，773（Fed.Cir.1993）（“The law is unequivocal that the sale of equipment to perform a process is not a sale of the process within the meaning of section 271（a）.”）.Although the Supreme Court focused on the whole operable assembly of a system claim for infringement in Deepsouth，there is no corresponding whole operable assembly of a process*1318 claim.A method or process consists of one or more operative steps，and，accordingly，“［i］t is well established that a patent for a method or process is not infringed unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are utilized”.
Because a process is nothing more than the sequence of actions of which it is comprised，the use of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the steps recited.This is unlike use of a system as a whole，in which the components are used collectively，not individually.We therefore hold that a process cannot be used“within”the United States as required by section 271（a）unless each of the steps is performed within this country.In the present case，each of the asserted method claims of the'960，'172，and'451 patents recites a step that utilizes an“interface”or“interface switch”，which is only satisfied by the use of RIM's Relay located in Canada.Therefore，as a matter of law，these claimed methods could not be infringed by use of RIM's system.See Eli Lilly & Co.v.Am.Cyanamid Co.，82 F.3d 1568，1571（Fed.Cir.1996）（discussing the enactment of section 271（g）and stating that“prior to the enactment of the［Process Patents Amendments Act of 1988］，a patentee holding a process patent could sue for infringement if others used the process in this country，but had no cause of action if such persons used the patented process abroad to manufacture products，and then imported，used，or sold the products in this country”）；see also Zoltek Corp.v.United States，51 Fed.Cl.829，836（2002）（stating that“if a private party practiced even one step of a patented process outside the United States，it avoided infringement liability，as［section 271（a）］was limited to acts committed within the United States”）.
Thus，we agree with RIM that a finding of direct infringement by RIM's customers undersection 271（a）of the method claims reciting an“interface switch”14 or an“interface”15 is precluded by the location of RIM's Relay in Canada.As a consequence，RIM cannot be liable for induced or contributory infringement of the asserted method claims，as a matter of law.
b.“offers to sell，or sells”
Because we conclude that RIM's customers could not have infringed the asserted method claims of the'960，'172，and'451 patents under the“use”prong of section 271（a），and thus，could not have provided the necessary predicate for the charges of induced or contributory infringement of those claims，we must consider whether RIM could have directly infringed the method claims under the“sell”or“offer to sell”prongs of section 271（a）.The cases cited by RIM are concerned primarily with the“use”and“make”prongs of section 271（a）and do not directly address the issue of whether a method claim may be infringed by selling or offering to sell within the meaning of section 271（a）.
Because the relevant precedent does not address the issue of whether a sale of a claimed method can occur in the United States，even though the contemplated performance of that method would not be wholly within the United States，the issue is one of first impression.We begin with the language of the statute.Section 271（a）does not define“sells”or“offers to sell”，nor does the statute specify which infringing acts apply to which types of claims.Section 271（a）was merely a codification of the common law of infringement that had developed up to the time of passage of the 1952 Patent Act.It was not meant to change the law of infringement.Deepsouth，406 U.S.at 530 n.10，92 S.Ct.1700.A claim directed to a method or process，although somewhat controversial in the Nineteenth Century，is now a well-established form of claiming.See In re Tarczy-Hornoch，55 C.C.P.A.1441，397 F.2d 856，857-65（1968）（describing the evolution of Supreme Court precedent concerning process claims）.Nevertheless，the precise contours of infringement of a method claim have not been clearly established.
c.“imports into the United States”
Because the jury's instruction on direct infringement by RIM included the act of importing，we must consider next whether the jury could have found that RIM imported any of the processes covered by the asserted method claims in violation of section 271（a）.Like the sell and offer to sell provisions discussed supra，the question of whether a method claim can be infringed by importation is a difficult one conceptually.The legislative history cited with respect to the sell and offer to sell provisions indicates that Congress did not consider the“import”prong of section 271（a）to apply to method claims.However，we need not decide that broad issue.We hold only that for the same reasons that the jury could not have found that RIM infringed the method claims under the sale or offer for sale prongs，it could not have found infringement by importation under the facts of this case.
3.Section 271（f）
The statute provides：
（1）Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of thecomponents of a patented invention，where such components are uncombined in whole or in part，in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States，shall be liable as an infringer.
（2）Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use，where such component is uncombined in whole or in part，knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States，shall be liable as an infringer.
