(七)法治
目的解释将法治[107]纳入考量范围。法治是一个复杂的概念。[108]鲁宾斯坦正确地指出“很少有概念被如此频繁地使用,也很少有概念像法治一样难以被理解。”[109]要理解这个概念,我们应该区分它的三个主要本质:形式法治、法理法治和实体法治。法治的这三个本质具有重叠的部分。然而,在对法律进行解释时,它们之间存在巨大差异。如对形式法治可以这样理解:
国家的每个人——个人、公司和国家机关——都必须依法行事,非法活动必须得到社会的有组织的制裁。从这个意义上讲,法治具有双重含义,既涉及规则的合法性,也涉及法治。这是一个形式的原则,它不针对法律的内容,而是针对法律制裁的需要,无关乎内容本身。这种意义上的法治与政权标准无关,与公共秩序的原则相关。[110]
形式法治无助于我们构建恰当的解释理论。每一套解释理论,一旦被采纳和尊重,必须对解释后的法律实施有帮助。目的解释使用目的推定的方式将法治要求转化为解释原则。
(编辑:吴冬兴)
【注释】
[1]阿哈龙·巴拉克(Aharon Barak),以色列前最高法院院长。本文来源:Purposive Interpretation in Law,Princeton University Press,2005,pp.218-243。已获得普林斯顿大学出版社授权翻译成中文。
[2]潘璐,上海人,华东政法大学刑法学博士研究生,研究方向为刑法学。
[3]H.Kelsen,General Theory of Norms130(M.Hartney trans.,1991).
[4]C.Sunstein,“Five Theses on Originalism”,19 Harv.J.L.&Pub.Pol’y 311(1996).
[5]J.W róblewsk,The Judicial Application of Law 108(1992).根据作者观点,“解释的规范理论”可以解答解释中存在的所有疑问。
[6]W.Eskridge and Frickey,Dynamic Statutory Interpretation(1994).
[7]D.Hermann,“Phenomenology,Structuralism,Hermeneutics,and Legal Study:Applications of Contempora-ry Continental Thought to Legal Phenomena,”36 U.Miami L.Rev.379,402(1982).
[8]文本有时也包含了对目的的申明条款。然而对这些申明条款也同样需要进行解释。
[9]R.Posner,LawandLiterature209(1998修订版).同样参见A.Vermeule, “Interpretive Choice,”75N.Y.U.L.Rev.74,82(2000)(解释者应当对法律解释的目的和目标尽了解义务)。
[10]D.Brink, “Legal Theory,Legal Interpretation,and Judicial Review,”17 Phil.and Pub.Aff.105,125(1988).
[11]该观点从法的社会学视角出发。参见R.Pound,“Mechanical Jurisprudence,”8 Colum.L.Rev.605(1908);R.Pound,“A Survey of Social Interests,”57 Harv.L.Rev.1(1943).但该观点并不是社会学视角独有的观点。大部分法理学学者都认为法律扮演着一种角色,虽然不同法律体系对角色的定位各不相同。参见J.Harris,Legal Philosophies237(1980);W.Friedmann,Law in a Changing Society(2d ed.1972);R.Summers,Law:Its Nature,Functions and Limits440(2d ed.1972);R.Summers,Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory(1982);J.Stone,The Province and Function of Law(1946)。
[12]J.Raz,The Authority of Law 163(1979);R.Wasserstrom,The Judicial Decision 10(1961);S.J.Burton,An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 107(1985).
[13]该观点是耶林对法理学所做的突出贡献。参见R.Jhering,The Law as a Means to an End(Husik trans.,1914)。
[14]F.H.C.4601/95,supra p.159,note 36 at 826.
[15]R.Summers,“Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought—A Synthesis and Cri-tique of Our Dom inant General Theory about Law and Its Use,”66 Cornell L.Rev.861(1981).
[16]针对功利主义法学派的争论,参见Harris,supra p.221,note 9 at36.See also R.Posner,Economic Analysisof Law(5th ed.1998)。
[17]关于法律的历史沿革,参见Harris,supra p.221,note 9 at 219。
[18]或许折中观点本身就被视作哲学发展的一部分?参见J.Hall,“Integrative Jurisprudence,”in Interpretation ofModern Legal Philosophies:Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound 313(P.Sayre ed.,1947);H.Berman,“Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence:Politics,Morality,History,”76 Cal.L.Rev.779(1988)。
[19]E.Patterson,Jurisprudence:Men and Ideas of the Law 556,557(1953).
