附录 本书相关部分案例
英国上诉法院（民事庭）
1993年
案 由
本案原告是英国海港保险公司[HARBOUR ASSURANCE CO.（U.K.）LTD]，被告是芬兰的堪萨（KANSA GENERAL INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD）等六个公司。双方订立了涉及保险与再保险的合同，约定原告保险公司为被告保险公司在1980年至1982年里的风险进行再保险，堪萨保险公司一方希望借此协议从而进入英国保险市场。在两者签订的合同中订立了仲裁条款：“基于该合同项下产生的所有争议或者分歧，应当交由仲裁程序解决。”
随后，原告英国海港保险公司一方向英国商事法院后座庭提起诉讼，声称按照英国在1974年与1981年的《保险公司法案》，被告堪萨等保险公司在英国没有注册或被核准从事保险或再保险业务，故协议因违反法律而自始无效。被告一方当事人认为依据英国《1975年仲裁法》第1部分的规定，提出双方已在合同中约定将争议提交仲裁解决，请求法院裁定中止该诉讼。
法院审理意见
初审由英国商事法院后座庭的斯特恩（Steyn J.）法官对本案进行了审理，于1991年7月16号作出判决，认定该案合同违法，而自始违法的合同不属于仲裁庭的管辖范围，不能提交仲裁。
斯特恩法官认为，合同中所包含的仲裁条款的独立性，固然是已经确立了的规则，如仲裁员可以决定合同落空、被撤销等情形下的争议；但是本着遵循先例的法律传统的缘故，在英国之前的判例中，并不存在着合同中所包含的仲裁条款的独立性可以被扩大到让仲裁员来决定合同本身是否因违法而无效的地步的情形，因此驳回了被告关于适用《1975年仲裁法》的请求。
斯特恩法院的判决作出后，第一、三、四、五被告依据以下的理由提起了上诉:首先，斯特恩法官错误的将之前先例所确立的“主合同的违法性问题不能由仲裁协议来决定”作为该案判决依据的一部分；其次，法官的认识应该与普通法和成文法的发展保持一致，即仲裁协议作为一个独立于原合同的可分割的协议，只要仲裁协议被范围足够广泛的起草，应当在任何情形下都可以用来解决争议，包括在主合同初始无效的情况下；再次，法官既然已经正确地认识到仲裁协议在措辞方面已经范围足够广泛的起草，以涵盖包括初始无效和合同违法方面的争议，应当判决本案的争议属于仲裁协议解决的范畴内，且《1975年仲裁法》应当被适用。
随后，原告又针对被告的上诉理由发表了意见，认为法官的命令基于以下额外理由应当被支持:首先，法官正确的认为，合同自始违法的问题并不属于仲裁员的管辖范围，但是根据上议院的案例Heyman v.Darwins Ltd.中所确立的原则，合同的自始违法问题为不可仲裁事项，这一点斯特恩法官却没有遵守；其次，法官不正确的认为仲裁协议的独立性是Heyman v.Darwins一案中的判决理由；再次，既然合同属于直接无效，案件的法律逻辑应当与合同间接无效区分开来，即完全排除仲裁员对案件的管辖权；最后，另外法官没有查明，该仲裁条款并不是措辞足够充分和广泛适用以至于可以管辖涉及到主合同自始无效或违法方面的争议。
随后案件上诉到了英国上诉法院的民事法庭，吉布森（Ralph Gibson）法官发表了对此案的意见。
吉布森法官认为，该案件涉及的问题是，即假定一个仲裁协议在订立时涵盖了解决包括合同的有效性方面的争议，并且合同的自始无效并不能影响仲裁条款的有效性的情况下，一个合同中包含的仲裁条款是否能够赋予仲裁员管辖权以决定一个合同的自始有效与否方面的问题。虽然，之前的英国法的相关规定，是更倾向于原告一方的，即如果仲裁条款被包含在一个自始无效的合同之中的话，那么就什么都没有；既然什么都没有，那么仲裁条款也当然自始就不存在。（nothing can come of nothing；ex nihil nil fit），这也是这个案件的逻辑问题。
斯特恩法官遵循了先例的判决，即在之前的判例中，并不存在着合同中所包含的仲裁条款的独立性可以被扩大到让仲裁员来决定合同本身是否因违法而无效的地步的情形。接下来吉布森法官认为，关于仲裁协议，是双方当事人之间的一种事先协议，在这个协议中独立的记载了双方当事人的意愿和行为，以及互相之间作出的承诺；他们约定关于以后的行为的承诺的意思和后果应当由法律决定，并受到仲裁条款的约束。就合同的违法性而言，是否所有包含在这个协议中的承诺都是无效的，是一个争议的问题。
判决意见
吉布森法官最后判决：依照英国法规定，当仲裁条款本身未受到指控时，合同中的仲裁条款可以独立存在，也当然可以独立于一个自始无效的合同。因此，仲裁员享有对合同的初始效力进行裁定的管辖权，而在仲裁条款未受到直接指控为无效的前提下，合同自始无效的问题也可以通过仲裁解决。在本案中，合同的违法性与仲裁条款不相关，对仲裁条款所作的恰当的解释足够充分，可以包含通过仲裁的方式来解决主合同自始违法的问题。因此，吉布森大法官确认了被告的上诉。
案例参考原文：
HARBOUR ASSURANCE CO.（U.K.）LTD.v KANSA
ENERAL INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD.
ANDOTHERS
[COURTOFAPPEAL]
[1993]QB 701
HEARING-DATES:25，26，28 January 1993
28 January 1993
INTRODUCTION:
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL from Steyn J.
The plaintiffs，Harbour Assurance Co.（U.K.）Ltd.，claimed，inter alia，a declaration that certain insurance policies made by way of obligatory quota share retrocession，taking effect for the years1980 to1984，entered into with the six de-fendants，Kansa General International Insurance Co.Ltd.，Tapiola International Insurance Co.Ltd.，Keskinainen Vakuutusyhtio Autoilijat（a body corporate），Tyovaen Keskinainen Vakuutusyhtio Turva（a body corporate），Keskinainen Vakuutusyhtio Varma（a body corporate）and Finnish Industrial and General Insurance Co.Ltd.，were void for illegality on the grounds，inter alia，that the defendants were not registered or approved to effect or carry on insurance or reinsurance business in Great Britain under the Insurance Companies Acts of 1974 and 1981.The agreements contained an arbitration clause and the defendants applied for the action to be stayed under section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975.On the trial of a preliminary issue Steyn J.ruled that he was compelled by authority to hold that the principle of separability of an arbitration clause from the contract in which it was contained，could not extend so as to enable the arbitrator to consider whether the contract itself was void ab initio for illegality，and dismissed the application.
