结论
布什政府针对伊拉克以及范围更广的中东地区的计划是极其失败的。美国军队不仅胶着于一场失败的战争之中,而且在中东地区输出民主几乎不存在任何很快出现的前景。伊朗是这场构想拙劣的冒险的主要获益者,而且它似乎比任何其他时候都更下定决心要获得核能力。就像伊朗一样,叙利亚依然同华盛顿争争吵吵,而且这两个国家都从美国军队陷入伊拉克的困境中获得巨大的利益。哈马斯现在控制着加沙地带,巴勒斯坦当局严重分裂——这使得同以色列达成和平甚至更加捉摸不定,而在2006年的战争中反击以色列之后,黎巴嫩真主党在黎巴嫩比任何时候都更强大。用国务卿赖斯令人觉得遗憾的话来说,我们可能正目睹“一个新中东在剧痛中出现”,但是这个新中东几乎肯定将比美国在入侵伊拉克之前更不稳定和更加危险。〔161〕
伊拉克战争对以色列也不利,特别是自那以来它加强了伊朗在该地区的力量。事实上,《前沿》周报在2007年初报道说,在以色列有一种“不断增强的众口一词”的声音,他们现在说,既然萨达姆已经被赶下台了,这个犹太国家“可能发现自己更加危险”〔162〕。阿马茨亚·巴拉姆(Amatzia Baram)是以色列的一位伊拉克问题专家,他在战前美国以色列公共事务委员会的时事通讯《近东报道》的访谈中支持推翻萨达姆,而现在他却说:“如果我那时知道我现在——2007年1月——所知道的事情,我就不会建议发动战争,因为萨达姆的危险性比我所认为的要小得多。”进而言之,他承认入侵已经产生了“比我预料的要多得多的(恐怖主义)”。以色列国内安全机构辛贝特(Shin Bet)负责人伊瓦尔·狄斯金(Yuval Diskin)在2006年2月说:“我不能肯定说我们不会想念萨达姆。”〔163〕
由于美国寻找使自己从这种灾难性局势中脱身的途径,因此要求布什政府同伊朗和叙利亚进行会谈,并进行解决以巴冲突的一致努力的压力在不断增强。当然,新保守派和以色列人都相信,抵达耶路撒冷之路要经由巴格达。他们相信,一旦美国在伊拉克获胜,巴勒斯坦人就将根据以色列的条件而达成和平。但是由两党组成的伊拉克研究小组、托尼·布莱尔,以及许多其他人都相信,实际情况与此相反:抵达巴格达之路要经由耶路撒冷。〔164〕换言之,建立一个能够生存下来的巴勒斯坦国,将有助于美国处理伊拉克和其他的中东地区问题。以色列和以色列游说集团有力地挑战了这一派观点,坚持认为美国在伊拉克遭遇的麻烦同巴勒斯坦人毫不相干。事实上,就在伊拉克研究小组的报告发布前夕,以色列《国土报》在2006年11月底曾报道说,埃胡德·奥尔默特总理“希望犹太人的游说,能够动员新一届国会中的民主党多数在巴勒斯坦人问题上反对任何对现状的偏离”〔165〕。类似地,许多亲以色列的团体依然坚持认为,美国应该拒绝同伊朗和叙利亚会谈,直到这些国家同意华盛顿的所有要求。〔166〕
虽然布什政府面临不断加大的从伊拉克撤出的压力,但是以色列领导人却鼓励它继续待在那里完成这项工作。为什么?因为这些以色列领导人相信,美国的撤离将威胁到以色列的安全。以色列外交部长齐皮·利夫尼和奥尔默特在2007年3月的美国以色列公共事务委员会的年度会议上都表明了这一点。利夫尼说:“在一个看重印象的地区,国家必须小心不要向极端分子示弱和屈服。”〔167〕奥尔默特说的甚至更加直截了当:“那些关心以色列安全的人……那些关心整个中东地区的人,应该认识到美国在伊拉克的成功以及从伊拉克负责任地撤离的必要性。”他在评论的结尾处这样说道:“当美国在伊拉克取得成功的时候,以色列就会更加安全。以色列的朋友们知道这一点。关心以色列的朋友们知道这一点。”〔168〕批评者之所以严厉批评奥尔默特作出这样的评论,主要是因为他的评论提供了另外表明以色列曾支持美国入侵伊拉克的证据。为以色列《国土报》写作的布拉德利·布尔斯顿,对于奥尔默特冒险在伊拉克问题上卷入美国的论辩尤其感到愤怒。他对这位总理有一句简单明了的话要说:“别见鬼似地介入到辩论之中”。〔169〕
在2006年11月访问白宫期间,奥尔默特实际上表达了他对美国继续留驻在伊拉克的支持。他说道:“对美国在伊拉克的伟大行动给中东带来的稳定,我们印象非常深刻并大受鼓舞。”〔170〕甚至是一些以色列的一贯支持者也为奥尔默特的好战言论所烦扰,因此国会议员加里·阿克曼说道:“我大大地感到吃惊。这是非常不现实的言论。我们这里的大多数人都明白,我们的政策对美国来说是一个彻头彻尾的灾难。”〔171〕
考虑到现在许多美国人对战争有着与阿克曼一样的观点,我们对这样一种现象就不应该感到吃惊了:有些以色列人和他们的美国盟友企图改写历史记录,以便使以色列免于承担伊拉克灾难的任何责任。2007年3月,《耶路撒冷邮报》的编辑戴维·霍罗威茨写了有关“以色列鼓励美国进行伊拉克战争的错误观念”的文章。〔172〕类似地,前贾菲战略研究中心主任、现任布兰代斯大学克朗中东研究中心主任的夏伊·费尔德曼,在2006年夏告诉《华盛顿邮报》的格伦·弗兰克尔(Glenn Frankel)说:“瞧,以色列并未动员任何人征服伊拉克,而在这个问题上将以色列同新保守派联系在一起是荒谬可笑的。以色列没有将伊拉克看作一个危险;进而言之,它没有兴趣推动布什政府的民主议程。”〔173〕虽然这种观点无疑反映了费尔德曼有关以色列利益及其所面临威胁等级的看法,但是就像我们所显示的那样,这同在战争即将来临时以色列领导人实际上的言行完全相左。
华盛顿近东政策研究所的研究员马丁·克雷默更胜一筹,他声称任何试图将以色列和以色列游说集团同伊拉克战争联系在一起的企图,“简直就是虚假的谎言”,并认为“在伊拉克战争之前的一年里,以色列一次又一次地同美国意见不一致,认为伊朗构成了更大的威胁”。〔174〕但是就像上面所显示的那样,以色列对伊朗的关注从来就没有导致它作出重要的努力来阻止伊拉克战争的进程。相反,以色列高官却竭尽所能确保美国会紧追萨达姆不放,不会在最后一秒钟罢手。他们将伊拉克看作一个严重威胁,确信布什在对付完伊拉克之后将着手对付伊朗。他们可能更喜欢美国先关注伊朗而非伊拉克,但是就像克雷默所承认的那样,以色列人“对萨达姆的灭亡不会掉一滴泪”。相反,他们的领导人迷恋上了美国的电台、电视,撰写报刊的公众舆论版社论,在国会进行作证,同五角大楼和副总统办公室的新保守派过从甚密,以便形成有关伊拉克的情报信息并整合走向战争的推动力。
贾菲研究中心的以色列战略家约西·阿尔菲现在坚持认为,前总理沙龙对入侵伊拉克怀有极度的保留意见,而且他私下警告过布什反对这样做。阿尔菲甚至暗示说,如果沙龙说出了他所关注的事情的话,他本可以阻止这场战争。他写道:“如果沙龙通过引证对以色列至关重要的利益所构成的威胁而公开他的批评的话,他本可能使美国和世界的战前辩论变得不同吗?”〔175〕既然对伊拉克的占领已经走下坡路了,因此这就成了便利的借口托词,但是没有公开的记录证据表明沙龙曾经建议布什不要进攻伊拉克。事实上,有相当的证据表明这位以色列领导人及其主要顾问都强烈支持这场战争,并鼓励布什政府与其晚打这场战争还不如早打。如果沙龙相信这场战争将是错误的,为什么他自己的发言人要反复强调伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器的危险?为什么沙龙本人警告布什政府说推迟进攻“不会为未来的行动创造更便利的环境”呢?〔176〕
沙龙在私下里和公开场合表达不同的观点是可能的。然而,这种情况却是不可能的,因为如果不是在巴格达陷落一年或两年之后,在战争开始之前沙龙反对战争的言词肯定已经泄露了出来。沙龙表达自己观点的时候,很少有出言谨慎的情况——即便是这样做的时候涉及美国。而如果他认为入侵伊拉克的决定将对以色列产生损害,很难相信他会在公开场合沉默不言。简而言之,阿尔菲的观点无论在事实上或逻辑上都说不通。
“对胜利人人趋之若鹜,对失败则避之唯恐不及。”就像伊拉克灾难形形色色的始作俑者现在想方设法要撇清自己一样,约翰·F.肯尼迪那满怀悲伤的评论再合适此刻的情景不过了。但是伊拉克的结果却并不总是像它看起来的那样是个大错。在2003年春短暂的几个月里面,美国似乎赢得了非常大的胜利,而那时候以色列的捍卫者们几乎不需要否认战争的责任。事实上,在这短暂的行事良机,地位关键的以色列人及其美国盟友开始向布什政府施压,将美国的权力导引到叙利亚和伊朗,冀望这两个“流氓国家”将遭受萨达姆·侯赛因政权的同样厄运。现在让我们来看看以色列及以色列游说集团是如何影响美国的叙利亚政策的,然后再转向伊朗。
〔1〕George Packer, The Assassins'Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar,Straus and Giroux, 2005), p.46.前美国中央情报局局长乔治·特尼特提出了类似的观点,因为他在回忆录中写道:“对于我来说,最大的谜团之一是伊拉克战争在什么时候变得不可避免。” George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper, 2007), p.301.
