中国在津巴布韦的影响力[63]
2002年，美国对有违法行为的250名津巴布韦个人和实体实施经济和签证制裁。2003年、2005年和2008年，名单进一步扩大，美国同时禁止国防设备转移和暂停非人道的政府对政府援助[64]。2009年，奥巴马总统再次延长这些制裁时效[65]。欧盟对穆加贝及其核心集团实施旅行禁令和财产冻结，限制武器销售[66]。
西方国家为了孤立穆加贝而实施的制裁减少了它们与津巴布韦的贸易。美国的贸易从2008年的2亿美元下降到2011年的1.11亿美元[67]。与此同时，实施制裁和公开反对穆加贝使美国和欧盟与津巴布韦的关系恶化。
尽管南非是一个地区大国，是津巴布韦的一个邻国，也是津巴布韦最大的贸易伙伴，它对津巴布韦给予了重要的外交支持。但是由于姆贝基实行的是“静悄悄的外交”[68]，对推动津巴布韦的改革成效甚微，部分原因是姆贝基和穆加贝均蔑视津巴布韦反对派领导人茨万吉拉伊。因此，相对于中国在世界上的地位，南非在津巴布韦的影响逊于中国。另外，穆加贝厌恶（也许用“嫉妒”一词更合适——译者注）包括曼德拉、姆贝基和祖马在内的南非领导人，因为他们被看作是南部非洲解放运动的旗帜。
我们有理由相信中国在津巴布韦施加了重要影响。如前所述，中国与穆加贝有浓厚的历史渊源，自60年代以来就开始支持其在津巴布韦的政治合法性，穆加贝认为其成功得益于中国的支持。中国在国际舞台也积极保护穆加贝政府。与南非的“静悄悄”不同，中国发表公开声明，对其给予投票支持。中国的支持包括：认可2005年选举结果、支持土地改革、在人权理事会合作、反对制裁。即使在遭受公众批评后，中国仍然一如既往地支持穆加贝政府。中国在津巴布韦经济发展中也有相当大的影响力，2010年，中国成为津巴布韦的第三大贸易伙伴，中国在津巴布韦有着大量的投资。
【注释】
[1]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，p.3.
[2]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，pp.9-11.
[3]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，Executive summary.
[4]Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，p.118，123.
[5]2008年的数据主要受中国中辉矿业集团投资53亿美元的影响。
[6]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，p.1，11.
[7]Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa.Amsterdam University Press，2009，p.124.
[8]Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，p.124.
[9]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，pp.15-16；Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，pp.128-129.
[10]Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，p.129.
[11]Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，p.130；Peter Kragelund and Meine Pieter van Dijk，China's Investments in Africa，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，p.94.
[12]Centre for Chinese Studies，University of Stellenbosch，China's Interest and Activity in Africa's Construction and Infrastructure Sectors，2006.
[13]Centre for Chinese Studies，University of Stellenbosch，China's Interest and Activity in Africa's Construction and Infrastructure Sectors，2006.
[14]不知道是不是指“江苏省建设集团有限公司”，作者与该公司邮件联系，但未获得回复。
[15]Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，pp.131-133；George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，pp.20-21.
[16]Thomas M.Kane and Lawrence W.Serewicz，China's Hunger：The Consequences of A Rising Demand for Food and Energy，Parameters，2001，31（3），pp.63-75.
[17]Ethel Hazelhurst，South Africa's First-Half Trade Deficit with China Cut to＄200Million，Business Report，1August，2007.
[18]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，pp.20-21.
[19]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，pp.12-14.
[20]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，p.1.
[21]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，pp.18-19.
[22]Austin Muneku，Chinese Investments in Zambia，in Baah AY and Jauch H，Chinese Investments in Africa：Labor Perspective，Africa Labor Research Network，2009.
[23]Dan Haglund，Regulating Diversity：China and the Changing Composition of Zambia's Mining Sector，The China Monitor 44，2009，pp.8-11.
[24]这并不违反赞比亚关于“最低工资”的法律规定，按照规定，临时工的最低工资每月约150美金。
[25]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，pp.23-28.
[26]Dan Haglund，Regulating Diversity：China and the Changing Composition of Zambia's Mining Sector，The China Monitor 44，2009，pp.8-11.
[27]George Schoneveld，Laura German，Davison Gumbo，The Developmental Implications of Sino-African Economic and Political Relations：A Preliminary Assessment for the Case of Zambia，Working Paper 133，Center for International Forestry Research，2014，Executive summary.
[28]Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund，State-driven Chinese Investments in Zambia：Combining Strategic Interests and Profits，in Meine Pieter van Dijk，The New Presence of China in Africa，Amsterdam University Press，2009，p.126，127，129.
[29]Ian Taylor，China and Africa：Engagement and Compromise，Routledge Taylor ＆Francis Group，2006，pp.106-114.
[30]Ian Taylor，China's New Role in Africa，Lynne Rienner，2009，p.102.
[31]Ndabaningi Sithole，African Nationalism，Oxford University，1959，p.142.(https://www.daowen.com)
[32]Ian Taylor，China and Africa：Engagement and Compromise，Routledge Taylor ＆Francis Group，2006，pp.114-123.
[33]Reagan Thompson，Assessing the Chinese Influence in Ghana，Angola，And Zimbabwe：The Impact of Politics，Partners，And Petro，Stanford University，Center for International Security and Cooperation（CISAC），21May，2012，p.100.