By a notice of appeal dated 18 November 1991 the first，third，fourth and fifth defendants appealed on the grounds，inter alia，that（1）the judge had erred in holding that it was part of the ratio decidendi of Smith，Coney&Barrett v.Becker，Gray&Co.[1916]2 Ch.86 and/or David Taylor&Son Ltd.v.Barnett Trading Co.[1953]1 W.L.R.562 that an issue of illegality as to the primary contract could not be determined under an arbitration agreement；（2）the judge should have held，consistently with his findings as to the developments in the common law and by legislation，that an arbitration agreement，being a separate contract to the primary contract to which it referred，was capable of applying to a dispute of any nature，including initial invalidity of the primary contract，providing the arbitration agreement was sufficiently widely drafted，and（3）the judge，having correctly found that the arbitration agreement was sufficiently widely drafted as a matter of language to cover disputes as to the initial validity and/or illegality of thecontracts of retrocession between the plaintiff and the first，third，fourth and fifth defendants，ought to have held that the disputes which were the subject of the action fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement and should therefore have ordered that the action be stayed pursuant to section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975.
By a respondents'notice dated 6 December 1991 the plaintiffs contended that the judge's order should be affirmed on the additional grounds，inter alia，that（1）the judge，while correctly holding that arbitrators had no jurisdiction to determine disputes as to the illegality of a contract，had failed further to hold that the non-arbitrability of such disputes accorded with the decision and the reasoning of the majority of the House of Lords in Heyman v.Darwins Ltd.[1942]A.C.356；（2）the judge had incorrectly held that a principle of the separability of the arbitration contract was inherent in the ratio decidendi of Heyman v.Darwins Ltd.；（3）the judge had erred in law in holding that disputes as to whether a contract was void or voidable for misrepresentation were arbitrable and（4）alternatively，the judge had erred in law in finding that the arbitration clause was drawn in sufficiently wide terms to cover disputes as to the initial validity of the retrocession agreement or disputes as to illegality，as the clause was drawn in language not apt to cover such disputes.
Lord Justice Ralph Gibson:This is an appeal，brought with the leave of Steyn J，by first，third，fourth and fifth defendants against his order of 16 July1991 in an action brought by Harbour Assurance Co.（UK）Ltd.by that order Steyn J（1992）1 Lloyd's Rep 81 dismissed the application by the defendants for a stay of the action under section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975.
This case raises the question whether in English law，under the principle of the separability or autonomy of the agreement expressed in an arbitration clause，which clause is contained in a written contract，the clause can give jurisdiction to the arbitrators under that clause to determine a dispute over the initial validity or invalidity or the written contract，upon the assumptions that upon its true construction the arbitration clause covers such a dispute and that the nature of the invalidity alleged does not attack the validity of the agreement expressed in the arbitration clause itself.
The orthodox view in English law has always been，it has been said for the plaintiffs，that if the contract in which the arbitration clause is contained is void ab initio，and therefore nothing，so also must be the arbitration clause in the con-tract.That is the proposition that nothing cancome of nothing:ex nihil nil fit.It has also been called in this case the argument of logic.
As a result of agreement between the parties the only issues considered by him were whether，as the defendants alleged，the arbitration clause was wide enough to cover the illegality issued，and whether there was no impediment in law to giving effect to the arbitration agreement.
For the reasons set out in his judgment，Steyn J concluded that he was compelled by authority to hold that the principle of separability could not extend so as to enable the arbitrator to determine whether or not the contract，in which the arbitration clause in contained，is in fact void ab initio for illegality.He therefore dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings in which the plaintiffs seek to establish that illegality.
The appeal by the defendants was directed only to the last passages of the judgment by the judge，by which he held that he was required by authority to hold as he did.In all other respects the defendants adopted and supported the conclusions and reasoning of the judge.
In brief summary，the judge held as follows.（i）The principle of the separability of the arbitration clause or agreement from the contract in which it is contained exists in English law；and，provided that the arbitration clause itself is not directly impeached，the arbitration agreement is，as a matter of principled legal theory，capable of surviving the invalidity of the contract so that the arbitrators could have jurisdiction under the clause to determine the initial validity of the contract.Further，it would be consistent to hold that an issue as to the initial illegality of the contract is also capable of being referred to arbitration，provided that any initial illegality does not directly impeach the arbitration clause.（ii）The illegality alleged in this case does not impeach the arbitration clause.（iii）The arbitration clause on its proper construction is wide enough to cover a dispute as to the initial illegality of the contract.（iv）To his evident regret，however，Steyn J.was driven to hold that the principle of separability could not apply when the alleged ground of invalidity of the contract was initial illegality.The decision of this court in David Taylor&Son Ltd.v.Barnett Trading Co.[1953]1 W.L.R.562 compelled him to hold that the separability principle does not extend to initial illegality.
For the defendants Mr.Kentridge submitted，as already indicated，that Steyn J.was right in holding as he did on points（i），（ii）and（iii）above for the reasons which he gave，but contended that the decision in the Taylor case did not bind the judge to hold that the principle of separability could not apply so as to permit an arbitrator to decide an issue of initial illegality.
The contentions of the plaintiffs，in their respondents'notice，included the following.（i）The judge was wrong not to hold that the non-arbitrability of an issue of initial illegality was established by the reasoning of the majority in Heyman v.Darwins Ltd.[1942]A.C.356.（ii）English law has adopted the principle of separability only so far as to leave disputes as to initial validity or legality outside the jurisdiction of arbitrators.（iii）The logical ground for excluding the arbitrator's jurisdiction in cases of initial invalidity and initial illegality is ex nihil nihil fit，and it would be contrary to logic and principle to differentiate between cases of“direct”and“indirect”invalidity of the arbitration clause.（iv）Disputes as to the legality of the contract do impeach the arbitration clause contained in the contract either directly or sufficiently directly to exclude the arbitrator's jurisdiction.（v）Lastly，this arbitration clause is not wide enough to cover disputes as to the initial validity of the retrocession agreement，or disputes as to illegality.