〔2〕据报道,就像《纽约时报》专栏作家托马斯·L.弗里德曼在2003年5月所观察的那样:“并不只是新保守派带领我们来到巴格达的郊外。恰恰是美国的焦虑与傲慢这两个因素带领我们来到巴格达郊外。”参见Ari Shavit, “White Man's Burden,” Ha'aretz,May 4, 2003。
〔3〕引自Emad Mekay, “Iraq Was Invaded ‘to Protect Israel’—US Official,”Asia Times Online, March 31, 2004。我们在《伦敦书评》中最初的那篇文章中使用了这些所引用的内容,而泽利考则对我们的解释提出了质疑。我们的讨论以他的完整无误的评论记录为基础,而他的质疑事实上是毫无根据的。关于泽利考的质疑以及我们所作出的回应更详细的讨论,参见“Letters,” London Review of Books, May 25, 2006。泽利考在布什第一任期时也同赖斯一道在国家安全委员会效力,后来与她合著了一本关于德国统一的著作。他是《美国国家安全战略》(The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: White House, September 2002)这份文件的主要作者之一,该文件可能是对布什主义最为全面的声明。
〔4〕引自“US Assumes UK Help in Iraq, Says General,” Guardian, August 20,2002。
〔5〕引自对萨斯查·勒哈纳茨(Sascha Lehnartz)的采访,“Dann helfen uns eben die Osteuropaer,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, January 26, 2003。关于唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德在五角大楼的国家政策委员会的影响力,参见Stephen J.Hedges,“Iraq Hawks Have Bush's Ear,” Chicago Tribune, August 18, 2002。
〔6〕Joe Klein, “How Israel Is Wrapped Up in Iraq,” Time, February 10,2003.
〔7〕Senator Ernest F.Hollings, “Bush's Failed Mideast Policy Is Creating More Terrorism,” Charleston Post and Courier (online), May 6, 2004;“Sen.Hollings Floor Statement Setting the Record Straight on His Mideast Newspaper Column,” May 20, 2004,起初张贴在这位前参议员的网站上(现在无法进入),但仍然可以登录www.shalomctr.org/node/620。
〔8〕“ADL Urges Senator Hollings to Disavow Statements on Jews and the Iraq War,”反诽谤联盟2004年5月14日的新闻稿。
〔9〕Matthew E.Berger, “Not So Gentle Rhetoric from the Gentleman from South Carolina,” JTA.org, May 23, 2004; “Sen.Hollings Floor Statement”;“Senator Lautenberg's Floor Statement in Support of Senator Hollings,” June 3,2004, 登录http://lautenberg.senate.gov/news room/video.cfm。
〔10〕Aluf Benn, “Scapegoat for Israel,” Ha'aretz, May 13, 2004;Matthew Berger, “Will Some Jews' Backing for War in Iraq Have Repercussions for All?” JTA.org, June 10, 2004; Patrick J.Buchanan, “Whose War?” American Conservative, March 24, 2003; Arnaud de Borchgrave, “A Bush-Sharon Doctrine?” Washington Times, February 14, 2003; Ami Eden, “Israel's Role:The ‘Elephant’ They're Talking About,” Forward, February 28, 2003; “The Ground Shifts,” Forward, May 28, 2004; Nathan Guttman, “Prominent U.S.Jews,Israel Blamed for Start of Iraq War,” Ha'aretz, May 31, 2004; Spencer S.Hsu,“Moran Said Jews Are Pushing War,” Washington Post, March 11, 2003;Lawrence F.Kaplan, “Toxic Talk on War,” Washington Post, February 18, 2003;E.J.Kessler, “Gary Hart Says ‘Dual Loyalty’Barb Was Not Aimed at Jews,”Forward, February 21, 2003; Ori Nir and Ami Eden, “Ex-Mideast Envoy Zinni Charges Neocons Pushed Iraq War to Benefit Israel,” Forward, May 28, 2004,以及 Robert Novak, “Sharon's War?” CNN.com, December 26, 2002。
〔11〕引自Akiva Eldar, “Sharp Pen, Cruel Tongue,” Ha'aretz, April 13,2007。
〔12〕Michael Kinsley, “What Bush Isn't Saying About Iraq,” Slate.com,October 24, 2002.也可参见 Michael Kinsley, “J'Accuse, Sort Of,” Slate.com,March 12, 2003。
〔13〕Nathan Guttman, “Some Blame Israel for U.S.War in Iraq,” Ha'aretz,March 5, 2003.
〔14〕Bill Keller, “Is It Good for the Jews?” New York Times, March 8,2003.
〔15〕Ori Nir, “FBI Probe: More Questions Than Answers,” Forward, May 13,2005.
〔16〕Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited,” International Security 7, no.2(Autumn 1982);Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” Nonproliferation Review 12,no.2(July 2005).
〔17〕Joel Brinkley, “Confrontation in the Gulf: Israelis Worried by U.S.Restraint,” New York Times, August 30, 1990; Joel Brinkley, “Top Israelis Warn of Deep Worry over Diplomatic Accord in Gulf,” New York Times,December 4, 1990; Hugh Carnegy, “Pullout Not Enough, Says Israel,”Financial Times, January 10, 1991; Sabra Chartrand, “Israel Warns Against a Gulf Retreat,” New York Times, December 6, 1990; Jackson Diehl, “Israelis Fear Iraqi Threat Will Endure,” Washington Post, August 29, 1990; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Israel's Call for Action,” Washington Post, August 24, 1990; Michael Massing, “The Way to War,” New York Review of Books,March 28, 1991; Martin Merzer, “Israel Hopes Diplomacy Won't Let Iraqi Stay in Power,” Miami Herald, August 29, 1990,以及 “Sharon to Americans: Blast Iraqis Immediately,” Jerusalem Post, August 12, 1990。
〔18〕Aluf Benn, “Sharon Shows Powell His Practical Side,” Ha'aretz,February 26, 2001.
〔19〕Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Game,” New Yorker, December 3, 2001;Peter Hirschberg, “Background: Peres Raises Iranian Threat,” Ha'aretz,February 5, 2002; David Hirst, “Israel Thrusts Iran in Line of US Fire,”Guardian, February 2, 2002; “Israel Once Again Sees Iran as a Cause for Concern,” Ha'aretz, May 7, 2001,以及 Alan Sipress, “Israel Emphasizes Iranian Threat,” Washington Post, February 7, 2002。
〔20〕Robert Novak, “Netanyahu's Nuke Warning,” Chicago Sun-Times, April 14, 2002; Robert Novak, “War on Iraq Won't Be ‘Cakewalk’,” Chicago Sun-Times, April 25, 2002,以及William Raspberry, “To Solve the Crisis,”Washington Post, April 15, 2002。
〔21〕Elizabeth Sullivan, “Sharon Aide Expects United States to Attack Iraq;He Says Saddam Must Be Stopped from Making Nuclear Arms,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (online), May 3, 2002.