While it is difficult to conceive of how one might supply or cause to be supplied all or a substantial portion of the steps of a patented method in the sense contemplated by the phrase“components of a patented invention”in section 271（f），it is clear that RIM's supply of the BlackBerry handheld devices and Redirector products to its customers in the United States is not the statutory“supply”of any“component”steps for combination into NTP's patented methods.See Standard Havens Prods.，Inc.v.Gencor Indus.，Inc.，953 F.2d 1360，1374（Fed.Cir.1991）（holding that the sale in the United States of an apparatus for carrying out a claimed process did not infringe the process claim under§271（f）where the customer practiced the process abroad）；cf.Joy Techs.，6 F.3d at 773（stating that“the law is unequivocal that the sale of equipment to perform a process is not a sale of the process within the meaning of section 271（a）”）.By merely supplying products to its customers in the United States，RIM is not supplying or causing to be supplied in this country any steps of a patented process invention for combination outside the U-nited States and cannot infringe NTP's asserted method claims under section 271（f）as a matter of law.
4.Section 271（g）
The next question is whether RIM can be said to“import into...or offer to sell，sell，or use within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States”and thus infringe under 35 U.S.C.§271（g）.The district court held that“wireless electronic mail”specially formatted by a patented process can be a“product”under section 271（g）.The district court compared the breadth of“product”to the breadth of patentable subject matter，cited to Diamond v.Chakrabarty，447 U.S.303，100 S.Ct.2204，65 L.Ed.2d 144（1980），and explained that specially formatted wireless e-mail is not naturally occurring，an abstract idea，or a physical phenomenon.
In Bayer，we considered whether research data from the performance of a method to identify substances，which inhibit or activate a protein affecting characteristics of the cell，was“a product which is made by a process”.We held that“the production of information is not covered”by section 271（g），explaining that the process must be for the“manufacturing”of“a physical article”.Id.at 1377.In this case，the relevant claims are directed to methods for the transmission of information in the form of email messages.See'960 patent，col.52，11.12-50；col.54，11.31-36，59-68；col.55，11.10-14（claiming methods for“transmitting”information from an originating processor to a destination processor）；'172 patent，col.82，ll.11-33，57-64（claiming a method for“transmitting and distributing an inputted message”through an email system and an RF system）；'451 patent，col.51，11.41-60；col.58，11.8-26，34-63；col.59，ll.1-6，24-30（claiming methods for“transmitting information”contained in email using a communication system and RF system，and for“transmitting and distributing inputted information through a distributed system”）.Because the“transmission of information，”like the“production of information，”does not entail the manufacturing of a physical product，section 271（g）does not apply to the asserted method claims in this case any more than it did in Bayer.
AT & T，State Street Bank，Alappat，and Chakrabarty do not command a different result because sections 101 and 271（g）are not coextensive in their coverage of process inventions.Although section 101 extends to“any process that applies an equation to a new and useful end，”AT & T，172 F.3d at 1357，section 271（g）does not cover every patented process and its purported result，Bayer，340 F.3d at 1370.In Bayer，we expressed no doubt that a process producing research data is patentable under section 101.However，we held that section 271（g）was inapplicable because research data is not a physical product.NTP's argument that the transformation of data and the manipulation of addresses qualify the asserted processes for section 271（g）protection is unpersuasive.The requirement that a process transform data and produce a“tangible result”was a standard devised to prevent patenting of mathematical abstractions.We rejected this“tangible result”test for section 271（g）in Bayer when we held that research data—a“tangible result”for section 101 purposes—did not gamer the protection of section 271（g）.
For the foregoing reasons，the district court erred in not holding as a matter of law that§271（g）was inapplicable to the asserted method claims.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion，we alter the district court's construction of the claim term“originating processor.”We affirm the remainder of the district court's claimconstructions.We conclude that the district court correctly denied RIM's motion for judgment as a matter of law（“JMOL”），and did not abuse its discretion in denying evidentiary motions.We further conclude that the district court was correct in sending the question of infringement of the system and apparatus claims to the jury，but erred as a matter of law in entering judgment of infringement of the method claims.Accordingly，we reverse the judgment of infringement as to the asserted method claims，namely，claims 32 and 34 of the'960 patent；claim 199 of the'172 patent；and claims 309，313，317 of the'451 patent.We affirm the judgment of infringement with respect to the system and apparatus claims that do not contain an“originating processor”limitation，namely，claims 28 and 248 of the'451 patent，and claims 150，278，287，653，and 654 of the'592 patent.We vacate the judgment of infringement of the system claims that contain the“originating processor”limitation，namely，claim 15 of the'960 patent；claim 8 of the'670 patent；and claim 40 of the'592 patent（through its parent claim 25），and remand to the district court the questions of whether and to what extent the jury verdict of infringement should be set aside，based on the prejudicial effect，if any，of the district court's erroneous claim construction of the term“originating processor”.We vacate the damage award and the injunction and affirm the district court's judgment in all other respects.
