结论和对未来研究的建议
在本文中作者提出了一个可广泛适用于证明法律价值评价和规范性建议合理性的论证范式。除非法学研究者能够准确、清晰地表达观点,并证明其对论点中每个环节所做的选择均是正确的,否则就不该轻易地作出法律评价和规范性建议。对此,作者未来将做进一步的研究,至少有四大类问题需要解决。
第一个问题是价值观的主要分类。相互冲突的价值观是不可共存的,抑或仅是难以对比?是否有可能分析出最重要的价值观?教义统一性、合法性等法律价值观何以付诸实施,其重要性若何?何以将根本的实质性价值转变为效率和效力?如何实现从价值观到具体概念再到特定评价标准的稳健跨越?
第二类问题是阐释型论文和推理型论文之间的差异性。推理型论文的论证逻辑是线型的。在法教义学、法哲学等奉行统一主义解释学的学科中,分析过程是在所有相关环节中要形成逻辑闭环。我们如何在阐释型论文中构建辩证分析的过程?能否为指导法学课题研究形成一个标准的论证范式?
第三类问题是该范式是基于一种无法实现的“充分论证”状态的理想概念。为提升该框架在指导实际研究项目方面的有效性,我们应制定合理的阶段性策略和论据获取捷径。上文已列举了部分策略实例,例如聚焦一个特定领域的规范性论证,适度进行有限的浅显评价。另一个策略是将法院判例和相关的分析评价等权威资料作为对教义学研究的重要补充。未来研究者还应继续聚焦对研究策略的论据获取捷径的探索。
最后一类问题是兼容性问题。为了提升立法建议的合理性,作者认为应尽量采用法学内部视角。这就意味着需要将其他学科的研究成果转化为能够适应具有不同视角、不同规范特征和限定条件的法律制度框架。这种整合在事实价值区分和跨学科融合方面又产生了不少新问题。
我们在使用这一论证范式时需要解决包括上述四类主要问题在内的诸多问题。作者对其他研究者在不久的未来重构一个较本文更为丰富、严密的论证框架保持热切的期待。
(编辑:吕玉赞)
【注释】
[1]维布伦·范德堡(W ibren van der Burg),鹿特丹伊拉斯谟大学伊拉斯谟法学院,研究领域为法哲学、法学理论、法学和伦理学研究方法、多元社会交叉学科研究、宗教学、犯罪防治法、政治理论、民主理论。原文发表于《法哲学社会哲学文汇》105(1),11-43-doi.
[2]孙嘉伟,男,山东威海人,华东政法大学助理研究员、政治学与公共管理学院博士研究生,研究方向为法政治学。
[3]Joseph W illiam Singer,Normative Methods for Lawyers,UCLA Law Review 56(2009),926.
[4]Sanne Taekema,Relative Autonomy:A Characterization of the Discipline of Law,in:Bart van K link&Sanne Taekema,Law and Method,2011,35-36 argues thatmost doctrinal scholars go beyond mere reconstruction of the positive law,and include two additional aims:namely critical evaluations and recommendations for law reform.See also Carel Stolker,Rethinking the Law School.Education,Research,Outreach and Governance,2014,215.Terry Hutchinson,The Doctrinal Method:Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law,Erasmus Law Review 8(2015)3,130-138 refers to the Australian Pearce Comm ittee that distinguished in 1987 between doctrinal and reform-oriented research.
[5]参见J.B.M.Vranken,M r.C.Asser's Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk re-cht.Algemeen deel.****Een synthese,2014,105;Stolker(note 3),208。
[6]Rob van Gestel&Hans-Wolfgang M icklitz,Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship,EuropeanLaw Journal 20(2014),302.
[7]Lee Epstein&Gary King,The Rules of Inference,University of Chicago Law Review 69:1(2002),9.
[8]参见Rob van Gestel,Hans-W.M icklitz&M iguel Poiares Maduro,Methodology in the New Legal World,2012(EUIworking paper),5。
[9]学者们也需要注意修辞学问题,避免通过带偏见的表述和有选择地列举材料去筛选例证。
[10]这表明如果法学院校要推出一个培养方案,他们也应该应该因材施教,教授不同的逻辑推理和研究方法。
[11]本文并不关注究竟教义学研究者的研究立场究竟是实证主义的、解释主义的抑或是自然法的。基于一些解释,法律实证主义者和其反对者争论的焦点主要是关于我们是否能够在无涉基本道德价值观的情况下定义和重构法律的内涵。哈特引用了奥斯汀的名言Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,Harvard Law Review 71(1958),596:“法的存在是一回事,它的优缺点是另一回事。”作者认为以奥斯汀和哈特那样引起实证主义者和其反对者间的争议是无益的。即使是自然法学家也能够区分这些问题。See W ibren van der Burg,The Dynam ics of Law and Morality.A Pluralist Account of Legal Interactionism,2014,65f;Dan Priel,Toward Classical Legal Positivism,Virginia Law Review 101(2015),989-991.分属于不同学派的教义学研究者都自称能以其独有的方式重构和表述法的内涵,然后他们又各自提出了这样的问题:因此了解了怎样的法的价值呢?