〔22〕引自Joyce Howard Price, “Peres Encourages U.S.Action on Iraq,”Washington Times, May 12, 2002。
〔23〕Ehud Barak, “No Quick Fix,” Washington Post, June 8, 2002.
〔24〕引自Gideon Alon, “Sharon to Panel: Iraq Is Our Biggest Danger,”Ha'aretz, August 13, 2002。也可参见Nina Gilbert, “Iraq Poses Greatest Threat,” Jerusalem Post, August 13, 2002。
〔25〕“Israel to US: Don't Delay Iraq Attack,” CBSNews.com, August 16,2002.所引用的沙龙和佩雷斯的话来自Aluf Benn, “PM Urging U.S.Not to Delay Strike Against Iraq,” Ha'aretz, August 16, 2002。所引用吉森的话来自Jason Keyser,“Israel Urges U.S.to Attack,” Washington Post, August 16, 2002。所引用的雪莉的话来自Ben Lynfield, “Israel Sees Opportunity in Possible US Strike on Iraq,”Christian Science Monitor, August 30, 2002。也可参见Anton La Guardia,“Sharon Urges America to Bring Down Saddam,” Daily Telegraph (London),August 17, 2002; Reuven Pedhatzur, “Israel's Interest in the War on Saddam,”Ha'aretz, August 4, 2002; Jonathan Steele, “Israel Puts Pressure on US to Strike Iraq,” Guardian, August 17, 2002; Walter Rodgers, “Rice and Peres Warn of Iraqi Threat,” CNN.com, August 16, 2002; Tony Snow et al.,interview with Ra'anan Gissen, “Fox Special Report with Brit Hume,” August 16,2002,以及Ze'ev Schiff, “Into the Rough,” Ha'aretz, August 16, 2002。
〔26〕Benn, “PM Urging U.S.” 关于“以色列及其支持者”在2002年深切关注这一情况——“即批评者认为,美国将为了以色列而进行战争;甚或像有些人所认为的那样,美国将按照以色列的命令而进行战争”——的证据,参见Marc Perelman, “Iraqi Move Puts Israel in Lonely U.S.Corner,” Forward, September 20, 2002。
〔27〕amen corner,本意为“支持发言者的人的座位”,此处根据上下文意译为“支持者”。——译者注
〔28〕关于以色列游说集团对1991年海湾战争预备阶段的关注,参见John B.Judis,“Jews and the Gulf: Fallout from the Six-Week War,” Tikkun, May/June 1991;Allison Kaplan, “Saddam Splits Jewish Lobby,” Jerusalem Post, January 14,1991,以及 David Rogers, “Pro-Israel Lobbyists Quietly Backed Resolution Allowing Bush to Commit U.S.Troops to Combat,” Wall Street Journal, January 28,1991。关于以色列在那时的关注,参见Brinkley, “Top Israelis Warn of Deep Worry”;Carnegy, “Pullout Not Enough”; Chartrand, “Israel Warns”; Diehl,“Israelis Fear Iraqi Threat”,以及Merzer, “Israel Hopes”。 所引用的布坎南的话来自Chris Reidy, “The War Between the Columnists Gets Nasty,” Boston Globe,September 22, 1990。
〔29〕Benn, “PM Aide”;Keyser, “Israel Urges U.S.to Attack.”
〔30〕引自Rodgers, “Rice and Peres Warn”。
〔31〕Benn, “PM Aide.”
〔32〕Alon, “Sharon to Panel.” 2002年10月16日在白宫与美国总统布什举行的记者招待会上,沙龙说:“总统先生,我要谢谢您的友谊和合作。而据我记忆所及,当我们回望此前的许多年的时候,我认为我们与任何其他美国总统的关系都不及与您的关系,而且我们从未有过像与您这届政府这样在所有事情上的合作。”“President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Sharon to White House; Question and Answer Session with the Press,” 2002年10月16日美国国务院记者招待会新闻稿副本。也可参见Robert G.Kaiser, “Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy,” Washington Post, February 9, 2003。
〔33〕Shlomo Brom, “An Intelligence Failure,” Strategic Assessment(Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University) 6, no.3(November 2003): 9.也可参见“Intelligence Assessment: Selections from the Media, 1998—2003,” Ibid., pp.17—19; Gideon Alon, “Report Slams Assessment of Dangers Posed by Libya, Iraq,” Ha'aretz, March 28, 2004; Dan Baron, “Israeli Report Blasts Intelligence for Exaggerating the Iraqi Threat,” JTA.org, March 29, 2004; Molly Moore, “Israel Shares Blame on Iraq Intelligence, Report Says,” Washington Post, December 5, 2003; Greg Myre, “Israeli Report Faults Intelligence on Iraq,” New York Times, March 28, 2004; Ori Nir,“Senate Report on Iraq Intel Points to Role of Jerusalem,” Forward, July 16,2004,以及 James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp.72—73。
〔34〕关于推诿责任的普遍现象,参见John J.Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp.157—162。
〔35〕引自Perelman, “Iraqi Move”。
〔36〕Herb Keinon, “Sharon to Putin: Too Late for Iraq Arms Inspection,”Jerusalem Post, October 1, 2002.
〔37〕“Peres Questions France Permanent Status on Security Council,”Ha'aretz, February 20, 2003.
〔38〕Perelman, “Iraqi Move.”
〔39〕Shlomo Avineri, “A Haunting Echo,” Los Angeles Times, November 24,2002.也可参见Benjamin Netanyahu, “The Case for Toppling Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2002, 以及Nathan Guttman, “Shimon Peres Warns Against Repeat of 1930s Appeasement, ”Ha'aretz, September 15, 2002。
〔40〕关于一些有代表性的社论文章,参见“Next Stop, Baghdad,” Jerusalem Posteditorial, November 15, 2001; “Don't Wait for Saddam,” Jerusalem Posteditorial, August 18, 2002; “Making the Case for War,” Jerusalem Posteditorial, September 9, 2002。关于一些有代表性的专栏文章,参见Ron Dermer,“The March to Baghdad,” Jerusalem Post, December 21, 2001; Efraim Inbar,“Ousting Saddam, Instilling Stability,” Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2002,以及 Gerald M.Steinberg, “Imagining the Liberation of Iraq,” Jerusalem Post,November 18, 2001。
〔41〕“Don't Wait for Saddam.”
〔42〕Ehud Barak, “Taking Apart Iraq's Nuclear Threat,” New York Times,September 4, 2002.
〔43〕Netanyahu, “The Case for Toppling Saddam.” 也可参见 Benjamin Netanyahu, “U.S.Must Beat Saddam to the Punch,” Chicago Sun-Times, September 17, 2002。
〔44〕例如,可参见“Benjamin Netanyahu Testifies About Iraq to Congress,”CNN Live Event, CNN.com, September 12, 2002; Jim Lobe, “Hawks Justify Iraq Strike as War for Democracy,” Inter Press Service, September 27, 2002,以及Janine Zacharia, “Netanyahu: US Must Guarantee Israel's Safety from Iraqi Attack,” Jerusalem Post, September 13, 2002。
〔45〕Aluf Benn, “Background: Enthusiastic IDF Awaits War in Iraq,”Ha'aretz, February 17, 2003; James Bennet, “Israel Says War on Iraq Would Benefit the Region,” New York Times, February 27, 2003,以及Chemi Shalev,“Jerusalem Frets as U.S.Battles Iraq War Delays,” Forward, March 7, 2003.
〔46〕引自James Bennet, “Clinton Redux,” The Atlantic Aspenweblog, July 8, 2006。
〔47〕Asher Arian,“Israeli public Opinion on National Security 2002,”Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Memorandum no.61, July 2002, pp.10, 34.