On remand，if prejudice is shown with respect to the claims containing the“originating processor”limitation，and because the jury verdict did not specify the amount of infringing sales attributed to each individual patent claim，or the specific devices and services determined by the jury to infringe each separately asserted claim，the district court will have to determine the effect of any alteration of the jury verdict on the district court's damage award and on the scope of the district court's injunction.We thus affirm-in-part，reverse-in-part，vacate-in-part，and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
418 F.3d 1282
美国联邦巡回上诉法院
NTP，INC.，原告-被上诉人
v.(https://www.daowen.com)
Research in Motion，Ltd.被告-上诉人
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct.7，2005.[5]
背景：专利所有人起诉被告侵犯专利权，该项专利是一种方法专利，能够使移动用户通过无线网络接收电子邮件。美国弗吉尼亚东区地区法院的法官James R.Spencer对该案进行了审理并支持了陪审团的裁决（支持原告权利人的诉求），被告提起了上诉。
法官意见：巡回上诉法院法官Linn认为：
（1）“原始处理器”是独立于网关或接口开关的；
（2）当被诉系统在美国境内使用时，该系统专利是否被侵权；
（3）当被诉系统在美国境外使用时，该系统专利是否被侵权。
部分被支持，部分被推翻，部分被撤销，并发回重审。
我们认为：地方法院对于权利要求书中的术语进行解释分析时，仅对“原始处理器”的解释出了错误。我们也认为地方法院正确地拒绝了RIM对于JMOL的提议，并且地方法院没有滥用其自由裁量权驳回有关证据的动议。最后，我们认为，地方法院在向陪审团呈送关于系统和装备侵权的审查要求时不存在错误，但是对于方法专利的侵权判断存在错误。因此，我们部分维持，部分推翻，部分无效，部分发回重审。
侵权认定
RIM针对地方法院判决提出了三点抗辩。第一，地区法院对于权利要求解释是错误的，如果按照正确的解释，RIM的产品不侵权。第二，因为黑莓的中继组件位于加拿大，作为法律问题，不能依据第271条来认定侵权。第三，陪审团的判决缺少事实证据，因此，地区法院应当给RIM提起不侵权的JOML提议的机会。接下来我们将逐一讨论。
1.权利要求的解释
判定侵权需要两个步骤。因此地区法院必须：（1）正确解释涉案专利的权利要求；（2）将被控侵权设备、系统或方法与涉案专利权进行比较。我们已经确定，地方法院的陪审团指示/裁决包含了对“原始处理器”一词的错误解释。因此，摆在我们面前的问题是，陪审团裁决是否会因为受到这个错误解释的影响而被搁置。
如果当事人试图搁置陪审团指令/裁决，且该陪审团的判决具有“法律上的错误”或是“将导致实质性的影响”时，该陪审团判决将会被搁置。尤其是，“一方当事人基于错误的陪审团裁决而要求重新作出一份判决时，需要基于：（1）对陪审团的指令及时提出反对意见；（2）该错误是法律上的错误；（3）错误将导致实质影响；（4）要求重新作出判决修正错误”。如果法庭认为错误与实质性正义不符，则存在法律上的错误。然而，当这个错误“对结果不产生实质性的影响时，这个错误是无害的”。Weinar v.Rollform Inc.，744 F.2d 797，808（Fed.Cir.1984）。（只有陪审团的指示中出现错误的上诉人才能使用逆转……程序性的错误是无害的……在支持判决的证据是如此明确的，以致在没有错误的情况下必然达到同样的判决，或者错误被指令治愈，新的裁判将是浪费，并且需要维持判决。）