[20]对于通过何种途径能够使法律实现自身目的这一命题,仍然存在争议(包括提供救济、施加刑罚以及订立行政契约),参见H.Kelsen,“The Law asa Specific Social Technique,”9 U.Chi.L.Rev.75(1941);R.Summers,“The Technique Element in Law,”59 Cal.L.Rev.733(1971).
[21]J.Kohler,“Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law,”in Science of Legal Method 187(E.Bruncken andL.Register trans.,1917).
[22]G.Gottlieb,The Logic of Choice 106(1968);G.Hassold,“Strukturen der Gesetzesauslegung”Festschrift furKarl Larenz 232(1983).
[23]G.Tedeschi,“Al Hadin Hadispositivi[On Dispositive Law],”15 Iyunei Mishpat 5,8(1990).
[24]Hart and Sachs,The Legal process:Basic Problem in the Making and Application of Law 1124(W.Eskridgeand P.Frickey eds.1994).
[25]Llewellyn,supra p.172,note 102 at 400:“一条法条并不仅仅只设定了规则,不具有目的的法条没有存在的价值。”
[26]如迪克逊书中所写:“非常坦率地说,《加拿大人权与自由宪章》是裹有目的权利法案。它的目的是在原因所限范围内,保护和保障宪章所载的权利和自由。Hunter v.Southern,Inc.[1984]2 S.C.R.145,156。
[27]Peczenik,On Law and Reason 406(1989).
[28]M.Radin,“Statutory Interpretation,”43 Harv.L.Rev.863,870(1930).
[29]关于“具体的意图”和“唯结果论的意图”的概念,参见本书第126页。
[30]参见,e.g.,J.Frank,“Words and Music:Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,” 47 Col-um.L.Rev.1259(1947).对该文献的评论,参见K.Greenawalt,“Variation on Some Themes of a‘Disporting Gazelle’and His Friend:Statutory Interpretation As Seen by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter,”100 Colum.L.Rev.176(2000)。
[31]参见W.D.Popkin,Statutes in Court 145(1991)。
[32]M Radin,“A ShortWay w ith Statutes,”56 Harv.L.Rev.388,400(1942).
[33]Llewellyn,supra p.172,note 102 at 400.同样参见J.Breen,“Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons ofLlewellyn,”33 Loy.L.A.L.Rev.263(2000)(卢埃林坚信法律文本的语义和针对文本的解释都是裹有思想上的目的性)。
[34]针对实证法学的讨论,参见B.Bix,Jurisprudence 31(2d ed.1999)。
[35]H.Kelsen,Pure Theory of Law 348(Knight trans.,1967)(1934).
[36]S.Paulson,“Kelsen on Legal Interpretation,”10 Leg.Stud.136(1990);C.Luzzati,“Discretion and‘Indeterm inacy’in Kelsen's Theory of Legal Interpretation,”in Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory:A Diachronic Point ofView 123(L.Gianformaggio ed.,1990);P.Chiassoni,“Legal Science and Legal Interpretation in the Pure Theory of Law,”in Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory 63(L.Gianformaggio ed.1990).
[37]H.L.A Hart,The Concept of Law 124(2s.ed.1994).
[38]P.Schlag,“No Vehicles in the Park,”23 Seattle U.L.Rev.381(1999).
[39]Hart,The Concept of Law at127,129,204;H.L.A.Hart,“Positivism and the Separation of Law and Mor-als,”71 Harv.L.Rev.593(1958).
[40]L.Fuller,“Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart,”71 Harv.L.Rev.630(1958).
[41]H.L.A.Hart,Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 8(1983).
[42]麦考密克的观点与哈特相似。参见D.N.MacCormick,Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory 202(1978);D.N.MacCorm ick and O.Weinberger,An Institutional Theory of Law 201(1986);D.N.MacCorm ick,“On‘Open Texture’in Law,”in Controversies about Law's Ontology 72(P.Amselek and D.N.MacCormick ed.1991)。
[43]J.Raz,“Intention in Interpretation,”in The Autonomy of Law:Essays on Legal Positivism 249(R.P.Georged.1996).
[44]A.Marmor,“KavanatHam ichokek Visamchut Hachok[Legislative Intentand Statutory Authority],”16 IyuneiM ishpat 593(1991);A.Marmor,Interpretation and Legal Theory(1992).