〔48〕Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, “Peace Index: Most Israelis Support the Attack on Iraq,” Ha'aretz, March 6, 2003.关于科威特,2003年3月发表的一项民意调查发现,89.6%的科威特人赞成即将来临的对伊拉克的战争。James Morrison,“Kuwaitis Support War,” Washington Times, March 18, 2003.2007年5月初在以色列进行的一项民意调查中,59%的受访者说,美国决定入侵伊拉克是正确的。“Poll Shows That Israel Is a Staunch American Ally,” Anti-Defamation League press release,May 18, 2007.那时候,大多数美国人都得出结论认为这场战争是一个悲剧性的错误。
〔49〕“America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties: a Nine-Country Survey,” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Washington,DC, March 18, 2003.也可参见 Alan Travis and Ian Black, “Blair's Popularity Plummets,” Guardian, February 18, 2003。
〔50〕Gideon Levy, “A Deafening Silence,” Ha'aretz, October 6, 2002.
〔51〕参见Dan Izenberg, “Foreign Ministry Warns Israeli War Talk Fuels US Anti-Semitism,” Jerusalem Post, March 10, 2003, 这篇文章清楚表明,“以色列外交部已经得到美国的报告”,告诉以色列人要更慎重,因为美国媒体正在把以色列描绘为“企图驱使美国政府陷入战争”。
〔52〕引自Dana Milbank, “Group Urges Pro-Israel Leaders Silence on Iraq,”Washington Post, November 27, 2002。
〔53〕David Horovitz, “Sharon Warns Colleagues Not to Discuss Iraq Conflict,” Irish Times, March 12, 2003.也可参见James Bennet, “Threats and Responses: Israel's Role; Not Urging War, Sharon Says,” New York Times,March 11, 2003,以及 Aluf Benn, “Sharon Says U.S.Should Also Disarm Iran,Libya and Syria,” Ha'aretz, February 18, 2003。
〔54〕新保守派及其盟友的影响力,在战争之前得到广泛的反映,并清楚地反映在撰写于战争之前和战争刚刚开始之后的这些文章之中:Joel Beinin, “Pro-Israel Hawks and the Second Gulf War,” Middle East Report Online, April 6, 2003; Elisabeth Bumiller and Eric Schmitt, “On the Job and at Home, Influential Hawks' 30-Year Friendship Evolves,” New York Times, September 11, 2002; Kathleen and Bill Christison, “A Rose by Another Name: The Bush Administration's Dual Loyalties,” CounterPunch.org, December 13, 2002; Robert Dreyfuss, “The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA,” American Prospect, December 16, 2002; Michael Elliott and James Carney, “First Stop, Iraq,” Time, March 31, 2003;Seymour Hersh, “The Iraq Hawks,” New Yorker, December 24-31, 2001; Michael Hirsh, “Hawks, Doves and Dubya,” Newsweek, September 2, 2002; Glenn Kessler, “U.S.Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003; Joshua M.Marshall, “Bomb Saddam?” Washington Monthly, June 2002;Dana Milbank, “White House Push for Iraqi Strike Is on Hold,” Washington Post,August 18, 2002; Susan Page, “Showdown with Saddam: The Decision to Act,”USA Today, September 11, 2002; Sam Tanenhaus, “Bush's Brain Trust,” Vanity Fair (online), July 2003; Patrick E.Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, “Bush Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation,” New York Times, September 20, 2001,以及Jason A.Vest, “The Men from JINSA and CSP,” Nation, September 2/9,2002。
〔55〕Janine Zacharia, “All the President's Middle East Men,” Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2001.
〔56〕“Rally Unites Anguished Factions Under Flag of ‘Stand with Israel’,”Forward, April 19, 2002; “Forward 50,” Forward, November 15, 2002.
〔57〕John McCaslin, “Israeli-Trained Cops,” Washington Times, November 5,2002; Bret Stephens, “Man of the Year,” Jerusalem Post (Rosh Hashana Supplement), September 26, 2003,以及Janine Zacharia, “Invasive Treatment,”Ibid。其他有关沃尔福威茨的有益文章包括Peter J.Boyer, “The Believer,” New Yorker, November 1, 2004; Michael Dobbs, “For Wolfowitz, a Vision May Be Realized,” Washington Post, April 7, 2003; James Fallows, “The Unilateralist,” Atlantic, March 2002; Bill Keller, “The Sunshine Warrior,”New York Times Magazine, September 22, 2002,以及“Paul Wolfowitz,Velociraptor,” Economist, February 7, 2002。
〔58〕例如,可参见Douglas J.Feith, “The Inner Logic of Israel's Negotiations: Withdrawal Process, Not Peace Process,” Middle East Quarterly 3,no.1(March 1996); Douglas Feith, “A Strategy for Israel,” Commentary,September 1997。关于费思观点的有益讨论,参见Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Little Learning: What Douglas Feith Knew and When He Knew It,” New Yorker, May 9,2005; Jim Lobe, “Losing Feith, or Is the Bush Team Shedding Its Sharper Edges?” Daily Star (online), January 31, 2005; James J.Zogby, “A Dangerous Appointment: Profile of Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense Under Bush,” Middle East Information Center, April 18, 2001,以及“Israeli Settlements: Legitimate, Democratically Mandated, Vital to Israel's Security and, Therefore, in U.S.Interest,” Center for Security Policy, Transition Brief no.96-T 130, December 17, 1996。注意后一篇文章的标题,该文是由以色列游说集团的一个组织所发表的,文章说符合以色列的国家利益即符合美国的国家利益。在《失去费思》(Losing Feith)一文中,洛布写道:“根据华盛顿内部时事通讯《尼尔森报道》(Nelson Report)的说法,当2003年代替拉姆斯菲尔德参加中东问题跨部门‘负责人会议’的费思代表五角大楼进行总结评论的时候,(国家安全顾问康多莉扎·)赖斯说:‘感谢道格,但是在我们想要以色列的主张的时候,我们会邀请以色列大使。’”
〔59〕《干净了结:为保证地区安全的新战略》(A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm)是为耶路撒冷的高级战略与政治研究所所准备的,并于1996年6月发表。此文的副本可登录www.iasps.org/strat1.htm。
〔60〕Akiva Eldar, “Perles of Wisdom for the Feithful,” Ha'aretz, October 1, 2002.
〔61〕Packer, Assassins' Gate, p.32.
〔62〕“Israel's UN Ambassador Slams Qatar, Praises U.S.Envoy Bolton,”Ha'aretz, May 23, 2006.也可参见 “Bolton Is Israel's Secret Weapon, Says Gillerman,” BigNewsNetwork.com, November 18, 2006,以及 Ori Nir, “Senate Probes Bolton's Pro-Israel Efforts,” Forward, May 6, 2005。
〔63〕Marc Perelman, “Siding with White House, Groups Back Bolton,”Forward, November 17, 2006; “Dear John,” Forwardeditorial, December 8,2006.
〔64〕Ori Nir, “Libby Played Leading Role on Foreign Policy Decisions,”Forward, November 4, 2005.
〔65〕“He Tarries: Jewish Messianism and the Oslo Peace,” Rennert Lecture for 2002.克劳萨默每次在他的专栏中激烈地为以色列辩护。
〔66〕Asla Aydintasbas, “The Midnight Ride of James Woolsey,” Salon.com,December 20, 2001; Anne E.Kornblut and Bryan Bender, “Cheney Link of Iraq,9/11 Dismissed,” Boston Globe, September 16, 2003; David E.Sanger and Robin Toner, “Bush and Cheney Talk Strongly of Qaeda Links with Hussein,” New York Times, June 18, 2004,以及 R.James Woolsey, “The Iraq Connection,” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2001。
〔67〕戈德堡说:“在华盛顿圈内的犹太游说人员当中,对迫在眉睫的战争的支持几乎是理所当然的事情——一些人还对这种主张感到困惑,即有可能出现任何一种热心反对入侵伊拉克的情形。” Michelle Goldberg, “Why American Jewish Groups Support War with Iraq,” Salon.com, September 14, 2002.
〔68〕“An Unseemly Silence,” Forwardeditorial, May 7, 2004.