The policy consideration which is of greatest weight，in my judgment，is what the judge called the imperative of giving effect to the wishes of the parties unless there are compelling reasons of principle why it is not possible to do so.
The first argument for the plaintiffs，that is，the orthodox view to which we are invited to adhere，is based on the logic of the proposition that nothing can come from nothing.
The reference to an extraordinary arbitration clause as possibly outside the logical proposition is in effect an argument that，for the principle of separability to be applied so as to save the clause from voidness by reason of the voidness of the containing contract，special words are needed.I do not accept this argument.An arbitration clause，in ordinary terms-that is to say，without special words to ensure survival-is usually，and has been held to be，a self-contained contract collateral to the containing contract.As with any other contract，it must be construed according to its terms in and with regard to the relevant factual situation.I see no reason to establish a principle of this nature which would require special words to be inserted in order to secure that which the parties would probably suppose was covered by the ordinary words.
Mr.Longmore pointed out that a party to a contract the making of which he says wasinduced by fraud，would be surprised to be told that he is bound to have the issue tried by an arbitrator appointed under a clause in that contract.He also pointed out that when such a party alleges that the contract is void for illegality，he might well be astonished to be told that the issue of that illegality is to be determined by an arbitrator appointed under it.
There is，I think，forceful comments.Steyn J said that the question of fraud or initial illegality was capable of being referred to arbitration.He did not qualify the clearly stated principle that if the validity of the arbitration clause itself is attacked，the issue cannot be decided by the arbitrator.His reference to direct impeachment was，as I understand his judgment，to distinguish an attack upon the clause otherwise than by the logical proposition that the clause falls with the containing contract.When it is said that the contract was induced by fraud it may well be clear that，if it was，the making of the independent arbitration clause was also induced by the fraud.There is，further，the power of the court under section 24（2）of the Arbitration Act 1950，considered by Steyn J.（1992）1 Lloyd's Rep 81，88.
Next，as to illegality，the question whether the particular form of illegality will，if proved，render void both the contract and the arbitration clause must depend upon the nature of the illegality and，as Hoffmann L.J.pointed out in the course of argument，when it is said to consist of acts prohibited by statute，upon the construction of the relevant provisions of the statute.
In my judgment，Steyn J.was right to hold that，as a matter of construction of the contract，the present clause covers the issue of illegality，and his conclusion does not conflict with the judgment of Nourse L.J.in the Fillite case with which Hollings J.there agreed.
In agreeing that“all disputes or differences arising out of this agreement shall be submitted to the decision of two arbitrators，”the parties were indeed presupposing that“the agreement”had some relevant existence.For this purpose I think“the agreement”means the act of the parties recorded in the document，which contains the mutual promises，which they have made.The meaning and effect of those promises with references to their subsequent acts would be determined according to law and，if necessary，under the proviso for arbitration.The words must be construed by reference to any relevant facts（see Prenn v.Simmonds（1971）1 WLR 1381）but there has been no reliance on any particular circumstances for this purpose other than those evident from the making of the contract itself.The question whether all the promises contained in the agreement were rendered invalid and void at the time when the parties signed thedocuments by the illegality of the agreement，is，in my judgment，a dispute arising out of the agreement.