[12]在各种文章中,作者都倡导教义学、法社会学、法哲学研究者间的跨学科合作研究。See Sanne Taekema&W ibren van der Burg,Towards a Fruitful Cooperation between Legal Philosophy,Legal Sociology and Doctrinal Research:How Legal Interactionism May Bridge Unproductive Oppositions,in:R.Nobles and D.Schiff(eds.)Law,Society and Community.Socio-Legal Essays in Honour ofRoger Cotterrell,2014,129-145.这种合作是罗杰·科特威尔作品的核心思想,Roger Cotterrell,Law's Community.Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective,1995,Oxford: Clarendon Press and Roger Cotterrell,Law,Culture and Society.Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory,2006.See Cotterrell(2006),29:“法哲学和法社会学是法解释学共同事业上的亲密战友。”
[13]并不存在对某一问题唯一完全正确的答案。建议往往也包括两种甚至更多替代性方案,也并不总是需要概括性的理据。
[14]Brian Tamanaha,A Socio-Legal Methodology for the Internal/External Distinction:Jurisprudential Implications,Fordham Law Review 75(2006),1255-1274.
[15]Ray Pawson,The Science of Evaluation.A Realist Manifesto,2013;M ichael Quinn Patton,Qualitative Research&Evaluation Methods:Integrating Theory and Practice,2015;G.J.Veerman (w ith R.J.Mulder&E-.S.M.Meijsing),Een empathische wetgever.Meta-evaluatie van empirisch onderzoek naar de werking van wetten,2013.
[16]Hans-W.M icklitz,Guest Editorial.On the Politics of Legal Methodology,Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 21(2014)4,589.英联邦法学家争论,参见Terry Hutchinson,Researching and Writing in Law,2010;欧洲大陆法系学术界争论,参见Rob van Gestel,Hans-W.M icklitz&M iguel Poiares Maduro,Methodology in the New LegalWorld,2012(EUIworking paper)。
[17]M ichael Salter&Julie Mason,W riting Law Dissertations.An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research,2007;M ike McConville&W ing Hong Chui(eds.),Research Methods for Law,2007;Terry Hutchinson,Researching and W riting in Law,2010;Cryer,Robert Cryer,Tamara Hervey,Bal Sokhi-Bulley w ith Alexandra Bohm,Research Methodologies in EU and International Law,2013.
[18]参见Joseph W illiam Singer,Normative Methods for Lawyers,UCLA Law Review 56(2009),905。
[19]Jan M.Sm its,The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic,2012,41.
[20]参见 J.B.M.Vranken,Mr.C.Asser's Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk recht.Algemeen deel.Een synthese,2014,153-4 and 195-6。
[21]B.M.J.van K link&L.M.Poort,De normativiteit van de rechtswetenschap.Een pleidooi voormeer reflectie opde normatieve basis van het recht en de rechtswetenschap,RM Themis6(2013),260.
[22]参见Jules Coleman,The Grounds of Welfare:Fairness Versus Welfare.By Louis Kaplow&Steven Shavell,Yale Law Journal112(2003),1511-1543;Renny Reyes,Alessandro Romano&Cecilia Emma Sottilotta(2015),Regulatory Impact Assessment in Mexico:A Story of Interest Groups Pressure,Law and Development Review 8(2015)1,99-121。
[23]参见Jonathan Verschuuren(ed.),The Impact of Legislation.A Critical Analysis of Ex Ante Evaluation,2009。(https://www.daowen.com)
[24]Joseph W illiam Singer,Normative Methods for Lawyers,UCLA Law Review 56(2009),913.