在审判中，RIM就陪审团的指令及时地提出反对意见，该指令是关于地区法院对权利要求的解释，包括“原始处理器”这一术语。RIM也提出要求重新作出裁决来修正错误，而且要包含他所提出来的关于“原始处理器”的解释。但是如果需要搁置陪审团的裁决，必须基于该裁决具有错误且导致实质性的影响。
在审判之前，RIM通过其专家Reed博士提出了一个声明辩称，在RIM提出的对权利要求的解释，被控的黑莓产品和服务不会侵犯RIM的专利权。该提议主要涉及与“原始处理器”侵权的相关限制。然而，地区法院没有接受将Reed的声明作为证据或接受Reed声明中的有利点。虽然RIM声称法院排除了所有证据，有争议的权利要求限制与法院的权利要求的解释不同或不一致，但法院实际作出的裁决似乎只针对“单独且不同的实体和RF接收器的论证”。在审判时，RIM就地区法院对侵权的权利要求提出了异议。但是，在我们之前的记录中，在正确解释“原始处理器”一词的情况下，检验人员的证词和实际承认为证据可能与侵权问题有关的程度不清楚。但清楚的是，从上诉的摘要部分看，当事人没有完全审查证据记录，因为它可能与“原始处理器”一词的正确解释有关。因为地方法院对本案审理程序的全部记录有更直接地了解，因此，其有更好的立场对“原始处理器”权利要求的偏见错误作出明智决定，确定与错误权利要求的解释对这一问题的处理，本院不予处理，发回重审，我们拒绝在上诉中作出初步裁决，而是将其发回地区法院以适当解决。
发回重审，如果RIM可以确定错误的权利要求的解释损害了陪审团对受影响的索赔的裁决，地区法院将必须对这些索赔作出侵权裁决。该受影响的术语主要是“原始处理器”，即960号专利的权利要求15、670号专利的权利要求8，以及592号专利的权利要求40。
2.美国《专利法案》第271条（a）款
《专利法案》第271条（a）款提出专利直接侵权的构成要件。包括：
除本法另有规定外，在专利权存续期间，行为人未经专利权人授权，在美国境内制造、使用、许诺销售、销售或进口任何发明专利产品的行为，都构成侵权。
通常情况下，在美国境内的行为是否构成第271条（a）款的侵权容易判定。本案则较为复杂，因为：（1）涉案“发明专利”不是一个单一的设备，而是由诸多不同部件组成的系统或者说诸多不同步骤组成的方法；（2）这些部件或步骤的特性使其运转和使用可以与其实际存放地相分离。
如果发明专利的组件或步骤位于或实施于国外，依据第271条（a）款，对发明专利的使用、许诺销售、销售是否认定为侵权。陪审团也对进口侵犯专利权作了分析，我们在下文分别讨论。根据第271条（a）款，任何无权限的人在美国境内使用，许诺销售或销售任何发明专利……在专利期限内侵犯专利。法律文本的语法结构表明，“在美国境内”是对侵权行为条款的单独要求。因此，根据法律文本的语言，如果“专利发明”的至少一部分的位置与侵权行为的位置不相同，则领土性要求如何限制直接侵权是模糊的。
尽管Deepsouth没有解决这些问题，但是先前法院在Decca案的决定有指导性意义。在Decca案中，原告起诉美国政府使用和制造了其专利发明。涉案发明为一个无线电导航系统，接收者接收的信号由发射台传送。该案中，美国政府运营三个这样的发射台，其中一个电台位于美国境外的挪威，超出了美国境内的限制。只有在权利要求11中要求二个发射台。因此，在考虑是否构成对权利要求11侵权时，法院认为专利法的跨境管辖适用于一个组件位于美国以外的一个系统。法院认为Deepsouth没有解决这个问题。在分析这样一个系统的制造是否发生在美国时，法院集中在从Deepsouth案提出的“整体的组装操作”以及认为事实是其中一个元素位于美国境外以致其作为一个可操作的集合，根本不能认定在这个国家的领土范围内。法院认为，大部分系统位于美国，但法院没有表明被控侵权系统的制造是否位于美国。然而，法院认为，从在美国使用而不是从在美国制造的角度来分析，可能会更清楚。法院得出结论说，“很明显，尽管挪威站位于挪威，但事实上，导航器就是使用这个电台发出的信号，无论信号是在哪里被接收，这种使用均是以权利要求所述的方式使用。在形成判决中，法院发现尤其重要的是设备的拥有者是美国政府，设备受到美国政府控制，和……系统的实际获益使用是在美国境内”。尽管在Decca案中提出的政府使用问题是依据1498条的上下文，但是在美国境内使用是被隐含其中的，因为第271条（a）款下的直接侵权是构成1498条下政府责任的很重要的前提。