[45]关于拉兹的成文法解释理论,参见J.Raz,“On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions:Some Pre-lim inaries,”in L.Alexander(ed.),Constitutionalism:Philosophical Foundations 152(1998)。
[46]H.Hart and A.Sachs,The Legal Process:Basic Problems in the Making and application of Law 1374(1994). 富勒教授对程序法学的发展也颇具贡献。参见L.Fuller,The Law in Quest of Itself(1940);L.Fuller,“The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,”62 Harv.L.Rev.616(1949);L.Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,”92 Harv.L.Rev.353(1978)。
[47]H.Hart and A.Sachs,The Legal Process:Basic Problems in the Making and application of Law 1374(1994)(法律是一种带有目的性的活动,始终为解决社会基本问题而做出坚持不懈的努力)。
[48]就司法审判程序中的目的诠释,参见Popkin,Statues in Court147(1991).就格里纳沃尔特对该论文的评论,参见Greenawalt,K.Greenawalt,“Variation on Some Themes of a‘Disporting Gazelle’and His Friend:Statutory Interpretation as Seen by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter,”100 Colum.L.Rev.176(2000)。
[49]Hart and Sachs,H.Hart and A.Sachs,The Legal Process:Basic Problems in the Making and application of Law 1124.
[50]V.Wellman,“Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition:The Legacy of Hart and Sacks,”29 Ariz.L.Rev.443,462(1987).
[51]R.Dworkin,Freedom's Law:The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 291(1996).德沃金对包含解释的立法观念及不包含解释的立法观念进行了区分,参见R.Dworkin,AMatter ofPrinciple 39(1985)。
[52]R.Dworkin,Freedom's Law:The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 10(1996).
[53]R.Dworkin,“Comment,”in A.Scalia,A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law 116-17(1997).同样参见R.Dworkin,“The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:Originalism,Scalia,Tribe,and Nerve,”65 Fordham L.Rev.1249(1997)。(https://www.daowen.com)
[54]Dworkin,“Comment,”A Matter of Interpretation:Federal Courts and the Law 118(1997).
[55]L.Kaplow and S.Shavell,“Economic Analysis of Law,”in A.J.Auerbach and M.Feld-stein,Handbook ofPublic Economics(1985);A.Katz,“Contract Formation and Interpretation”in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary ofEconomics and the Law 425(P.Newman ed.1998).
[56]E.Zamir,Perush Hashlama Shel Chozim[Interpretation and Completion of Contracts]1789(1996);Posner,Economic Analysis of law 93.同样参见A.Schwartz“Justice and the Law of Contract:A Case for the Traditional Approach,”9 Harv.J.L.&Pub.Pol’y 107(1986)。
[57]Zamir,supra p.15,note 39 at 1789-90.
[58]参见本书第36页。
[59]W.D.Popkin,Statutes in Court 159(1991).
[60]F.Easterbrook,“Statute's Domain,”50 U.Chi.L.Rev.533,540(1983).
[61]该观点参考伽达默尔对解释学角度的相关论述,同样参见W.Eskridge,“Gadamer/Statutory Interpreta-tion”。
[62]在此处,目的解释也同样采纳原旨主义。
[63]参见本书第136页。
[64]O.Fiss,“Objectivity and Interpretation,”34 Stan.L.Rev.739(1982);O.Fiss,“Conventionalism,”58 S.Cal.L.Rev.177(1985).
[65]W.Eskridge,“Dynam ic Statutory Interpretatin,”135 U.Pa.L.Rev.1479,1482(1987).
[66]参见本书第56页。
[67]参见本书第60页。
[68]L.H.Hoffman,“The Intolerable W restle w ith Words and Meanings,”114 S.A.L.J.656(1997).
[69]Patterson,Jurisprudence:Men and Ideas of the Law 29-30(1953).
[70]参见Rubenfeld,“Reading the Constitution as Spoken,”104 Yale L.J.1119(1995)。
[71]J.Mashaw,“As If Republican Interpretation,”97 Yale L.J.1685,1686(1988).同样参见J.Schacter,“Metademocracy:The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,”108 Harv.L.Rev.593(1995); J.corry,“Administrative Law and Interpretation of Statutes,”V U.Toronto L.J.286(1935-36).同样参见Redish and Chung,“Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:Mourning the Death ofOriginalism in Statutory Interpretation,”68 Tul.L.Rev 847(1994)。
[72]关于法官在民主制度中的职责,参见A.Barak,“Foreword:The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,” 116 Harv.L.Rev.16(2002)。
[73]笔者并非断言其他法律解释方法不合宪。如果某法条的存在是为了解释立法,那么该法条必然合宪。参考Rosenkranz,supra p.49,note 159.笔者相对狭义地认为宪法理论始终支持适用目的解释。
[74]R.Fallon,“How to Choose a Constitutional Theory,”87 Cal.L.Rev.537(1999).
[75]R.A.Dahl,On Democracy(1998).
[76]R.Dworkin,A Bill ofRights for Britain 33.35(1990).