〔69〕Nacha Cattan, “Resolutions on Invasion Divide Jewish Leadership,”Forward, October 11, 2002; Laurie Goodstein, “Threats and Responses:American Jews; Divide Among Jews Leads to Silence on Iraq War,” New York Times,March 15, 2003,以及 Milbank, “Group Urges”。
〔70〕Matthew E.Berger, “Jewish Groups Back U.S.Stand on Iraq,” Jewish Journal (online), October 18, 2002; Jewish Council for Public Affairs,“Statement on Iraq,” 由犹太人公共事务委员会董事会于2002年10月所采用。
〔71〕Mortimer B.Zuckerman, “No Time for Equivocation,” U.S.News & World Report, August 26/September 2, 2002.也可参见Mortimer B.Zuckerman, “No More Cat and Mouse,” U.S.News & World Report, October 28, 2002; Mortimer B.Zuckerman, “Clear and Compelling Proof,” U.S.News & World Report, February 10, 2003,以及Mortimer B.Zuckerman, “The High Price of Waiting,” U.S.News &World Report, March 10, 2003。
〔72〕所引用的两段话均来自Goldberg, “Why American Jewish Groups”。
〔73〕Gary Rosenblatt, “The Case for War Against Saddam,” Jewish Week,December 13, 2002.也可参见Gary Rosenblatt, “Hussein Asylum,” Jewish Week,August 23, 2002。
〔74〕Ron Kampeas, “Cheney: Iran, Iraq a Package Deal,” JTA.org, March 13, 2007.
〔75〕Nathan Guttman, “Background: AIPAC and the Iraqi Opposition,”Ha'aretz, April 7, 2003.也可参见Dana Milbank, “For Israel Lobby Group, War Is Topic A, Quietly,” Washington Post, April 1, 2003。
〔76〕David Twersky, “A Bittersweet Affair for AIPAC,” New York Sun,January 23, 2003.关于反诽谤联盟,参见Cattan, “Resolutions on Invasion”;Nacha Cattan, “Jewish Groups Pressed to Line Up on Iraq,” Forward, August 23,2002,以及Nathan Guttman, “Groups Mum on Iraq, Despite Antiwar Tide,”Forward, March 2, 2007。
〔77〕Jeffrey Goldberg, “Real Insiders: A Pro-Israel Lobby and an FBI Sting,” New Yorker, July 4, 2005.战争开始之前的数月中,美国以色列公共事务委员会出版的针对中东问题的双周刊《近东报道》,刊登的都是针对伊拉克的文章。这些文章虽然没有明确要求入侵伊拉克,但是都把萨达姆描绘为一个特别危险的威胁,从而使读者认为如果不推翻他的政权,以色列和美国毫无疑问将有严重的麻烦。例如,可参见“Saddam's Diversion,” NER, October 7, 2002; interview with Ze'ev Schiff, NER,October 21, 2002; interview with Amatzia Baram, NER , February 25, 2002;interview with Amatzia Baram, NER , October 7, 2002; interview with Kenneth M.Pollack, NER , September 23, 2002; “Arming Iraq,” NER, July 1, 2002,以及“Backing Saddam,” NER, February 3, 2003。
〔78〕John Bresnahan, “GOP Turns to Israeli Lobby to Boost Iraq Support,”Roll Call (online), October 6, 2003.
〔79〕Matthew E.Berger, “Bush Makes Iraq Case in AIPAC Appearance,” Deep South Jewish Voice (online), May 11, 2004.
〔80〕David Horovitz, “Editor's Notes: Wading into the Great Debate,”Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2007.根据罗恩·坎皮斯的说法,切尼的“辩护词并没有得到热情反应。只有约1/3到一半的听众……礼貌性地报以掌声”。参见“Cheney: Iran,Iraq a Package Deal”。同样地,内森·瓜特曼写道,切尼的演讲“受到了冷遇”。参见“Cheney Links Action on Iran to Winning Iraq,” Forward, March 16, 2007。但是,格雷戈里·利维在《沙龙》杂志上的文章指出:“切尼受到了热情的接待和有力的掌声。”参见“Inside America's Powerful Israel Lobby,” Salon.com, March 16, 2007。
〔81〕关于波尔纳和佩洛西所受到的接待,参见Guttman, “Cheney Links Action”;Levey, “Inside”,以及 Ian Swanson, “Pelosi Hears Boos at AIPAC,” The Hill(online), March 13, 2007。
〔82〕Guttman, “Groups Mum on Iraq.”
〔83〕Ibid.; and Jeffrey M.Jones, “Among Religious Groups, Jewish Americans Most Strongly Oppose War,” Gallup News Service, February 23, 2007.
〔84〕就在美国入侵伊拉克之前,国会议员詹姆斯·P.莫兰在说了这番话之后产生了轰动,他说道:“如果不是犹太人社会强烈支持这场同伊拉克的战争,我们就不会打这场战争。”引自Hsu, “Moran Said”。然而,莫兰的话错了,因为在犹太人社会并不存在对战争的广泛支持。他应该这样说:“如果不是新保守派和以色列游说集团领导层强烈支持这场同伊拉克的战争,我们就不会打这场战争。”
〔85〕Samuel G.Freedman, “Don't Blame Jews for This War,” USA Today,April 2, 2003.也可参见James D.Besser, “Jews Souring on Iraq War,” Jewish Week, September 24, 2004; Goodstein, “Threats and Responses”,以及 Ori Nir,“Poll Finds Jewish Political Gap,” Forward, February 4, 2005。同样的情况也发生在1991年的海湾战争之前。到国会投票支持1991年1月12日的战争的时候,“唯一未记录在案支持政府立场的华盛顿重要犹太人组织,是现在就要和平的美国朋友(American Friends of Peace Now),因为它赞成继续进行制裁” 。Judis, “Jews and the Gulf,”p.13.尽管以色列游说集团努力使1991年的战争发生,然而,大部分的美国犹太人社会却反对这场战争,就像在2003年的情形一样。例如,美国国会众议院的犹太人议员以17票对16票的结果投票反对授权战争的决议,而犹太人参议员投票反对授权战争决议的结果则是5票对3票。Ibid., p.14.这一结果反映了这样一个事实,即关于是否发动伊拉克战争这一问题,与2002年至2003年期间所发生的情况相比,1990年至1991年期间有过严肃的辩论;这一结果还反映了另外一个事实,即以色列游说集团有时候采取与相当一部分美国犹太人社会相左的立场。
〔86〕1998年1月26日的信函可以登录美国新世纪计划网站www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm;1998年2月19日的信函可以登录伊拉克观察(Iraq Watch)网站www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/rumsfeldopenletter.htm。关于为了波斯湾的和平与安全委员会的背景,参见Judis, “Jews and the Gulf,” p.12。 也可参见1998年5月29日由美国新世纪计划所赞助的写给众议院议长纽特·金里奇和参议院多数党领袖特伦特·洛特的信函,登录 www.newamericancentury.org/iraqletter1998.htm。需要强调的是,新保守派主张入侵伊拉克推翻萨达姆政权。参见“The End of Containment,” Weekly Standard, December 1, 1997; Zalmay M.Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz,“Overthrow Him,” Ibid.; Frederick W.Kagan, “Not by Air Alone,” Ibid.,以及Robert Kagan, “A Way to Oust Saddam,” Weekly Standard, September 28,1998。
〔87〕伊拉克解放法案的副本可登录www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm。
〔88〕John Dizard, “How Ahmed Chalabi Conned the Neocons,” Salon.com, May 4, 2004; “Iraqi Myths,” Jerusalem Posteditorial, October 7, 1998; Seth Gitell, “Neocons Meet Israeli to Gain U.S.Backing,” Forward, July 31, 1998;Kagan, “Way to Oust Saddam”; Martin Kettle, “Pentagon Balks at ‘Idiotic’Law Urging Bay of Pigs-type Invasion of Iraq,” Guardian, October 21, 1998,以及Vernon Loeb, “Congress Stokes Visions of War to Oust Saddam; White House Fears Fiasco in Aid to Rebels,” Washington Post, October 20, 1998。关于犹太人国家安全事务研究所,参见“Concrete Responses to Saddam,” jinsa.org, Report no.79, August 10, 1998; “To Overthrow Saddam,” jinsa.org, Report no.82,October 2, 1998; “Spring 1998 Board Resolution-Iraq,” jinsa.org, March 22,1998, 以及 “Resolution in Support of the Iraqi Opposition,” jinsa.org,October 19, 1998。
〔89〕参见克林顿在签署1998年的伊拉克解放法案后所作的评论。1998年10月31日的白宫新闻办公室总统声明。也可参见Kettle, “Pentagon Balks”,以及Loeb,“Congress Stokes”。
〔90〕Vernon Loeb, “Saddam's Iraqi Foes Heartened by Clinton,” Washington Post, November 16, 1998; Nicholas Lemann, “The Iraq Factor: Will the New Bush Team's Old Memories Shape Its Foreign Policies?” New Yorker, January 22,2001,以及Robert Litwak, Rogue States and U.S.Foreign Policy (Washington, DC:Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), chap.4。
〔91〕Packer, Assassins' Gate, p.41.