[25]参见P.J.P.M.van Lochem(2015),Kwaliteit van wetgeving als keuze,in:Kwaliteit als keuze-kwaliteit(sbeoordeling)van rechtspraak,wetgeving en rechtswetenschappelijk onderzoek(Handelingen NJV),2015,141-242,esp.150-167;W illem J.W itteveen,A lternatieve regulering.De vele gezichten van de wetgever,in:Alternatieve regelgeving(Handelingen NJV),2007,1-66;W illem W itteveen,De wet als kunstwerk.Een andere filosofie van het recht,2014。
[26]Joseph W illiam Singer,Critical Normativity,Law and Critique 20(2009),27-42,31.
[27]Sanne Taekema,Bart van Klink&Wouter de Been(eds.),Facts and Norms in Law.Interdisciplinary Reflec-tions on Legal Method,2016,265-286.
[28]Joseph W illiam Singer,Critical Normativity,Law and Critique 20(2009),28.
[29]J.B.M.Vranken,M r.C.Asser's Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk recht.Algemeen deel.Een synthese,2014,37.
[30]Eveline Feteris&Harm Kloosterhuis,Law and Argumentation Theory.Theoretical Approaches to Legal Justifica-tion,in:Van K link&Taekema(note 3),255.
[31]Raymond A.Belliotti,Justifying Law.The Debate over Foundations,Goals,and Methods,1994,237.
[32]参见Giovanni Sartor,Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning,in:Jordi Ferrer Beltrán&Giovanni Battistta Ratti(eds.),The Logic of Legal Requirements.Essays on Defeasibility,2012,108-136。
[33]John Raw ls,A Theory of Justice,1971.On reflective equilibrium,see Norman Daniels,Justice and Justifica-tion:Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice,1996;W ibren van der Burg&Theo van W illigenburg,Reflective Equilibrium,1998.
[34]Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,1978,160;Marsha P.Hanen,Justification as Coherence,in:M ichael Alexander Stewart(ed.),Law,Morality and Rights,1983,67-92.
[35]http://www.sciencecartoonsplus.com/pages/gallery.php.
[36]John Raw ls,A Theory of Justice,1971,580.
[37]John Raw ls,A Theory of Justice,1971,20.
[38]作者认为,若所预设价值评价维度直接或间接与基本价值相关,则上述问题就能得到轻而易举地解决。判定良法的依据是某些基本价值究竟能够在多大程度上得以实现。
[39]Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,1978,103 and 134.
[40]Lon L.Fuller,The Morality of Law,1969;Joseph Raz,The Authority of Law.Essays on Law and Morality,1979,210-229;Jeremy Waldron,The Rule of Law as a Theater of Debate,in:Justine Burley(ed.),Dworkin and his Critics,2004,319-336.
[41]参见Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning,The Rule of Law.Definitions,Measures,Patterns and Causes,2014。
[42]Gustav Radbruch(1950[orig.1932],Legal Philosophy,in:The Legal Philosophies of Lask,Radbruch,and Dabin,(ed.E.W.Paterson〈1950〉,K.W ilk transl.),1950,109-112;Sanne Taekema,The Concept of Ideals in Legal Theory,2003,181-183.
[43]这并不意味着学术研究毫无底线和边界,即使是冲突的价值观也必须符合形式理性。
[44]参见Nicola Lacey,Contingency,Coherence,and Conceptualism:Reflections on the Encounter between“ Critique”and“the Philosophy of the Criminal Law”,in:Philosophy and the Criminal Law.Principle and Critique(ed.Antony Duff),1998。
[45]Ray Pawson,The Science Of Evaluation.A Realist Manifesto,2013,81.
[46]富勒提出的法律基本原则之一就是跨越时间的长期相对稳定性。
[47]Jan M.Sm its,The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic,2012.
[48]Peter Cane,Responsibility in Law and Morality,2002;Eric Tjong Tjin Tai,Duties of Care and Ethics of Care:A Case Study in Law and Ethics,in Van Klink&Taekema,329-340;and W ibren van der Burg,Law and Ethics:The Tw in Disciplines,in:Van Klink&Taekema,175-194.
[49]参见Ray Pawson,The Science Of Evaluation.A Realist Manifesto,2013。
[50]参见Ray Pawson,The Science OfEvaluation.A Realist Manifesto,2013.帕森认为,无论是经验主义法学,抑或是规范主义法学,学者都不能超越合理假设的认知基础。
[51]Lee Epstein&Gary King,The Rules of Inference,University of Chicago Law Review 69:1(2002),47-48.
[52]Lee Epstein&Gary King,A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship:A Reply,University ofChicago Law Review 69(2002),191-209.
[53]United States v.W indsor,570(2013).