[34]Medeiros Evan，The Security Threat from South Africa，in Colin Stoneman，Zimbabwe's Prospects，Harare College Press，1988，p.221.
[35]Deborah Brautigam，China in Africa：Think Again，The World Financial Review，28December，2010，http：//www.worldfinancialreview.com/？p＝2777.
[36]Ian Taylor，China and Africa：Engagement and Compromise，Routledge Taylor ＆Francis Group，2006，pp.123-126；Reagan Thompson，Assessing the Chinese Influence in Ghana，Angola，and Zimbabwe：The Impact of Politics，Partners，And Petro，Stanford University，Center for International Security and Cooperation（CISAC），21May，2012，pp.103-108.
[37]Oxford Analytica，Zimbabwe's“Look East”Disappoints，Forbes，28December，2007，http：//www.forbes.com/2007/12/27/zimbabwe-harare-mugabe-cx-1228oxford.html.
[38]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009，p.287.
[39]U.S.Department of the Treasury，Office of Foreign Assets Control，Zimbabwe：What You Need to Know About U.S.Sanctions，23November，2005，http：//www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documents/zimb.pdf，p.1.
[40]直到2009年，IMF才恢复对津巴布韦的技术援助，2010年，恢复其在IMF的投票权。U.S.Embassy-Harare，U.S.Sanctions and Bilateral Trade with Zimbabwe 2001-2010，harare.usembassy.gov/uploads/pz/tK/.../us＿zim＿sanctions＿trade.pdf.
[41]Mlambo，Alois and Brian Raftopoulos，Becoming Zimbabwe：A History From the Pre-colonial Period to 2008，Weaver Press，2009.
[42]Brown，Stephen and Sriram，Chandra Lekha，China's Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa：Clarifying Issues of Culpability，in Rotberg，Robert，China into Africa，Brookings Institution Press，2008，p.262.
[43]Anna Tibaijuka，Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe，U.N.Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues，17June，2005，http：∥www.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf，p.7.
[44]Joshua Eisenman，Zimbabwe：China's African Ally，The Jamestown Foundation，http：//wwwj.amestown.org/single/？no＿cache＝1＆tx＿ttnews［tt＿news］＝3877.
[45]Joshua Eisenman，Zimbabwe：China's African Ally，The Jamestown Foundation，http：//wwwj.amestown.org/single/？no＿cache＝1＆tx＿ttnews［tt＿news］＝3877.
[46]Stephen Brown and Chandra Lekha Sriram，China's Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa：Clarifying Issues of Culpability，in Robert Rotberg，China into Africa，Brookings Institution Press，2008，p.262.
[47]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009，p.288.
[48]华为（一家中国电信公司）要求，20%需要即时付款，并以烟草、铬或铂出口作为抵押；中国航空技术进出口公司要求预付定金360万美元，并以烟草出口作为抵押。
[49]越南和利比亚也投了反对票。
[50]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009，p.284.
[51]Stephen Brown and Chandra Lekha Sriram，China's Role in Human Rights Abuses in Africa：Clarifying Issues of Culpability，in Robert Rotberg，China into Africa，Brookings Institution Press，2008，p.262.
[52]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009.
[53]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009，p.292.
[54]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009，p.292.
[55]Ian Taylor，China's New Role in Africa，Lynne Rienner，2009，p.101.
[56]Ian Taylor，China and Africa：Engagement and Compromise，Routledge Taylor ＆Francis Group，2006，pp.123-126；Reagan Thompson，Assessing the Chinese Influence in Ghana，Angola，And Zimbabwe：The Impact of Politics，Partners，And Petro，Stanford University，Center for International Security and Cooperation（CISAC），21May，2012，p.102，pp.112-113.
[57]Chris Melville and Olly Owen，China and Africa：A New Era of South-South Cooperation，Open Democracy，7July，2005，http：//www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-G8/south＿2658j.sp.
[58]Ian Taylor，China and Africa：Engagement and Compromise，Routledge，2006，p.123.
[59]Nkepile Mabuse，Zimbabwe：China's Friend in Need？，CNN，26April，2011，http：//edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/04/26/zimbabwe.china/index.html.
[60]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009.
[61]Deborah Brautigam，The Dragon's Gift，Oxford University Press，2009.p.129.
[62]Sokwanele Special Report，21June，2005，in Ian Taylor，China and Africa：Engagement and Compromise，Routledge Taylor ＆Francis Group，2006，p.124.
[63]Ian Taylor，China and Africa：Engagement and Compromise，Routledge Taylor ＆Francis Group，2006，pp.123-126；Reagan Thompson，Assessing the Chinese Influence in Ghana，Angola，And Zimbabwe：The Impact of Politics，Partners，And Petro，Stanford University，Center for International Security and Cooperation（CISAC），21May，2012，pp.114-118.
[64]U.S.Department of State，Background Note：Zimbabwe，14October，2011，http：//www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm＃relations.
[65]Bill Trott，Obama Extends U.S.Sanctions Against Zimbabwe，Reuters，5 March，2006，http：//www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/05/us-zimbabwe-crisis-usaidUSTRE5241BT20090305.
[66]European Commission，European Union Restrictive Measures in Force，14 April，2012，eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures＿en.pdf.
[67]U.S.Census Bureau，Trade in Goods with Zimbabwe，http：//www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c7960.html.
[68]Barry Bearak and Celia Dugger，Complex Relationship Keeps South African Leader from Criticizing Mugabe，The New York Times，27June，2008，http：//www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/world/africa/27iht-mbeki.1.14044297.html.