〔92〕Jane Perlez, “Capitol Hawks Seek Tougher Line on Iraq,” New York Times, March 7, 2001; “Have Hawks Become Doves?” Washington Timeseditorial,March 8, 2001.也可参见Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press,2004), pp.129—131。
〔93〕Richard A.Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror(New York: Free Press, 2004); Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W.Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2004).
〔94〕Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004),p.12.也可参见Lemann, “Iraq Factor”; Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Meyers,“Bush Administration Warns Iraq on Weapons Programs,” New York Times, January 23, 2001。(https://www.daowen.com)
〔95〕她还指出,如果伊拉克的确得到大规模杀伤性武器,美国的适当反应将是发表一项“明确而典型的威慑声明——如果他们确实获得了大规模杀伤性武器,那么他们也将无法使用,因为任何使用这种武器的企图都将给他们带来国家灭亡。” Condoleezza Rice,“Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79,no.1(January/February 2000): 60—62.
〔96〕Timothy Noah, “Dick Cheney, Dove,” Slate.com, October 16, 2002;Adam Meyerson, “Calm After Desert Storm,” interview with Dick Cheney, Policy Review 65(Summer 1993).
〔97〕引自Kessler, “U.S.Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past”。埃利奥特(Elliott)和卡尼(Carney)(在“First Stop, Iraq”这篇文章中)报告说,当切尼被选择作为布什的竞选搭档时,由于切尼在结束第一次海湾战争问题上所持的立场,因而威廉·克里斯托尔这样的新保守派都心情沉重。但是克里斯托尔说,“9·11”事件之后,“新保守派却高兴地‘把他看作同路人’”。
〔98〕Elliott and Carney, “First Stop, Iraq”; Glenn Kessler and Peter Slavin, “Cheney Is Fulcrum of Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, October 13,2002; Kessler, “U.S.Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past”,以及“Vice President Dick Cheney Talks About Bush's Energy Plan,” interview with Tim Russert on NBC's Meet the Press, May 20, 2001。虽然切尼对于入侵伊拉克的态度在“9·11”事件之后发生了根本性的改变,但是这显然不是一夜之间发生的事情。参见“The Vice President Appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russert,” Camp David, Maryland,Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 16, 2001。 切尼对有关伊拉克具体问题的回应,并不表明在双子塔倒塌5天之后,他已改变了认为有必要推翻萨达姆政权的想法。
〔99〕所引用的卡根的两段话均来自Packer, Assassins' Gate, p.38。也可参见帕克本人在Assassins' Gate, p.32,中所作的类似评论。
〔100〕Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp.25—26.
〔101〕Page, “Showdown with Saddam.”
〔102〕Elliott and Carney, “First Stop, Iraq.” 伍德沃德把沃尔福威茨描述成一个“像不会停息的鼓声”一样的人。Plan of Attack, p.22.
〔103〕Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp.1—44.
〔104〕关于新保守派对切尼的影响,参见Elliott and Carney, “First Stop,Iraq”; Page, “Showdown with Saddam”; Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis Revisited,” Washington Monthly, November 2004; Frederick Kempe, “Lewis's‘Liberation’ Doctrine for Mideast Faces New Tests,” Wall Street Journal,December 13, 2005,以及 Carla Anne Robbins and Jeanne Cummings, “How Bush Decided That Hussein Must Be Ousted from Atop Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2002。尤其是关于阿杰米,参见Adam Shatz, “The Native Informant,” Nation,April 28, 2003。
〔105〕Jacob Weisberg, “Are Neo-cons History?” Financial Times, March 14,2007.这篇文章清楚表明,切尼和刘易斯有着亲密的关系。
〔106〕伍德沃德在Plan of Attack (pp.48—49)一书中对利比的影响力进行了简明的描述:“利比曾有三个正式头衔。他既是副总统切尼的办公室主任,又是副总统的国家安全顾问,最后还是布什总统的助理。以前可能从来没有一个人这样一身三任。斯库特(Scooter,含义为喷水炮)一词就是用在他自己身上的权力中心……利比是参加总统国家安全委员会会议的非部门负责人中仅有的两个人之一,而且他还参加由赖斯主持的独立部门首长会议。”也可参见Ibid., pp.50—51, 288—292, 300—301, 409—410; Bumiller and Schmitt, “On the Job and at Home”; Karen Kwiatkowski, “The New Pentagon Papers,” Salon.com, March 10, 2004,以及Tyler and Sciolino, “Bush Advisers Split”。
〔107〕Tyler and Sciolino, “Bush Advisers Split.” 也可参见 Bumiller and Schmitt, “On the Job and at Home”,以及 William Safire, “Phony War II,”New York Times, November 28, 2002。
〔108〕关于切尼在布什政府中的重要影响力,参见Jeanne Cummings and Greg Hitt,“In Iraq Drama, Cheney Emerges as President's War Counselor,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2003; Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff, and Evan Thomas,“Cheney's Long Path to War,” Newsweek, November 17, 2003; Kessler and Slavin, “Cheney Is Ful crum”; Barbara Slavin and Susan Page, “Cheney Rewrites Roles in Foreign Policy,” USA Today, July 29, 2002,以及 Woodward,Plan of Attack, pp.27—30。
〔109〕Kessler, “U.S.Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past”,以及Woodward,Plan of Attack, 410。也可参见ibid., pp.164—165, 409。
〔110〕引自Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size,” New York Times, February 28, 2003。
〔111〕“This Goes Beyond Bin Laden,” jinsa.org, September 13, 2001.也可参见Vest, “The Men from JINSA and CSP”。
〔112〕这封信发表于2001年10月1日的《旗帜周刊》上。 签名者当中有威廉·贝内特、埃利奥特·科恩、阿隆·弗里德伯格、唐纳德·卡根、罗伯特·卡根、珍妮·柯克帕特里克、威廉·克里斯托尔、查尔斯·克劳萨默、理查德·珀尔、诺曼·波多雷茨、蒂芬·索拉兹和利昂·威泽惕尔。
〔113〕Charles Krauthammer, “The War: A Road Map,” Washington Post,September 28, 2001; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Right War,”Weekly Standard, October 1, 2001.也可参见 “War Aims,” Wall Street Journaleditorial, September 20, 2001。
〔114〕Michael Barone, “War by Ultimatum,” U.S.News & World Report,October 1, 2001.也可参见Bill Gertz, “Iraq Suspected of Sponsoring Terrorist Attacks,” Washington Times, September 21, 2001; “Drain the Ponds of Terror,” Jerusalem Posteditorial, September 25, 2001; William Safire, “The Ultimate Enemy,” New York Times, September 24, 2001,以及 Mortimer B.Zuckerman, “A Question of Priorities,” U.S.News & World Report, October 8,2001。
〔115〕2002年4月3日的信函可以登录www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter040302.htm。
〔116〕Daniel Byman, Kenneth M.Pollack, and Gideon Rose, “The Rollback Fantasy,” Foreign Affairs 78, no.1(January/February 1999).