There was much material put before the court to which I have not referred.The material was provided to us before the hearing so that we were able to read it before the argument commenced.We are indeed grateful for this assistance.I have not referred to the authorities copied，to the extracts from textbooks and articles，and to the reports of decisions in the courts of theUnited States，Australia，Germany and Bermuda.In a case of this nature it was，I think，of importance that we be shown this material so that we should be instructed as to the development in this part of the law in other jurisdiction.The parties were not at one as to the precise direction and extent of such development.It is sufficient in my judgment to say that Ihave read much that has encouraged me to reach the conclusion expressed in this judgment，and nothing to suggest that in doing so Iwould be ignoring any substantial matter of policy or departing from any principle which should form part of the development of the common law.
I would allow this appeal.
案件评析
这是一个在英国的仲裁历史上举足轻重的案例。
研究仲裁条款的独立性问题，起源于西方的商事仲裁案例，仲裁条款独立性的确立是以如下案例为脉络发展的：
第一个案例，1942年英国上议院审理的Heyman v.Darwins Ltd一案，在许多学者的研究中被称为仲裁条款独立性的理论起源。被告达文斯是一家英国钢铁制造商，与作为原告的纽约海曼公司签订了独家销售代理合同。合同中订有仲裁条款，规定本合同引起的任何争议均应当通过仲裁解决。随后被告Darwins公司拒绝履行合同，原告Heyman等人诉至法院请求违约赔偿，被告英国Darwins公司请求法院中止审理，认为争议应当提交仲裁解决。上诉法院的判决意见是：仲裁条款可独立于合同存在，没有违约的一方是否可以继续履行合同的问题应由仲裁员而不是法院决定。无论是一方当事人是否违约，还是另一方当事人是否可以继续履行合同的问题，都属于仲裁条款的管辖范围，因为这些问题都是与合同有关的争议。这是第一个确认仲裁条款独立于主合同存在的案例，具有开创性的意义，随后被国际仲裁公约以及多数国家的商事仲裁立法与实践采纳。
最终上议院西蒙大法官（Viscount Simon）提出如下意见：“If，however，the parties are at one in asserting that they entered into a binding contract，but a difference has arisen between them as to whether there has been a breach by one side or the other，or as to whether circumstances have arisen which have discharged one or both parties from further performance，such differences should be regarded as differences which have arisen‘in respect of’，or‘with regard to’or‘under’the contract，and an arbitration clause which uses there，or similar，expressions should be construed accordingly.”意为如果双方当事人都坚持认为他们已经签署了有拘束力的合同，但是他们之间的争议是关于其中一方当事人是否违约，或者是否存在着一方当事人不再继续履行或者双方当事人都不再继续履行合同的情况，这样的争议应被视为是与合同有关的争议。
另一段话：“I do not agree that an arbitration clause expressed in such terms as above ceases to have any possible application merely because the contract has‘come to an end’，as，for example，by frustration.In such cases it is the performance of the contract that has come to an end….There is a previous decision of this House which establishes this precise proposition.I refer to Scott&Sons v.De；Sel（1923），where sellers of jute contended that a contract to export from Calcutta 2，800 bales to Buenos Aires was brought to an end，after a portion has been dispatched，by a government prohibition of further export，notwithstanding that the contract contained an express term exempting the sellers from liability for late delivery due to unforeseen circumstances.The arbitration clause ran：‘Any dispute that may arise under this contract to be settled by arbitration.’”这一段话西蒙大法官反对仅仅由于合同终结就导致措辞广泛的仲裁条款不能适用的观点，并通过援引先前案例的形式来进一步阐明即使合同“终止”，该合同中的仲裁条款仍应被适用。这样上议院就得出了在本案中仲裁条款仍可以适用的结论。
但是判词中还有一段话“If the dispute is as to whether the contract which contains the clause has ever been entered into as all，that issue cannot go to arbitration under the clause，for the party who denies that he has ever entered into the contract is thereby denying that he has ever joined in the submission.Similarly，if one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initio（because，for example，the making of such a contract is illegal），the arbitration clause cannot operate，for on this view this clause itself is also void.”在这段话中，西蒙法官明确表达了如果争议是关于合同是否有效签订，或者合同因违法而无效，那么在此种情况下仲裁条款是不具有独立性的，因为仲裁条款应随着自始无效或违法合同而无效。
故作者认为本案例只是说明了一个有效成立的合同，在履行过程中发生争议时仲裁条款能否有效的问题，而在这种情况下仲裁条款是当然发生效力的，这也正是案件中法官说到“the case was‘a very simple one”，只涉及在解决合同一般争议时，仲裁条款具有独立性，根本不涉及合同无效时仲裁条款的独立性问题。同时西蒙法官在判词中明确表示了在主合同是否有效签订和自始违法的情况下，仲裁条款是当然不具有独立性的，语言中非常明确地表示了对仲裁条款的独立性的反对，所以把本案例作为仲裁条款具有独立性的理论起源是不恰当的。
第二个案例，在1963年，法国最高法院在高赛特案中确立了仲裁条款独立的原则。本案涉及法国公司（Gosset，买方）与意大利公司（Carapelli，卖方）订立的含有仲裁条款的粮食买卖合同，后因关于仲裁产生争议法国当事人上诉到法国最高法院，主张主合同及其所包含的仲裁条款由于不能履行而无效，法国最高法院认为，在国际仲裁中，国际合同中的仲裁条款是完全独立的，即使主合同无效时亦然[1]。
第三个案例，在1967年，美国最高法院审理的Prima Paint co.v.Flood&Conklin manufacturing co.一案，确立了仲裁条款可独立存在于自始无效的欺诈合同。本案涉及马里兰州的Prima Paint买下了新泽西州F&C生产涂料的生意，并签订咨询协议，规定由F&C向Prima Paint提供相关的业务咨询，该协议中含有措辞广泛的仲裁条款，后因F&C宣告破产双方就费用支付问题产生争议，Prima Paint主张F&C在订立协议时有欺诈行为，因此双方签订的协议无效，而诉诸法院。美国最高法院最后确认：即使合同自始无效，通过仲裁解决合同争议的仲裁条款，同样也是一项可以独立实施的协议[2]。
第四个案例，1993年，英国上诉法院审理了海港公司案，即Habour Assurance Co.v.Kansa General International Insurance Co.一案。本案涉及芬兰一些保险公司为了打入英国的保险市场，与英国海港公司订立了在英国从事保险和再保险活动的保险协议，合同中含有仲裁条款。后因根据英国国内法规定，在英国从事保险活动，必须取得英国工商局的认可，而本协议未取得英国工商局的认可，英国海港公司主张由于违反英国的法律，该协议无效，而提交诉讼。最后上诉法院民事庭审理后认为：即使合同因违反法律而无效，合同中的仲裁条款依然可以独立实施[3]。
本案的意义与海曼诉达文斯的意义区别在于，后者只是以个案的形式确认了仲裁条款在解决合同一般争议时的独立性原则，在涉及合同的存在与否以及是否自始无效的问题时，不属于仲裁协议的管辖范围。海曼诉达文斯案中这一遵循“皮之不存，毛将焉附”规则的判决，并未确定仲裁条款的绝对独立性。而前者将这一原则推向了新的高度，即涉及到自始无效或者违法的合同，其间的仲裁条款依然能够被视为一个可分割的独立的协议。经历了斯特恩法官所认为的“并不存在仲裁条款的独立性可以被扩大到让仲裁员来决定合同本身是否因违法而无效的地步的情形”后，直到上诉法院法官吉布森的确认上诉判决，才认定并从根本上确立了仲裁条款可以独立于它所依据的各种合同而存在，包括自始无效或违法的合同。但是，这一独立性却依然是有限制的，即仲裁条款本身不能受到无效的指控。
