斯多亚德性论：一种未竟之业
随着德性伦理学的复兴,人们重新将目光聚焦到斯多亚学派的伦理学,试图从中选择当代德性论所需要的理论资源。由此,对斯多亚学派做德性议题的分梳就绝不简单地定位于思想史的梳理,而且要深入斯多亚学派的理论脉络,对其做类型学甄别,从而探问一种斯多亚式德性伦理学(stoic virtue ethics,以下简称为斯多亚德性论)是否可能。斯多亚的德性理论(stoic virtue theory)是否构成斯多亚德性论(stoic virtue ethics)?如果构成的话,它应该成为哪一种类型的德性论?支持者会认为,斯多亚德性论是可以成立的,即使构不成斯多亚式的德性论的话,至少应该成为德性论的某种类型(如,可以是幸福主义德性论)；而反对者会强调,斯多亚学派虽讨论了德性问题,但这只是其伦理学的议题之一(即斯多亚的德性理论),但却不足以成为德性论。
支持者们认为,斯多亚学派继承了亚里士多德的幸福主义,德性的最终目的在于幸福生活,在德性和幸福之间的关系问题上,斯多亚学派提供了相对充足的解释,在方法论上也延续了自然主义的分析框架。和亚里士多德的德性论一样,斯多亚学派也坚持德性的统一性(unity of virtues),主张各种德性之间不存在冲突,并从根本上反映了古希腊和谐的宇宙观。此外,斯多亚学派重视实践理性(practical reasoning)作用与亚氏强调实践智慧的根本作用也存在一致之处。马泰·夏普(Matthew Sharpe)认为,斯多亚学派将德性视为唯一的善,就这点而言,就已经从一个方面称得上是鲜明的古希腊德性论。[73]斯多亚学派跟亚里士多德一样均高度重视行为者的品格涵养,更进一步地,甚至可以说,斯多亚学派就是幸福主义德性论。丹尼尔·罗素(Danniel Russell)明确地将斯多亚主义划入幸福主义伦理学的阵营[74],认为古希腊罗马时期的伦理学都在追求人类的幸福和卓越,都可以置于幸福主义伦理学。
除此之外,在如何培育德性的问题上,斯多亚学派负有盛名的“斯多亚圣徒”(stoic sage)形象成为德性实践的范例化。斯多亚圣徒身上凝聚了卓越的人性品质,是最完美德性的人格化身。斯多亚学派在讨论伦理学的时候,喜欢描述完全有德性的人——斯多亚圣徒会做什么,圣徒如何成就,以此来展现我们应该做什么和应该如何做,[75]从而为人们的道德模仿提供可以参照的现实样本。在很多人看来,这也从一个方面佐证了斯多亚伦理思想构成德性论。
当代较为坚定的斯多亚德性论倡导者以劳伦斯·贝克(Lawrence Becker)为代表,他主张斯多亚学派能够为德性伦理学提供统一化的、基础性的框架,从而更为深刻地把握当代德性伦理学的多样性,甚至可以成为亚里士多德主义的替代性方案。除了贝克这位坚定的支持者之外,当代其他的一些思想家尽管没有明确地声称,但所做的工作也是在尝试修正或发挥古典斯多亚学派的部分观点。这其中,尤以对待情感的态度问题为最,以玛莎·纳斯鲍姆(M.Nussbaum)、朱丽叶·安娜斯(Julia Annas)为代表的新斯多亚主义(neostoics)试图恢复斯多亚学派在情感问题上的信条。
不过,在反对者看来,斯多亚学派德性理论的部分特征及其倡导的一系列独特信条使其难以被认定为德性论:(1)德性并不构成斯多亚德性论的起点,从而无法将其视为德性论。泰德·布伦南(Tad Brennan)就对斯多亚学派德性论的身份表示怀疑。德性论将品格(character)视为基础性概念,但对斯多亚学派来说,自然似乎更具有根本性的地位,自然不仅构成宇宙运行和幸福生活的动力原理,而且成为用以诠释人的德性、理性、幸福等相关概念的关键。德性恰恰是通过与自然寻求沟通甚至还原为自然的方式才能获致理解,这样,我们可以称斯多亚伦理学为自然主义,却无法将之视为德性论。(2)德性是幸福的唯一构成要素(sole),并不能将其视为幸福主义。斯多亚学派坚持认为,德性是幸福的充分条件,拥有了德性自然能够通达幸福。不过,在亚里士多德看来,幸福是人之潜能的完满实现,是生活兴盛、繁荣状态。德性固然是幸福的重要条件,但除此之外,物质条件、经济地位甚至运气等均发挥作用。亚氏的理论因将幸福视为终极善(final good)被称为幸福主义。如果按亚氏的标准来看,斯多亚学派视德性为唯一的善,自然也就谈不上是幸福主义。
从思想史来看,亚里士多德为德性伦理学提供了经典的诠释框架,以至于每一次对德性问题的讨论都是不同程度地与亚氏的理论展开对话。如果脱离了亚氏提供的德性论框架,斯多亚学派还能否言说德性?是把德性作为主题的形式,还是提供一种独立的德性理论形态?事实上,上述简要梳理表明:该问题是存在争议甚至难以达成共识的。从德性论的理论建构来看,一种具有解释力的德性论应该能够从品质的视角对人的道德生活予以全景且合适的说明。斯多亚伦理学总体上反映出道德理论在社会发展正遭遇大变革时期人的生存境遇,敞开了人类道德生活的部分镜像,而要完满地把握德性论,这些理论镜像恰恰又不容回避(如存在的当下性、自我保足等)。这样,问题的关键似乎在于:不应过多地纠缠“斯多亚德性理论是否成为一种德性论”,而应关注斯多亚的德性理论究竟能够对当代德性论自我建构提供哪些有益的思想方案。
Nature,Rational Agency and Virtue：on Stioic Virtue Theory
YE Fangxing
【Abstract】With the revival of virtue ethics,Stoic Ethics is becoming analternative resource for Contemporary Virtue Ethics to its self-standing theoretical construction.Stoicsvirtue theory is based on nature.Nature includes human nature and cosmic nature.Lt is not only themotive principle of cosmic operation and human life,but also the ontological basis of virtue theory and even the whole ethics.As the intrinsic quality of human beings,virtue points to the perfection of human rational ability.Virtue is the only good and the necessary and sufficient condition for a happiness.Happiness should be in harmony with nature.Natural is rational,natural life is rational life,happiness is consistent with nature,remove all emotions to achieve a tranquility state of The orientation of Stoics virtue theory should not be entangled toomuch aboutwhether Stoic virtue theory can become Stoic virtue ethics,but aboutwhat beneficial ideas Stoic virtue theory can provide for the self-construction of contemporary theory of virtue.
【Keywords】Virtue Ethics,Stoic,Nature,Hunam Rational Agency,Emotion
【注释】
[1]本文系教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“21世纪以来西方德性伦理学的多样性研究”(项目编号:17YJC720033)、华东师范大学青年预研究项目“21世纪以来西方德性伦理学的多样性研究”(项目编号:2017ECNU-YYJ007)的阶段性成果。
[2]作者简介:叶方兴,华东师范大学马克思主义学院副教授,研究重点为德性伦理学、品德教育。
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