Decca案为分析该类问题提出了一种法律框架。正如先前法院所认为的那样，即便专利系统的一个组件位于美国境外也不必然排除构成直接侵权的可能。然而，从Decca案也可以看出来，境外组件给不同的侵权行为带来的影响是不一样的。在Decca案件中，法院认为难以断定该系统是在美国境内制造的，但可以断定该系统已在美国使用，即使其中的一项专利权利要求仅仅被某一个在挪威的部件所覆盖。不仅不同类型的侵权行为的分析结果不同，而且不同类型的权利要求之间的差异也会有所不同。见Minton v.Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.Dealers，Inc.，336 F.3d 1373，1378（Fed.Cir.2003）。［在102（b）中没有对产品专利和方法专利进行任何区别对待。发明的性质可能具有很大的差异。］因为分析的框架不同，所以我们将分别分析各种侵权行为，先分析系统（专利）的权利要求，再分析方法专利的权利要求。
a.在美国境内使用
侵权地“是指任何实施侵权行为的地方”。N.Am.Philips Corp.v.Am.Vending Sales，Inc.，35 F.3d 1576，1579（Fed.Cir.1994）。（第271条表面上清楚地表明，专利侵权的“侵权”发生在犯罪行为发生的地方，而不是损害结果地。）侵权行为地是一个纯粹的物理上的地点。法院对于侵权行为中的“使用”术语进行解释时很宽泛。在Bauer & Cie v.O'Donnell，229 U.S.1，33 S.Ct.616，57 L.Ed.1041（1913）中，最高法院指出，在美国专利法的前一个版本中“使用”是一个“综合性术语，并且包含在其意义内为任何特定发明投入使用的权利”。“使用”一词的一般意义是“投入使用或服务”。少数法院裁决关于“使用”的含义一直遵循最高法院的广泛解释。
对于NTP要求的方法专利的权利要求，我们有不同的结论。第271条（a）款下，在“使用”的概念上，专利方法或过程从根本上不同于专利系统或设备的使用。在Kollar案中，产品、设备或装置权利要求指向的都是有形物，而方法权利要求是由一系列行为或步骤组成……一个方法由做一些事情构成，因此必须被实施或执行。在Joy Techs.，Inc.v.Flakt，Inc.案中，［法律明确销售设备而执行一个方法不是第271条（a）款所述的销售方法］。尽管在Deepsouth案的侵权判定中，最高法院专注于整个系统权利要求的组装操作，该案中不存在描述整个组装过程的相应的方法权利要求。一个方法或过程专利由一个或多个操作步骤组成，因此，除非方法权利要求中的所有步骤或阶段都被实施了，否则不构成侵犯方法或过程专利。
由于一个方法只不过是由一系列行为组成，对方法的使用必须包括执行每一个步骤。这跟使用系统不同，系统只能作为一个整体使用，其组件只能集合使用，而不能单独使用。因此我们认为，一个方法专利不能被认为符合第271条（a）款意义上的“在美国”使用，除非它的每一个步骤都在美国实施。在该案中960、172和451号专利的权利要求都有使用“交互界面”或“交互界面转换”的内容，但是这种操作必须要位于加拿大的中继组件的共同作用。因此，作为法律问题，要求被保护的方法不能因为使用RIM的系统而被侵犯。见Eli Lilly & Co.v.Am.Cyanamid Co.，82 F.3d 1568，1571（Fed.Cir.1996）。［讨论第271条（g）款和1988年专利法修正案现有条款的规定，一个过程专利权人可以诉在本国未经授权使用该过程专利的人，但是没法起诉在国外使用该过程专利制造，然后进口到本国并使用或销售产品的人。］见Zoltek Corp.v.United States，51 Fed.Cl.829，836（2002）。［只要过程专利中的某个步骤在国外实施，那么就不能依据第271条（a）款认定该行为人的行为构成侵权，因为第271条（a）款仅仅规范在美国境内的侵权人。］