通过对以上法、美、英等国的司法判例的分析总结，可以得出如下结论：在不违反社会公共利益的前提下，主合同因不能履行而无效，因欺诈而无效，因违反法律而无效都不能影响合同中有效成立的仲裁条款的效力，仲裁条款具有独立性。
案例二：费兰多公司诉谢理外克国际公司案
美国纽约南区地方法院
1993年
案 由
本案是美国纽约南区地方法院审理的关于当事人之间是否存在着有效的仲裁协议的案件。原告费兰多公司（FILANTO，S.P.A.）是意大利的鞋类制造商，被告是纽约谢理外克国际贸易公司（CHILEWICH INTERNATIONAL CORP.）。
1989年2月，被告美国谢理外克国际贸易公司与苏联（现俄罗斯）的拉兹诺外贸公司（Raznoexport）订立了向后者供应皮靴的合同，双方在供货合同中约定所有的争端应在莫斯科工商会[4]进行仲裁解决。被告为了履行本合同，被告美国谢理外克国际贸易公司又与意大利最大的鞋类制造商费兰多公司签订合同。
关于合同的内容和签订时间存在一些争议，被告美国谢理外克国际贸易公司声称1990年3月13日，包含合同基本条款的要约（备忘录协议）送往费兰多公司，声明与苏联（现俄罗斯）的合同“尽可能包含在其中”，且特别指出任何仲裁必须符合此合同。原告意大利公司收到此要约（备忘录协议）后，没有作出任何反应：既没有在此协议上签字，也未将此协议退给被告。
同年5月，被告的银行按照备忘录协议中的规定，向原告开出了以原告为受益人的信用证。此信用证根据备忘录协议开出，其中也提到关于与苏联外贸公司的合同及仲裁条款。据此，原告便发运了一些皮靴并得到了部分付款。8月，原告在备忘录协议上签了字并退还给被告，在附具的信中称，尽管原告同意按被告提出的条件供货，但不同意其中的关于在俄罗斯仲裁的条款。
在履行向被告提供皮靴的合同义务的过程中，由于被告未能付清全部货款，原告在纽约地方法院提起诉讼，要求法院令原告支付其未付的货款。被告则抗辩道，原告无权在纽约提起此项诉讼，因为按照双方当事人之间的约定，原告的请求只能在俄罗斯通过仲裁解决。
法院审理意见
原告费兰多公司将此案提交被告所在地法院审理的主要依据，是该公司在1990年8月向被告谢理外克公司发出的信函中声明不接受谢理外克公司在3月提出的要约中关于在俄罗斯仲裁的条款。故请求法院判决被告付清其欠款。
被告谢理外克国际贸易公司则辩称，该公司于1990年3月签署的并向原告发出的备忘录协议是向原告提出的包括仲裁条款在内的含有皮靴的价格、支付等内容明确的要约。原告尽管未对此要约作出承诺，但后来接受了被告提出的要约内容的履行，即被告于1990年5月根据其要约开出了购买协议项下的皮靴货款的信用证。为此，原告不能否认它对此协议的接受。因为原告的实际交货的行为本身意味着对合同的接受，其中包括对该协议中的仲裁条款的接受。至于被告于1990年8月向原告返还的备忘录协议及其所附具的关于拒绝接受仲裁协议的要求，只能被视为对被告提出的要约的修正，而被告当时就拒绝接受此项修正。因此，原告提出的对被告要约的修正是无效的。这是由于如果原告对被告将其与苏联外贸公司订立的合同中的仲裁条款纳入该协议有异议，它有义务将此异议及时地告知被告，作为对被告于3月发出的要约的拒绝。事实上，原告此项对合同中的仲裁条款的拒绝是在被告提出备忘录协议后的5个月和开出信用证的2个月后提出的。况且，原告本身也以其交付信用证项下的皮靴而履行了该协议项下的义务。被告认为，原告在8月所提出的请求是对被告于3月提出的要约的修订，由于未能在合理的期限内提出，被告拒绝此项请求。原告应当受3月的备忘录协议中的仲裁条款的约束，并按该条款的规定，将争议提交仲裁解决。被告请求法院裁定终止此项诉讼。
对被告的上述解释，法院表示满意，认为原、被告之间存在着仲裁协议。而原告未能在合理的期限内对协议中的仲裁条款及时提出异议，也未能对此作出令法院满意的解释。况且，此协议已经得到履行，被告在5月11日开出的信用证中，同样提到了其与苏联外贸公司之间的合同。作为被要约人的本案原告，在收到被告提出的要约后的合理期限内未能对此要约提出异议，应当视为接受了本案被告提出的要约。(https://www.daowen.com)
鉴于本案当事双方所属的国家均为《联合国国际货物买卖合同公约》的当事国，按照公约第18条（1）款的规定，“被要约人声明或作出其他行为表示同意一项要约，即是接受”，尽管“沉默或不行为”本身不等于接受。考虑到本案当事人双方的具体情况，原告的不行为是否构成接受，按照公约第8条（3）款的规定，“在确定一方当事人的意思或一个通情达理的人应有的理解时，应适当地考虑到与事实有关的一切情况，包括谈判情形、当事人之间确立的任何习惯做法、惯例和当事人其后的任何行为”。在本案中，在交易达成之前，原告当然有权利和义务对备忘录协议的内容及时提出异议。特别是被告反复引用了其与苏联外贸公司的合同，且原告也曾有过此项文件，当时并未提出异议。
原告在诉讼中还辩称，如果法院判定仲裁解决，法院应当考虑到在俄罗斯仲裁的不确定条件，而裁定在纽约仲裁。法院认为，当事各方的确同意在俄罗斯仲裁解决本案争议，所选择的地点与本案有着合理的联系，最终的买方是苏联的当事人，被告与苏联外贸公司之间的合同也被包括在备忘录协议中。尽管俄罗斯的情况还不明朗，但没有理由认定，俄罗斯商会不能公正地解决此争议。
判决意见
法院判被告胜诉。当事人应将它们之间的争议提交俄罗斯仲裁解决。根据《联合国国际货物买卖合同公约》，原告在未能对被告提出的仲裁条款及时提出异议的情况下，接受了被告对合同的履行，而此项行为本身意味着对仲裁协议的接受。因为原告有对被告提出的条件及时提出异议的权利和义务。
案例参考原文：
FILANTO，S.P.A.，Plaintiff-Appellant，v.CHILEWICH
INTERNATIONAL CORP.，Defendant-Appellee.
Docket No.92-7657
UNITED STATESCOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHESECOND CIRCUIT
984 F.2d 58；1993 U.S.App.LEXIS874
November 13，1992，Argued
January 19，1993，Decided
JON O.NEWMAN，Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents a variation on the recurring issue of whether a district court's order requiring arbitration is appealable.The precise question is whether such an order is appealable when it is entered in a lawsuit brought on the underlying dispute，the complaint is not dismissed，but the case is nonetheless marked“closed.”The issue arises on the purported appeal of Filanto，S.p.A.（“Filanto”）from the May 21，1992，judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York（Charles L.Brieant，Chief Judge），789 F.Supp.1229（S.D.N.Y.1992）.We conclude that the appeal is premature，and accordingly dismiss the appeal.
Background
Defendant-appellee Chilewich International Corp.（“Chilewich”）is a New York-based import-export company.In 1989，Chilewich contracted to sell footwear to Raznoexport，then a Soviet Government entity.This contract（the“Russian Contract”）specified that all disputes would be resolved by arbitration before the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry.To fulfill its obligations under the Russian Contract，Chilewich contracted with Filanto，the largest Italian manufacturer of shoes and boots.There is some dispute as to the content and time of formation of that contract.Chilewich contends that a March 13，1990，letter it sent to Filanto contains the essential terms of the contract.This letter provided that the Russian Contract was“incorporated…as far as practicable，”and specifically indicated that any arbitration should be in accordance with that contract.Filanto contends that it never accepted these terms，and that a contract was formed only by conduct at a later date.Under applicable principles of international law，Filanto contends，such a contract would not include any arbitration provisions.