〔117〕Kenneth M.Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq(New York: Random House, 2002); Kenneth M.Pollack, “Why Iraq Can't Be Deterred,” New York Times, September 26, 2002; Kenneth M.Pollack, “A Last Chance to Stop Iraq,” New York Times, February 21, 2003; Martin S.Indyk and Kenneth M.Pollack, “How Bush Can Avoid the Inspections Trap,” New York Times,January 27, 2003,以及Martin S.Indyk and Kenneth M.Pollack, “Lock and Load,”Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2002。
〔118〕William Kristol, “The Axis of Appeasement,” Weekly Standard,August 26/September 2, 2002; Robert Bartley, “Thinking Things Over: What We Learned,” Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2002; Michael Ledeen,“Scowcroft Strikes Out,” National Review Online, August 6, 2002; George Melloan, “Who Really Doubts That Saddam's Got to Go,” Wall Street Journal,September 10, 2002; John O'Sullivan, “Chamberlain Deserves an Apology:Scowcroft, Hagel, and Raines Are No Chamberlains,” National Review Online,September 3, 2002; “This Is Opposition? There Is No Revolt in the GOP Against Bush's Iraq Policy,” Wall Street Journaleditorial, August 19, 2002,以及“Who Is Brent Scowcroft?” New York Suneditorial, August 19, 2002。新保守派表示愤怒的那些目标中,没有一个人主张对伊拉克进行绥靖,而是支持对战争进行控制。
〔119〕William Safire, “Our ‘Relentless’ Liberation,” New York Times,October 8, 2001.也可参见 William Safire, “Saddam and Terror,” New York Times,August 22, 2002,以及William Safire, “Big Mo,” New York Times, November 19,2001。
〔120〕Robert Kagan, “On to Phase II,” Washington Post, November 27,2001; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “What to Do About Iraq,” Weekly Standard, January 21, 2002,以及 Safire, “Saddam and Terror”。
〔121〕Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The U.N.Trap?” Weekly Standard,November 18, 2002; Charles Krauthammer, “A Costly Charade at the U.N.,”Washington Post, February 28, 2003; George F.Will, “Stuck to the U.N.Tar Baby,” Washington Post, September 19, 2002,以及 William Safire, “The French Connection,” New York Times, March 14, 2003。
〔122〕Krauthammer, “Our First Move.” 也可参见Reuel Marc Gerecht, “A Necessary War,” Weekly Standard, October 21, 2002,以及Charles Krauthammer,“Where Power Talks,” Washington Post, January 4, 2002。
〔123〕对政府兜售战争行动的精彩描述参见Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: The Decline and Fall of Truth from 9/11 to Katrina (New York: Penguin Press, 2006)。
〔124〕James Bamford, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies (New York: Doubleday, 2004), chaps.13—14;Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Knopf, 2006),pp.440—446; 以及 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp.288—292, 297—301。也可参见Ibid., pp.72, 163。
〔125〕Woodward, Plan of Attack, p.290.
〔126〕“Powell Regrets UN Speech on Iraq WMDs,” ABC News Online, September 9, 2005.
〔127〕Bamford, Pretext for War, pp.287—291, 307—331; Julian Borger,“The Spies Who Pushed for War,” Guardian, July 17, 2003; David S.Cloud,“Prewar Intelligence Inquiry Zeroes in on Pentagon Office,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2004; Seymour M.Hersh, “Selective Intelligence,” New Yorker, May 12, 2003; Kwiatkowski, “New Pentagon Papers”; W.Patrick Lang,“Drinking the Kool-Aid,” Middle East Policy 11, no.2(Summer 2004); Jim Lobe, “Pentagon Office Home to Neo-Con Network,” Inter Press Service, August 7, 2003; Greg Miller, “Spy Unit Skirted CIA on Iraq,” Los Angeles Times,March 10, 2004; Paul R.Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,”Foreign Affairs 85, no.2(March-April 2006); James Risen, “How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence,” New York Times, April 28, 2004,以及Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Threats and Responses: A C.I.A.Rival; Pentagon Sets Up Intelligence Unit,” New York Times, October 24,2002。
〔128〕Risen, State of War , pp.72—73.
〔129〕Lobe, “Pentagon Office.” 关于马科夫斯基,参见Jack Herman, “A Whole New Ballgame Overseas,” St.Louis Post-Dispatch, February 20, 1989。这篇文章写在马科夫斯基正要离开美国移居以色列的时候。他告诉赫尔曼(Herman)说:“我对帮助建立一个犹太国家怀有强烈的感情。”他然后补充说:“这就像落叶归根一样。”
〔130〕Borger, “The Spies.”
〔131〕Inspector General, Department of Defense, “Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,”Report no.07-INTEL-04, February 9, 2007.
〔132〕Franklin Foer, “Founding Fakers,” New Republic, August 18, 2003.
〔133〕Robert Dreyfuss, “Tinker, Banker, NeoCon, Spy,” American Prospect , November 18, 2002.也可参见 “Who Will Lead a Free Iraq?” jinsa.org,May 9, 2003,以及 “Creating a Post-Saddam Iraq,” jinsa.org, Report no.481,April 6, 2005。
〔134〕引自Dreyfuss, “Tinker, Banker”。也可参见Matthew E.Berger, “Iraqi Exiles and Jews Form Unlikely Alliance,” Jewish News Weekly (online),October 18, 2002; Juan Cole, “All the Vice-President's Men,” Salon.com ,October 28, 2005,以及 Michelle Goldberg, “The War over the Peace,”Salon.com , April 14, 2003。
〔135〕引自Robert Dreyfuss, “Chalabi and AEI: The Sequel,” TomPaine.com,November 10, 2005。也可参见Laurie Mylroie, “Unusually Effective,” New York Sun, November 8, 2005,以及Michael Rubin, “Iraq's Comeback Kid,” National Review Online, December 5, 2005。
〔136〕Bernard Lewis, “Put the Iraqis in Charge,” Wall Street Journal,August 29, 2003.也可参见 Ian Buruma, “Lost in Translation,” New Yorker,June 14, 2004,以及 Michael Hirsh, “Bernard Lewis Revisited,” Washington Monthly, November 2004。
〔137〕Dizard, “How Ahmed Chalabi Conned the Neocons.” 2003年6月中旬,本杰明·内塔尼亚胡宣布说:“不久你将见到伊拉克的石油流向海法。” Reuters,“Netanyahu Says Iraq-Israel Oil Line Not Pipe-Dream,” Ha'aretz, June 20,2003.当然,这种事情并没有发生,而且在可预见的将来也不可能发生。也可参见Douglas Davis, “Peace with Israel Said to Top New Iraq's Agenda,” Jerusalem Post,April 21, 2003。
〔138〕Matthew E.Berger, “New Chance to Build Israel-Iraq Ties,” Jewish Journal (online), April 28, 2003.也可参见 Bamford, Pretext to War, p.293,以及 Ed Blanche, “Securing Iraqi Oil for Israel: The Plot Thickens,”Lebanonwire.com, April 25, 2003。
〔139〕Nathan Guttman, “Mutual Wariness: AIPAC and the Iraqi Opposition,”Ha'aretz, April 27, 2003.
〔140〕引自Packer, Assassins' Gate, p.41。
〔141〕弗里德曼通过加入这样的话而修正了这一评论:“在最后的分析中,煽动战争的是美国对9·11事件的过度反应。”我们同意这种修正;导致美国陷入伊拉克泥潭的,乃是以下这三个因素共同作用的结果:新保守派对战争的积极推动、以色列游说集团中主要团体的支持,以及特定的国际、国内环境。参见Shavit, “White Man's Burden”。
〔142〕Noam Chomsky, “The Israel Lobby?” Znet (online), March 28, 2006.也可参见 Stephen Zunes, “The Israel Lobby: How Powerful Is It Really?” Znet(online), May 25, 2006。
〔143〕有位学者指出,即将来临的伊拉克战争的反战力量“喜欢的口号”,是“不要为了石油而流血”。John B.Judis, “Over a Barrel,” New Republic, January 20,2003, 20.也可参见William R.Clark, Petrodollar Warfare: Oil, Iraq and the Future of the Dollar (Gabriola Island, Canada: New Society Publishers, 2005);Michael Elliott, “The Selling of the President's War: Bush Should Take Israel and Oil Out of the Iraq Equation,” Time , November 18, 2002; Michael Meacher,“This War on Terrorism Is Bogus,” Guardian , September 6, 2003; Kevin Phillips, “American Petrocacy,” American Conservative, July 17, 2006,以及Sandy Tolan, “Beyond Regime Change,” Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2002。
〔144〕Judis, “Jews and the Gulf,” pp.16—17.