因此，我们赞同RIM的观点，RIM的用户根据“交互界面转换”或“交互界面”的方法权利要求和RIM中继组件位于加拿大的事实排除了第271条（a）款下的直接侵权认定。因此，RIM对引诱或帮助侵犯NTP要求保护的权利要求不承担责任。
b.许诺销售、销售
因为我们得到RIM的用户不构成侵犯第271条（a）款下的使用而侵犯960、172和451号专利权，因此，不能得到引诱或帮助侵权的结论。但我们必须要考虑RIM是否直接侵犯了方法专利，即是否实施了第271条（a）款下的“销售”或“许诺销售”行为。在RIM引用的案件中，首先考虑的是第271条（a）款语境下的“使用”和“制造”的问题，而没有直接回答第271条（a）款下的方法专利是否可以通过销售或许诺销售的方式被侵犯。
因为之前的案件没有回答在美国销售方法专利是否是侵权的问题，即使该方法专利的预期实现不完全在美国，该问题是首次出现。我们从法条开始分析。第271条（a）款没有定义“销售”和“许诺销售”，也没有对该类行为作出规定。第271条（a）款仅仅是1952年《专利法案》通过时发生的普通侵权法的编纂。它不意味着改变了专利侵权法。尽管在19世纪对方法专利或是产品专利的权利要求有争议，现在是一种确定的权利要求形式。见In re Tarczy-Homoch，55 C.C.P.A.1441，397 F.2d 856，857-65（1968）。（描述最高法院关于方法专利的态度的演变）然而，侵犯方法权利要求的确切轮廓尚未明确确定。
c.进口到美国
由于陪审团关于由RIM直接侵权的解释包括进口行为，因此我们必须考虑陪审团是否可能发现RIM违反第271条（a）款的规定，实施了方法权利要求所涵盖的任何步骤。像上文讨论的销售和许诺销售的情况一样，一个方法专利是否可以被进口行为侵犯的问题在概念上是一个困难的问题。关于销售或许诺销售条款的立法历史表明国会没有考虑第271条（a）款的“进口”条款适用于方法专利。然而，我们不需要回答这个宽泛的问题。我们仅认为，出于同样的原因，陪审团不能发现RIM以销售或许诺销售的形式侵犯了方法专利，根据本案的事实，不能够认为进口构成侵权行为。
3.美国《专利法案》第271条（f）款
法律规定：
（1）行为人未经授权在美国境内提供或促成他人提供一项发明专利的全部组成部分/起实质性作用的（主要）组成部分，该全部组成部分或主要组成部分在美国境内并未被组合，行为人积极引诱他人组合位于美国境外的组成部分，如果他人的组合行为发生在美国境内，那么行为人应当承担侵权责任。
（2）任何人在美国境内提供或促成他人提供或预谋提供发明专利的任何组成部分，该组成部分是基于特定目的而制造或者适用于特定用途（用于侵权用途），而不是用于实质上非侵权的商业用途，而且这些组成部分在美国境内并未被组合成整体或者某一部分，行为人明知这些组成部分是特殊制造或者有特殊用途，并明知这些组成部分会在美国境外被组合，如果该组合行为发生在美国境内，那么行为人应当承担侵权责任。
虽然难以明确属于在第271条（f）款中“专利发明的组件”所涵盖的意义上提供或帮助提供专利方法的所有或大部分步骤，很明显，RIM向美国用户提供的黑莓手持设备和重定向器产品不是将任何“组件”步骤组合到NTP的专利方法中的法定“提供”。见Standard Havens Prods.，Inc.v.Gencor Indus.，Inc.，953 F.2d 1360，1374（Fed.Cir.1991）。［认为在美国销售要求保护的程序的设备没有违反第271条（f）款的规定，即用户在域外实施了该程序。］Joy Techs.，6 F.3d at 773［指出法律明确规定销售某一程序的设备不是销售第271条（a）款所指的程序］。作为一项法律问题，根据第271条（f）款的规定，通过仅向美国用户提供产品，RIM没有在美国向美国以外组合专利提供或帮助提供组件，并不侵犯NTP方法专利。
4.美国《专利法案》第271条（g）款
接下来的问题是能否依据第271条（g）款认定RIM实施了“进口到美国……或许在美国许诺销售、销售、使用以专利方法获得的产品”。地区法院认为“无限电子邮件系统”——尤其是以专利方法得到的系统属于第271条（g）款下的“产品”。地方法院将“产品”的广度与可专利对象的广度进行了比较，并解释了特殊格式的无线电子邮件不是自然发生的，不是一个抽象的想法，或一种物理现象。