In January 1991，Chilewich refused to accept 90，000 boots，causing Filanto to incur a substantial loss.Filanto filed a breach of contract suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York，invoking jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship.Prior to answering，Chilewich moved to stay the proceeding pending arbitration in Moscow.The District Court concluded that various actions by Filanto estopped it from denying the existence of an agreement to arbitrate，and directed the parties to arbitrate their dispute before the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Moscow，Russia.
Somewhat less clear is whether the District Court then intended to retain jurisdiction or to dismiss the action.In his written opinion，Chief Judge Brieant concluded that he had the power to stay the action，but that“to do so in this case would serve no purpose，”and that“[a]ccordingly，it is appropriate that a final judgment issue here containing a mandatory injunction to arbitrate.”789 F.Supp.at 1242.But on the separate document submitted for his signature as the judgment of the District Court，Judge Brieant drew a line through the sentence that would have read:“ORDERED，ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's complaint be and hereby is dismissed.”The judgment，as entered，ordered only arbitration and did not dismiss the complaint.The docket entries，however，reflect that the case was“closed”on May 21，1992.
Discussion
When Congress in 1988 added a new provision governing appeals of orders concerning arbitration，see Pub.L.100-702，tit.X，§1019（a），102 Stat.4642，4670-71（1988），codified at 9 U.S.C.16（Supp.III 1991），1 it endeavored to promote appeals from orders barring arbitration and limit appeals from orders directing arbitration.However，Congress did not implement this policy fully.Instead，Congress built upon the distinction the courts had previously recognized between so-called“independent”proceedings and so-called“embedded”proceedings and authorized the following regime for appeals:
（a）If the suit is“independent，”i.e.，the plaintiff seeks an order compelling or prohibiting arbitration or a declaration that a dispute is arbitrable or not arbitrable，and no party seeks any other relief，a final judgment ending such litigation is appealable at once.9 U.S.C.16（a）（3）；Matter of Chung and President Enterprises Corp.，943 F.2d 225，227-29（2d Cir.1991）；Stedor Enterprises，Ltd.v.Armtex，Inc.，947 F.2d 727，731（4th Cir.1991）.If arbitration has been ordered，the objecting party need not await the outcome of the arbitration before challenging the order to arbitrate.
（b）If the suit is“embedded，”i.e.，a party has sought some relief other than an order requiring or prohibiting arbitration（typically some relief concerning the merits of the allegedly arbitrable dispute），orders denying arbitration are immediately appealable，9 U.S.C.16（a）（1）（A）-（C），（a）（2）；see Haviland v.Goldman，Sachs&Co.，947 F.2d 601，604（2d Cir.1991）（appeal of anti-arbitration order in embedded case），cert.denied，—U.S.—，112 S.Ct.1995，118 L.Ed.2d 591（1992）；Com-Tech Associates v.Computer Associates International，Inc.，938 F.2d 1574，1576（2d Cir.1991）（same），but orders directing arbitration are not immediately appealable，9 U.S.C.16（b）；2 see McDermott International，Inc.v.Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Memorandum of Insurance No.104207，981 F.2d 744（5th Cir.1993）（appeal of proarbitration order in embedded case dismissed）；Perera v.Siegel Trading Co.，951 F.2d 780，784-86（7th Cir.1992）（same）.In the latter circumstance，the party opposing arbitration cannot challenge the arbitration requirement until the arbitration has occurred and its result is available for challenge on a motion to confirm or vacate the award.In effect，the pro-arbitration tilt of the statute requires that，with respect to embedded actions，the party opposing arbitration must bear the initial consequence of an erroneous district court decision requiring arbitration.
This case presents a classic example of an embedded proceeding.Filanto sued on a contract，and Chilewich moved to stay the proceedings pending arbitration.The District Court，having concluded that the parties made an agreement to arbitrate and that the chosen location was not“seriously inconvenient，”see The Bremen v.Zapata Off-Shore Co.，407 U.S.1，16，92 S.Ct.1907，1916，32 L.Ed.2d 513（1972）（forum selection clauses），directed the parties to arbitrate.Because the District Court declined to dismiss the complaint，see Borden，Inc.v.Meiji Milk Products Co.，919 F.2d 822，826（2d Cir.1990）（district court may retain jurisdiction over action subject to Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards），cert.denied，—U.S.—，111 S.Ct.2259，114 L.Ed.2d 712（1991），its order compelling arbitration is not appealable under 9 U.S.C.16（b）（3）.3
We see no jurisdictional significance to the docket entry marking the case as“closed，”which we will assume was made for administrative or statistical convenience.See Corion Corp.v.Chen，964 F.2d 55，56-57（1st Cir.1992）（direction of district court“that the case be‘administratively closed’pending arbitration…[not]equivalent to a final judgment of dismissal”）；Campbell v.Dominick&Dominick，Inc.，872 F.2d 358，360（11th Cir.1989）（order closing case for statistical purposes did not render action final）.The closing of the case without an adjudication of the complaint did not place the complaint in some sort of jurisdictional limbo and did not render the arbitration order available for immediate appeal.The complaint in the embedded action，not having been adjudicated，remains within the jurisdiction of the District Court，regardless of the effort to tidy up the docket card.