〔145〕Stephen J.Hedges, “Allies Not Swayed on Iraq Strike,” Chicago Tribune, August 28, 2002; “Saudi Arabia Says It Won't Join a War,” New York Times, March 19, 2003; “Saudis Warn US over Iraq War,” BBC News (online),February 17, 2003; Jon Sawyer, “Saudi Arabia Won't Back War on Iraq without U.N.Authority, Prince Warns,” St.Louis Post-Dispatch (online), January 23,2003; “Scorecard: For or Against Military Action,” New York Times, August 27, 2002,以及 Brian Whitaker and John Hooper, “Saudis Will Not Aid US War Effort,” Guardian, August 8, 2002。
〔146〕Peter Beinart, “Crude,” New Republic, October 7, 2002; Michael Moran and Alex Johnson, “The Rush for Iraq's Oil,” MSNBC.com, November 7,2002; Anthony Sampson, “Oilmen Don't Want Another Suez,” Observer, December 22, 2002; John W.Schoen, “Iraqi Oil, American Bonanza?” MSNBC.com,November 11, 2002,以及Daniel Yergin, “A Crude View of the Crisis in Iraq,”Washington Post, December 8, 2002。
〔147〕(白宫新闻秘书办公室,2002年8月26日)副总统向海外退伍军人协会 第103届全国大会发表的讲话,田纳西州纳什维尔。也可参见(白宫新闻秘书办公室,2002年8月29日)副总统向朝鲜战争退伍军人协会(Veterans of the Korean War)发表的讲话,得克萨斯州圣安东尼奥。
〔148〕关于演说的副本,参见“In the President's Words: ‘Free People Will Keep the Peace of the World’,” New York Times, February 27, 2003。也可参见(白宫新闻秘书办公室,2002年9月12日)总统向联合国大会发表的讲话,纽约;(白宫新闻秘书办公室,2002年6月1日)总统向毕业班发表的讲话,西点军校;(白宫新闻秘书办公室,2005年1月20日)总统的就职演说,华盛顿哥伦比亚特区,以及《美国国家安全战略》(2002)[National Security Strategy of the United States (2002)]。
〔149〕Robert S.Greenberger and Karby Leggett, “President's Dream: Changing Not Just Regime but a Region: A Pro-U.S., Democratic Area Is a Goal That Has Israeli and Neoconservative Roots,” Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2003.也可参见 George Packer, “Dreaming of Democracy,” New York Times Magazine, March 2, 2003; Paul Sperry, “Bush the Nation-Builder: So Much for Campaign Promises,” Antiwar.com, October 6, 2006,以及Wayne Washington, “Once Against Nation-Building, Bush Now Involved,” Boston Globe, March 2, 2004。
〔150〕Charles Krauthammer, “Peace Through Democracy,” Washington Post,June 28, 2002.
〔151〕Barak, “Taking Apart.”
〔152〕引自Lynfield, “Israel Sees Opportunity in Possible U.S.Strike on Iraq”。
〔153〕Benn, “Background.”
〔154〕Bennet, “Israel Says.”
〔155〕Shalev, “Jerusalem Frets.”
〔156〕例如,可参见Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, Report of the Project for the New American Century(Washington, DC, September 2000), pp.14, 17—18。
〔157〕Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East,” 向索里夫研讨会(Soref Symposium)发表的演讲,华盛顿近东政策研究所,1993年5月18日。也可参见 Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs 73, no.2(March/April 1994)。
〔158〕Kenneth M.Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), pp.261—265.
〔159〕Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); Charles Kraut-hammer, “Universal Dominion: Toward a Unipolar World,” National Interest 18(Winter 1989/90); Michael A.Ledeen, Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a Global Democratic Revolution, Won the Cold War,and Walked Away (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996); Joshua Muravchik,Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, DC: AEI Press,1991); Marina Ottaway et al., “Democratic Mirage in the Middle East,”Policy Brief20(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,October 2002); Norman Podhoretz, “Strange Bedfellows: A Guide to the New Foreign-Policy Debates,” Commentary, December 1999; “Statement of Principles,” Project for the New American Century, June 3, 1997,以及Albert Wohlstetter, “A Vote in Cuba? Why Not in Iraq?” Wall Street Journal, May 24,1991。
〔160〕关于新保守派进行中东地区改造的思想,参见Robert Blecher, “Free People Will Set the Course of History,” Middle East Report Online, March 2003; Jack Donnelly and Anthony Shadid, “Iraq War Hawks Have Plans to Reshape Entire Mideast,” Boston Globe, September 10, 2002; Halper and Clarke, America Alone, pp.76—90; Nicholas Lemann,“After Iraq: The Plan to Remake the Middle East,” New Yorker, February 17, 2003,以及 Klein, “How Israel”。
〔161〕引自Roula Khalaf, “Rice ‘New Middle East’ Comments Fuel Arab Fury over US Policy,” Financial Times , July 31, 2006。
〔162〕Orly Halpern, “Israeli Experts Say Middle East Was Safer with Saddam in Iraq,” Forward, January 5, 2007.也可参见 Leslie Susser, “Iraq War: Good or Bad for Israel? Saddam's Execution Revives Debate,” JTA.org, January 2,2007。
〔163〕引自Chris McGreal, “Israelis May Regret Saddam Ousting, Says Security Chief,” Guardian, February 9, 2006。
〔164〕James A.Baker III and Lee H.Hamilton, co-chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Random House, 2006), xv, pp.28—29, 43—45, 50—58.一再呼吁解决以巴冲突,并主张同伊朗和叙利亚进行谈判的托尼·布莱尔说,伊拉克研究小组“提供了一条坚定的前进道路”。引自Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Kate Zernike, “Bush Expresses Caution on Key Points in Iraq Panel's Report,” New York Times,December 7, 2006。也可参见 Kirk Semple, “Syrian Official, in Iraq, Offers Assistance,” New York Times, November 19, 2006。
〔165〕Akiva Eldar, “The Gewalt Agenda,” Ha'aretz, November 20, 2006.
〔166〕Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler, “Hawks Bolster Skeptical President,” Washington Post, December 10, 2006; Associated Press, “Israel Experts Doubt Focusing on Israel-Arab Conflict Will Help in Iraq,”International Herald Tribune, December 6, 2006; “Gates's Shocking Thinking on Iran,” Jerusalem Post editorial , December 6, 2006; Nathan Guttman, “Baker Group Advisers ‘Surprised,’ ‘Upset’ at Report's Israel-Iraq Link,”Forward , January 30, 2007; Jeff Jacoby, “Fighting to Win in Iraq,” Boston Globe, December 3, 2006; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “A Perfect Failure,” Weekly Standard, December 11, 2006; Ron Kampeas, “ISG Fallout Continues with Query: Is Israeli-Arab Peace the Linchpin?” JTA.org, December 10, 2006; Jim Lobe, “Neocons Move to Preempt Baker Report,” Antiwar.com,December 6, 2006; Marc Perelman, “As Washington Studies Iraq Report,Jerusalem Frets over Tehran Talk,” Forward, December 15, 2006; Shmuel Rosner,“Baker's Brew,” Ha'aretz, December 8, 2006,以及“The Iraq Muddle Group,”Wall Street Journaleditorial, December 7, 2006。
〔167〕引自Shmuel Rosner, “FM Livni: U.S.Must Stand Firm on Iraq,”Ha'aretz, March 13, 2007。也可参见Shmuel Rosner, “Livni to AIPAC: U.S.Can't Show Weakness on Iraq, Iran,” Ha'aretz, March 12, 2007。
〔168〕所引用的奥尔默特的话来自Bradley Burston, “Israel Must Stay the Hell Out of U.S.Debate on Iraq,” Ha'aretz, March 13, 2007,以及Hilary L.Krieger,“PM's AIPAC Talk Surprises Delegates,” Jerusalem Post, March 13, 2007。
〔169〕Burston, “Israel Must Stay.”也可参见 Krieger, “PM's AIPAC Talk”,以及Shmuel Rosner, “No Easy Answers on Israel and the Iraq Debate,” Ha'aretz,March 13, 2007。
〔170〕“President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Olmert of Israel to the White House,” 白宫新闻秘书办公室,2006年11月13日。
〔171〕引自James D.Besser, “Olmert Support for Iraq War Stirs Anger,”Jewish Week, November 17, 2006。
〔172〕David Horovitz, “Editor's Notes: Wading into the Great Debate,”Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2007.
〔173〕引自Glenn Frankel, “A Beautiful Friendship?” Washington Post Sunday Magazine, July 16, 2006。
〔174〕Martin Kramer, “The American Interest,” Azure 5767, no.26(Fall 2006): 29.克雷默还声称说:“代表以色列而发动伊拉克战争的论断是纯粹编造的故事,”这一评论与奥尔默特总理2007年向美国以色列公共事务委员会政策会议发表的声明相左,因为他明确把以色列的安全与在伊拉克的胜利挂钩。参见前面的第167条注释。也可参见Yossi Alpher, “Sharon Warned Bush,” Forward, January 12, 2007。
〔175〕Alpher, “Sharon Warned Bush.” 也可参见Herb Keinon, “Sharon Warned Bush of Saddam Threat,” Jerusalem Post, January 11, 2007。
〔176〕参见前面的注释21和注释25。