[77]参见本书第249页。
[78]B.McLachlin,“The Role of the Supreme Court in a New Democracy”(unpub.2001);M.Kirby,“AustralianLaw——A fter 11 September 2001,”21 Austl.Bar Rev.21(2001);A.Mason,“A Bill of Rights for Australia?”5 Austl.Bar Rev.79(1989).
[79]B.Ackerman,“Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,”99 Yale L.J.453(1989).
[80]关于司法审查与合宪性解释之间的关系,参见Rubenfeld,supra p.162,note 46。
[81]C.A.165/82,Kibbutz Chatzor v.Tax Assessor of Rehovot,39(2)P.D.70.
[82]H.C.73/53,Kol Haam Ltd.V.M inister of Interior,7 P.D.884(Agranat,J.).
[83]T.Sandalow,“Constitutional Interpretation,”79 Mich.L.Rev.1033(1981).
[84]Poe v.Ullman,367 U.S.497,542(1961).哈伦大法官特别提到风俗传统是宪法的价值的起源之一“既包括国家予以弘扬的风俗传统也包括国家不予认可的风俗传统。“
[85]参考本书第371页。
[86]E.Levi,“Some Aspects of Separation of Powers,”76 Colum.L.Rev.371(1976).
[87]H.C.306/81 Sharon v.Knesset Comm ittee,35(4)P.D.118,144-45,同样参见A.Feld,“Separation ofPolitical Powers:Boundaries or Balance,”21 Ga.L.Rev.171(1986).
[88]Myers v.United States,272 U.S.52,293(1926).孟德斯鸠将实现自由价值视为分权制衡的核心目的。参见C.Montesquieu,11 The Spirit of Laws209(Eng.Trans.,1977)。
[89]Farber,supra p.25,note 73;W.Eskridge,“Spinning Legislative Supremacy,”78 Geo.L.J.319(1989);E-.Maltz,“Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:Underenforcement,Overenforcement,and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy,”71 B.U.L.Rev.767(1991).
[90]C.A.481/73.Rosenberg v.Stasel,29(1)P.D.505,516.
[91]S.Smith,“Law w ithout M ind,”88 Mich.L.Rev.104,122(1989).
[92]J.Raz,“Intention in Interpretation,”in The Autonomy of Law:Essays on Legal Positivism 249(R.Georgeed.,1996).
[93]关于具体意图与抽象意图的区别,参见本书第126页。
[94]Peczenik,On Law and Reason 350(1989);Gebbia-Pinetti,“Statutory Interpretation,Democratic Legitima-cy and Legal System Values,”22 Seton Hall Leg.256(1997).
[95]R.Dworkin,VA Bill of Rights for Britain 35(1990).
[96]Mashaw,“As If Republican Interpretation,”97 Yale L.J.1690(1988).(司法解释与司法审查虽不完全一致但也所差无几。都是法院对立法活动进行的监督以避免反民主结果发生的活动。)针对这一观点的评论,参见Redish and Chung,“Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation”871。
[97]参见本书第236页。
[98]J.Brudny,“Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:Idle Chatter or Telling Re-sponse?”93 Mich.L.Rev.1,3(1994).
[99]J.Waldron,Law and Disagreement(1999).
[100]J.Waldron,The Dignity of Legislation 1(1999).
[101]其他关注法律及经济学的理论重视立法部门的作用,认为立法机构是最能创造社会财富的部门。R.Posner,Economic Analysis of Law 569(5th ed.1998)。
[102]Posner,The Problems of Jurisprudence 277(1990).
[103]参见Easterbrook,“Statute's Domain,”50 U.Chi.L.Rev.547(1983).(尽管立法者存有自身的愿望、优先项和偏好,但也无法据此结合形成协调的判断。)同样参见F.Easterbrook,“The Supreme Court,1983 Term——
[104]C.Sunstein,“The Republican Civic Tradition:Beyond the Republic Revival,”97 Yale L.J.1539(1988).
[105]Hart and Sachs,The Legal Process:Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1378.
[106]W.Blatt,“Interpretive Communities:The M issing Element in Statutory Interpretation,”95 Nw.U.L.Rev.629(2000).
[107]R.Cass,The Rule of Law in America(2001);P.Craig,“Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule ofLaw:An Analytical Framework,”[1997]Pub.L.467.
[108]R.Fallon,“‘The Rule of Law’as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,”97 Colum.L.Rev.1(1997).
[109]A.Rubinstein,Constitutional Law of Israel 227(5th ed.1996).
[110]H.C.428/86 Barzilai v.State of Israel,40(3)P.D.621.同样参见A.Scalia,“The Rule of Law asa Law of Rules,”56 U.Chi.L.Rev.1175(1989)。