Conclusion
The appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
1 From 1988 to 1990，this provision was codified at 9 U.S.C.15.See Pub.L.101-650，§325（a），104 Stat.5089，5120（1990）（renumbering 9 U.S.C.15 to 9 U.S.C.16）
2 An appeal might be specifically allowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1292（b）（1988）.In the absence of certification，however，the barrier to appeal cannot be circumvented by the collateral order doctrine，whether the order compels arbitration，see Steele v.L.F.Rothschild&Co.，864 F.2d 1，3（2d Cir.1988），or refuses to stay an action pending arbitration，see McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp.v.Pennsylvania Power&Light Co.，849 F.2d 761，764（2d Cir.1988）
3 Had the complaint been dismissed，it is arguable that an appeal would be immediately available，though the relief might be limited to vacating the dismissal，reinstating the complaint，and declining to review at that stage the order directing arbitration.But see McCowan v.Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.，889 F.2d 451，453（2d Cir.1989）（reference of claims to arbitration in embedded proceeding unappealable despite District Court's statement that it had granted motion to dismiss）
案例评析
本案涉及的仲裁协议的表现方式是买卖皮靴合同中的仲裁条款。作为主合同一个组成部分的仲裁条款，就其本身的性质而言，也是一项契约，是一项通过仲裁的方式解决合同争议的契约。即便主合同无效、失效或者已经终止或解除，关于解决合同争议的仲裁条款，同样约束合同当事人，任何一方当事人对由于该合同所产生的争议或者与该合同有关的争议，均有权将此争议提交仲裁解决。因此，作为合同一个组成部分的仲裁条款，一般可以独立于它所依据的合同而存在。
英国著名的国际贸易法学家施米托夫教授对此曾作过精辟的概述：仲裁协议是双方当事人保证将仲裁条款项下的争议提交仲裁解决的协议。也就是说，仲裁协议本身就是一项契约，是当事各方就其将有关争议交由仲裁解决的一致的意思表示。此条款作为各种合同中的关于解决争议的条款，所产生的义务不同于合同中其他条款的义务。当事人违反仲裁条款的义务并不产生损害赔偿的请求权，而是解决合同争议的方式的请求权。
在费兰多一案中，法院对该案的判决是对仲裁协议的强制执行，即令当事人按照他们之间的约定在俄罗斯仲裁解决他们之间由于货款问题发生的争议。这就是仲裁条款可以独立存在的主要原因。当事人就仲裁条款所依据的合同发生争议，无论该合同是否有效，均应交由仲裁解决，除非法院认定该仲裁条款本身无效、失效或者不能履行。
关于合同中的仲裁条款的性质和作用，早在20世纪40年代，英国法院的麦克米兰（Macmilan）大法官就对此作出了明确的界定。他认为，仲裁条款的性质与合同中的其他条款完全不同。因为合同中的其他条款规定的都是当事人相互之问承担的义务，而仲裁条款规定的不是一方当事人对另一方当事人的义务。仲裁条款是当事双方的协议，即如果产生了有关一方当事人对另一方当事人承担的义务的争议，则这些争议将由他们自己成立的法庭解决。一个实质性的区别是：合同中当事人相互之间承担的义务一般不能专门予以强制执行，违反此项义务只能请求损害赔偿。而仲裁条款则可以由仲裁法规定的机构专门予以强制执行。违反仲裁协议的适当的补救办法不是损害赔偿，而是要求当事人强制履行仲裁协议。
可见，仲裁条款具有契约的性质，它是当事各方将特定争议交由仲裁解决的约定。在国际商事仲裁立法与实践中，当事人之间作出的将争议提交仲裁解决的约定，受到各国法律的保护，其后果是当一方当事人违反此项约定将协议项下的争议提交法院解决时，法院依法令当事人提交仲裁解决，除非双方当事人共同变更他们之间先前作出的上述约定，又愿意将该争议提交法院解决。例如，美国《联邦仲裁法》第2条规定：“在任何海事或者商事契约中，为了用仲裁方式解决可能由于契约引起的或者由于拒绝履行契约全部或者部分引起的争议所作的书面规定，又或者将由于这种契约引起的或者由于拒绝履行契约引起的争议提交仲裁的书面协议，都是有效的、不可撤销的和可以强制执行的，除非具有法律或者衡平法所规定撤销契约的理由。”在本案中，既然原告对被告提出的含有仲裁条款的要约未能及时提出异议，被告对含有此仲裁条款的合同的实际履行意味着对合同和该合同中所包含的仲裁条款的接受。而一旦接受此项仲裁协议，按照美国法的上述规定，该协议就是有效的、不可撤销的和可以强制执行的。
仲裁条款作为合同的一个组成部分，如果双方当事人对合同的有效性没有争议，则仲裁条款的效力是不言而喻的。在本案中，双方当事人对皮靴买卖合同没有争议，而争议的重要问题是该合同中的仲裁条款的效力问题，法院认为，该合同中的仲裁条款是作为本案被告的卖方在其向作为买方的原告发出的要约中的一个不可分割的组成部分，原告既然对合同的效力不持异议，那么在合同有效成立的同时，该合同中的仲裁条款的效力也是不言而喻的。况且，在有关的国际立法与实践中，即便合同是无效的，其中的仲裁条款的效力也不因为合同的无效而理所当然地无效。如欺诈合同被许多国家的法律认定为无效合同，当双方当事人对该合同的有效性发生争议时，并不影响该合同中的仲裁条款的有效性。由此产生的争议，仍然应当通过仲裁的方式解决，而不应诉诸法院。它所依据的基本理论，就是为许多国家的立法与司法所承认和认可的仲裁条款独立原则。即仲裁条款可以作为一个独立的契约存在，对其有效性，应当专门作出认定。
1958年《纽约公约》第2条，也明确规定了各缔约国有承认仲裁协议的效力的义务，如果当事人就诉讼事项订有此仲裁协议者，缔约国法院受理诉讼时应依当事人一方之请求，令当事人提交仲裁。这就是说，至少在《纽约公约》这135个缔约国中，有效的仲裁协议作为当事人之间的一项契约，具有可强制执行的效力。因此，如果这些国家的法院受理了含有仲裁协议的诉讼，法院有义务根据一方当事人的请求，终止此项诉讼，令当事人将他们之间的争议提交仲裁解决。
案例三：最高人民法院
民事裁定书
（2004）民四终字第17号
上诉人（原审原告）：香港富世国际集团有限公司。住所地，香港特别行政区九龙上海街91号永盛大厦十楼C座。
法定代表人：廖俊锋，该公司授权代表。
委托代理人：张国杰，男，1960年6月14日生，身份证号×××××××××××××××××，住内蒙古自治区包头市昆区锡华百合苑。
委托代理人：巴布，爱德律师事务所律师。
被上诉人（原审被告）：内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司。住所地，内蒙古自治区乌海市海勃湾区七一五。
法定代表人：刘锦文，该公司董事长。