在Bayer案中，我们考虑了一种操作来搜索研究数据是否“由过程产生的产物”，其中该物质抑制或激活影响细胞特性的蛋白质。我们认为“信息的生成不能够适用”第271条（g）款，因为该款必须是“有形物”的“制造”。在本案中，相关权利要求涉及用于以电子邮件消息的形式传输信息的方法见960号专利（要求用于将信息从原始处理器“传送”到目标处理器的方法）；172号专利（要求通过电子邮件系统和RF系统“传送和分发输入的消息”的方法）；451号专利（使用通信系统和RF系统权利要求包含的电子邮件中“传送信息”的方法，以及用于“通过分布式系统传送和分发输入的信息”）。因为“信息的传输”像“信息的生成”，并不是对实物的制造，第271条（g）款不适用于本案。
AT & T，State Street Bank，Alappat，and Chakrabarty案中出现了不同的结果，因为第101条和第271条（g）款在其过程发明的覆盖范围内不是共同扩展的。尽管第101条中规定“任何方法将方程运用于新的和有用的终端”，AT &T，172 F.3d at 1357，第271条（g）款不包括每个专利进程及其权利要求的结果。在Bayer案中，我们毫不怀疑，根据第101条，生产研究数据的过程是可以申请专利的。但是联邦巡回法院认为，研究数据不是有形产品，不能适用第271条（g）款。NTP认为数据的转换和地址的操纵符合第271条（g）款保护的确定过程是不明智的。转换数据并产生“有形结果”的过程要求是设计用于防止数学抽象的专利的标准。当我们认为研究数据——第101条目的“有形产品”没有获得第271条（g）款的保护时，我们拒绝在Bayer案中使用第271条（g）款的“有形产品”的规定。
出于上述原因，地方法院错误地适用第271条（g）款于本案的方法专利。
结论
最后，我们更改了地区法院对权利要求术语“原始处理器”的解释。我们认可地区法院对其余权利要求的解释。我们的结论是，地方法院正确地否认RIM的动议——作为法律问题的判决（JMOL）——并没有滥用其酌情权拒绝证据动议。我们进一步得出结论，地方法院将系统和设备权利要求的侵权问题提交陪审团是正确的，但是在作出侵犯方法权利要求的判决时违反了法律问题。因此，我们推翻了关于所主张的方法权利要求的侵权判决，即960专利的权利要求32和34；172专利的权利要求199；451专利的权利要求309、313、317。我们承认对不包含“原始处理器”限制的系统权利要求的侵权判决，即451号专利的权利要求28和248，以及592号专利的权利要求150、278、287、653和654。我们撤销对包含“原始处理器”限制的系统权利要求的侵权判决，即960专利的权利要求15；670专利的权利要求8；592专利的权利要求40（通过其主申请权利要求25），并且根据有害的影响（如果有的话），将区域法院判决陪审团判决侵权的问题以及在何种程度上搁置，地区法院对“原始处理器”一词的错误解释。我们撤销损害赔偿和强制令，并确认地方法院在所有其他方面的判决。
在发回重审时，如果对包含“原始处理器”限制的权利要求明显具有偏见，并且因为陪审团的裁决没有详细说明归因于每项单独专利权利要求的侵权销售金额陪审团也没有对其认定为侵犯权利要求的设备或服务作出详细的说明，地区法院就必须考虑是否变更陪审团的以下裁决——关于地区法院判赔损害赔偿金数量以及地区法院采取禁令的范围。因此，我们部分确认，部分撤销，部分无效，并根据这个意见发回重审。
【注释】
[1]本译文为主审法官Jacob法官的意见（译者加注）。该案法官的观点代表了英国法院对于系统专利的组件跨境问题的审理观点，值得比较与考察。
[2]参见NTP，418 F.3d at 1316-1317。
[3]参见418 F.3d at 1317。
[4]Abrogation Recognized by Avid Technology，Inc.v.Harmonic，Inc.，Fed.Cir.（Del.），January 29，2016.
[5]Abrogation Recognized by Avid Technology，Inc.v.Harmonic，Inc.，Fed.Cir.（Del.），January 29，2016.