委托代理人：马江涛，北京市大成律师事务所律师。
委托代理人：张东，北京市大成律师事务所律师。
上诉人香港富世国际集团有限公司（以下简称富世公司）为与被上诉人内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司承包合同纠纷一案，不服内蒙古自治区高级人民法院（以下简称原审法院）（2004）内民三初字第1号民事裁定，向本院提起上诉。本院依法组成由审判员王玧、代理审判员杨兴业、陈纪忠组成的合议庭审理了本案，现已审理终结。
2004年3月24日，富世公司起诉至原审法院，称1996年3月5日，原告与内蒙古黄河化工集团公司签订《合资经营中国内蒙古富世化工有限公司合同》一份（以下简称“合资合同”）、1997年10月21日，双方又签订《合同书》一份（以下简称“承包合同”），约定由内蒙古黄河化工集团公司承包经营合资企业内蒙古富世化工有限公司，承包期6年零3个月。合同签订后，被告没有按合同约定全部履行给付承包利润款的义务，截止到2004年3月1日共欠款2560.13万元。请求判令内蒙古黄河化工集团公司偿还所述承包费。
原审法院审理过程中，内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司在提交答辩状期间内提出管辖权异议，以合资合同订有仲裁条款为由，认为本案应通过仲裁解决。
原审法院认为，富世公司与内蒙古黄河化工集团公司1996年3月5日签订了《合资经营中国内蒙古富世化工有限公司合同》，该合同中订立了“凡因执行本合同所发生的或与本合同有关的一切争议，双方应通过友好协商解决；如果协商不能解决，应提交中国北京中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会，根据该会的仲裁程序暂行规则进行仲裁”的条款。1997年10月21日，原告与内蒙古黄河化工集团公司又签订一份“承包合同”），约定由内蒙古黄河化工集团公司承包经营合资企业内蒙古富世化工有限公司，承包期6年零3个月。合同第四条约定，该合同是合资合同不可分割的一部分，与原合同同等效力，有抵触之处以该合同为主，未尽事宜由双方协商解决。根据《中华人民共和国仲裁法》第5条“当事人达成仲裁协议，一方向人民法院起诉的，人民法院不予受理，但仲裁协议无效的除外”的规定，本案不属于人民法院的受案范围。根据《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》第108条第（四）项、第140条第（三）项的规定，裁定驳回原告富世公司的起诉。
富世公司不服原审裁定，向本院提起上诉称:原审裁定将合资合同中的仲裁条款适用于承包合同是错误的。首先，承包合同与合资合同是性质上独立的两个合同，相互之间没有法律上的内在联系；其次，承包合同没有改变合资者的出资义务和对外承担有限责任的义务；再次，虽然承包合同约定该合同是合资合同不可分割的一部分，但两个合同不存在包含关系，合资合同的仲裁条款不能直接适用于承包合同。承包合同没有对争议解决事项进行约定，没有订立排除诉讼的仲裁条款，承包合同签订后也没有达成书面仲裁协议，因此原审裁定适用法律错误，请求裁定由原审法院对本案行使管辖权。
内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司答辩称:一、内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司和内蒙古黄河化工集团公司是两个各自独立的法人，上诉人据以起诉的承包合同的签订主体是内蒙古黄河化工集团公司而非内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司；二、本案争议的解决方式应当从双方约定；三、承包合同第四条的约定意味着合资合同关于争议解决方式的约定同样适用于解决承包合同的争议，即通过仲裁方式解决争议。
本院认为，本案是因承包合同纠纷而引起的管辖权异议案件。对于有关人民法院主管权的管辖权争议，应当根据当事人的意思表示来确定。在本案中，富世公司和内蒙古黄河化工集团公司在合资合同中约定有仲裁条款，在承包合同中则明确约定该合同是合资合同不可分割的一部分，与合资合同具有同等效力，如有抵触，以承包合同为准。由于承包合同并未就争议解决方式作出约定，因此本案两合同之间不存在有关争议解决方式的抵触之处。因此，有关承包合同争议的解决方式应当受合资合同中的争议解决方式条款的约束。鉴于合资合同中约定有明确有效的仲裁条款，因此对于有关本案合资合同和承包合同的争议，人民法院没有管辖权，富世公司的起诉应予驳回。原审法院适用法律正确，应予维持。至于内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司答辩中所称，内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司和内蒙古黄河化工集团公司是两个各自独立的法人一节，因被上诉人已经以自己的名义应诉且从未在原审法院审理过程中提出此项异议，也没有对已列其为被告的原审裁定提出上诉，因此本院对此不再予以审查。而且上诉人的起诉既已被本院驳回，则被上诉人（原审被告）的任何权益都将不受本案影响。
本院依据《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》第38条、第151条、第154条、第158条的规定，裁定如下:
驳回上诉，维持原裁定。
二审案件受理费50元，由上诉人香港富世国际集团有限公司负担。
本裁定为终审裁定。
审判长 王 玧
代理审判员 杨兴业
代理审判员 陈纪忠
二〇〇五年二月四日
书记员 梁 颖
案例评析
本案是一例典型的因仲裁协议存在而排除法院管辖的案例。本案中上诉人香港富世国际集团有限公司与被上诉人内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司签订合资合同，并在合同中约定“凡因执行本合同所发生的或与本合同有关的一切争议，双方应通过友好协商解决；如果协商不能解决，应提交中国北京中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会，根据该会的仲裁程序暂行规则进行仲裁”的条款。这意味着仲裁协议作为已经有效存在。
后因合同履行过程中就承包利润款产生争议，原告香港富世国际集团有限公司将被告内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司诉至法院，请求偿还所述承包费。被告内蒙古黄河化工集团有限责任公司答辩称承包合同第四条的约定意味着合资合同关于争议解决方式的约定同样适用于解决承包合同的争议，即通过仲裁方式解决争议。
法院最后判定对于有关本案合资合同和承包合同的争议，人民法院没有管辖权。
[1]赵秀文:《国际商事仲裁法原理与案例教程》，法律出版社2010年版，第88页。
[2]赵秀文:《国际商事仲裁法原理与案例教程》，法律出版社2010年版，第89页。
[3]赵秀文:《国际商事仲裁案例解析》，中国人民大学出版社2005年版，第47页。
[4]莫斯科工商会MOSCOW CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY，地址位于22，AC.PILUGIN STR.，117393，MOSCOW，RUSSIA，是现今俄罗斯四个大型商会组织之一。商会的职能:工商会积极参加国际经济机构，如国际商会、国际贸易中心、博览会国际事务局、国际博览会联盟、世界贸易中心联合会等的业务活动。工商会每年在国外举办20至25个展览会（包括参加国际博览会）。在专利方面，工商会向接受专利的60个国家的3500家企业提供服务，工商会每年委托340个商品检验局和苏联境内的280个城市、港口、国境车站的专家小组，进行150万件商品的检验。近年来，苏联（现俄罗斯）工商会在情报和翻译方面的业务也大大增加，大部分这种业务是在工商会分会的对外贸易和海事仲裁委员会、法务局、商船和海事法局、工业所有权和市场局等部门进行处理。